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RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0997/01 1970602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160602Z JUL 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1179
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SR
