Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BUENOSAIRES1347, ARGENTINA ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, JULY 6 -

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BUENOSAIRES1347.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BUENOSAIRES1347 2007-07-13 19:09 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1347/01 1941909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131909Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8629
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 6344
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6209
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1342
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL 4748
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 2105
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1872
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0138
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1404
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6573
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0963
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0572
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 3409
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR CLAY LOWERY, NANCY LEE, AJEWEL, WBLOCK, LTRAN 
NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS, ROD HUNTER 
PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR RANDALL KROSZNER, PATRICE 
ROBITAILLE 
PASS EXIM BANK FOR MICHELE WILKINS 
PASS OPIC FOR JOHN SIMON, GEORGE SCHULTZ, RUTH ANN NICASTRI 
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/OLAC/PEACHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, JULY 6 - 
13, 2007 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1313 
 
1. (U) Provided below is Embassy Buenos Aires' Economic and 
Financial Review covering the period July 6 - 13, 2007.  The 
unclassified email version of this report includes tables and 
 
SIPDIS 
charts tracking Argentine economic developments.  Contact 
Econoff Chris Landberg at landbergca@state.gov to be included 
on the email distribution list.  This document is sensitive 
but unclassified.  It should not be disseminated outside of 
USG channels or in any public forum without the written 
concurrence of the originator.  It should not be posted on 
the internet. 
 
---------- 
Highlights 
---------- 
 
-- Central Bank (BCRA) tightens capital controls to avoid 
peso appreciation 
-- BCRA meets its monetary targets for sixteenth consecutive 
quarter 
-- GoA, unions, private sector agree to increase monthly 
minimum wage 22.5% 
-- GoA's intervention in private energy company MetroGas 
 
------------------- 
Banking and Finance 
------------------- 
 
BCRA tightens capital controls to avoid 
peso appreciation 
--------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) On July 5, the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) issued 
a circular (A 4687) to tighten capital controls in order to 
discourage capital inflows and avoid the peso from 
appreciating.  The measure, which generated much confusion in 
the market due to its complexity, seeks to discourage the so 
called "contado con liquidacion" (AKA "Blue Chip Swap") 
transaction, which investors use to avoid capital controls 
and arbitrage international and domestic exchange rate 
differentials.  The transaction generally begins when an 
investor purchases an Argentine bond (denominated in either 
pesos or dollars, but purchased with pesos at the local 
exchange rate).  The investor then transfers the bond to a 
foreign market (e.g. the U.S. or Europe) through EuroClear or 
some other securities settlement system, and then sells it 
for dollars at the international exchange rate.  The investor 
then gradually transfers the proceeds back to Argentina in 
denominations of less than $2 million -- circumventing the 
30% unremunerated reserve requirement ("encaje") to which 
capital inflows are subject as part of the GoA's capital 
controls -- and then converts the dollars back to pesos at 
the local exchange rate. 
 
3. (SBU) The point of this trade is to arbitrage the lower 
international peso exchange rates (caused largely by the 
GoA's existing capital controls) against the higher domestic 
exchange rate.  However, the result is a steady inflow of 
foreign currency, putting upward pressure on the peso.  The 
BCRA's new measure requires proof that the Argentine bond 
used in such a transaction has been held for at least 20 days 
in a foreign account.  In theory, this delay should raise 
exchange rate risks enough to discourage the arbitraging. 
However, in practice the participating banks and brokers are 
scrambling to determine how to demonstrate proof of the 
incoming monies' origins.  Post's market sources argued that 
 
the impact of the measure will be short-term, since investors 
will quickly find creative new ways to circumvent the 
controls. 
 
BCRA meets its monetary targets for sixteenth 
consecutive quarter 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The BCRA announced July 10 that it fulfilled its 
monetary target for the second quarter of 2007, the sixteenth 
consecutive quarter that it has met its targets.  The 2007 
BCRA Monetary Program targets M2, which is defined as cash in 
circulation plus private and public sector sight-accounts 
(savings and checking).  According to preliminary BCRA data, 
the average M2 level during the quarter was ARP 132.3 
billion, ARP 3.1 billion below the upper limit of ARP 135.4 
billion established in the 2007 Program, and ARP 3.4 billion 
above the lower limit of ARP 128.5 billion.  At the end of 
June M2 was above the upper band, and the average M2 level 
during the month was only ARP 1.0 billion below the upper 
limit. 
 
5. (SBU) According to local analysts, the BCRA achieved its 
M2 target by shifting public sector funds from sight accounts 
to time deposits (not counted in M2).  However, the BCRA 
appears to have attempted to disguise the actions it took to 
meet the target.  Its July 10 press release made no mention 
of the transfer of public funds.  Rather, it argued that time 
deposits increased at a faster rate (31%) than sight deposits 
(18%) in response to BCRA policy of increasing short term 
repo rates, which led to an increase of time deposit yields. 
However, the explanation is not consistent with market data, 
which show falling time deposit rates over 2007. 
 
6. (SBU) In its release, the BCRA highlighted that during the 
first half of the year it sterilized 80% of the monetary 
expansion generated by its purchases of foreign currency 
inflows (technically part of its reserve-building strategy, 
but in reality done to prevent the peso from appreciating). 
The BCRA faces a difficult task in meeting its M2 targets for 
the remainder of 2007, if it continues to accumulate reserves 
at the current pace.  The problem is that it is becoming 
harder for the BCRA to sterilize its interventions without 
raising interest rates on its main instruments -- Lebacs 
(fixed-rate) and Nobacs (variable-rate).  (Note: in the 
BCRA's July 10 auction, it was able to rollover only 60% of 
its maturities.  The BCRA received bids for ARP 677 million 
and accepted bids for ARP 626 millions, well below its 
maturities for ARP 1.1 billion.) 
 
---------------- 
Economic Outlook 
---------------- 
 
GoA, unions, private sector agree to increase 
monthly minimum wage 22.5% 
--------------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) The Salary Council -- made up of representatives of 
the private sector, the unions and the Labor Ministry -- 
agreed July 10 to increase by 22.5% the monthly minimum wage 
to ARP 980.  The increase will be implemented in three steps: 
 from the current ARP 800 to ARP 900 in August, following by 
an increase to ARP 960 in October, and a final hike to ARP 
980 in December.  The unions had originally sought a minimum 
wage of ARP 1,040, while business sector was offering ARP 
930.  According to media reports, GoA intervention convinced 
 
both sides to agree to the ARP 980 level.  The wage increase 
will benefit an estimated 420,000 individuals, roughly 3.8% 
of all wage-earners (including informal sector employees). 
 
8. (SBU) With this increase, the monthly minimum wage will be 
close to the total monthly cost of the basic good basket -- 
necessary to maintain a household of two adults and three 
children -- which "officially" (according to GoA statistical 
agency INDEC) reached ARP 923 in June.  However, according to 
Consultora Equis (a local think-tank) the basic good basked 
valued at ARP 923 in June is 10% undervalued and its "real" 
cost is ARP 1,011.  INDEC's undervaluation of the basic foods 
basked is a result of its manipulation of CPI numbers, which 
the GoA has carried out since the beginning of the year to 
avoid showing real inflation.  (Note:  INDEC reported 
inflation of 3.9% through the end of June, compared to 
private sector estimates of 8-10%). 
 
-------------- 
Energy Outlook 
-------------- 
 
GoA's intervention in private energy 
company MetroGas 
------------------------------------- 
9. (SBU) On July 6, the Economy Ministry's Secretary of 
Internal Commerce Guillermo Moreno, Argentina's notorious 
price control czar, instructed MetroGas' Director General 
Roberto Brandt, to reverse his decision to cut natural gas 
provision by 35% to MetroGas' industrial clients, including 
those whose contracts with MetroGas only allowed for supply 
interruptions under extreme circumstances ("contratos no 
interrumpibles con ventanas").  Brandt requested a written 
order from Moreno, as the 35% cuts were in line with earlier 
written instructions from the Secretariat of Energy's crisis 
committee, aimed at increasing natural gas deliveries to 
residential consumers.  Moreno responded by "intervening" 
MetroGas (taking it under State control), justifying his 
actions based on the GoA's "Mandatory Supply law" (Law 20680 
or "ley de abastecimiento").  Moreno argued that this law 
allowed him to intervene a company up to 180 days if it does 
not supply enough of a product to meet market demand. 
 
10. (SBU) Legal experts question the legality of the Supply 
law, but also argue that the Secretary of Energy and natural 
gas regulatory agency, ENARGAS, should have jurisdiction in 
this area.  Planning Minister Julio De Vido, who oversees the 
Secretary of Energy and ENERGAS, lifted the intervention only 
 
SIPDIS 
a few hours after Moreno had announced it.  MetroGas' stock 
price, traded in both Buenos Aires and New York fell by 
almost 10% following the intervention, but ended the day 
(after Minister De Vido's announcement) down only 4.2%. 
 
11. (SBU) While announcing the end of the intervention, the 
Ministry of Planning also announced that MetroGas 
shareholders had subsequently removed Brandt as Director 
General and replaced him with the second-in-command of the 
firm, Vito Camporreale.  (Note:  Consorcio Gas Argentino 
Sociedad Anonima, in which British Gas Group holds almost a 
55% stake, owns 70% of MetroGas, while Repsol-YPF owns the 
remaining 30%.  Brandt is said to have been appointed by 
British Gas, whereas Camporreale is a Repsol man.) 
 
12. (SBU) The Argentine press interpreted the MetroGas event, 
as follows: 
 
-- Evidence that the GoA does not have an agreed-upon 
strategy to deal with the energy crisis.  (Note:  on one side 
is Secretary of Energy Daniel Cameron, who supports dealing 
with the crisis with higher user fees.  President Kirchner 
and Minister De Vido (and, therefore, Moreno, De Vido's 
protege) strongly oppose this strategy.  Local analysts 
speculate that President Kirchner believes that having 
Argentine ownership of energy sector firms (e.g., Repsol's 
proposed sale of 25% of YPF to a local investor and 20% on 
the Argentine stock market) will help the GoA limit the 
impact of the energy crisis.  End Note) 
 
-- A struggle for power between the Secretariat of Energy and 
the Secretariat of Internal Commerce.  (Note:  The Argentine 
press has speculated that Energy Secretary Daniel Cameron is 
a possible replacement for Planning Minister De Vido if/when 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner is elected President in 
October.  End Note) 
 
-- MetroGas Director Brandt's removal is evidence of 
strengthening ties between the GoA and Spanish-owned Repsol 
(Note:  President Kirchner is rumored to have suggested 
Enrique Eskenazi, President of Banco de Santa Cruz, as the 
local party in the acquisition of 25% of YPF.  End Note) 
 
-- This could also be a means for the GOA to penalize British 
Gas.  (Note:  British Gas has taken Argentina to 
international arbitration under UNCITRAL rules, demanding 
$200 million in damages related to the GoA's 2002 currency 
devaluation.   British Gas rejected a GoA proposal to 
terminate the arbitration case in exchange for a 
re-negotiation of fees.  End Note) 
WAYNE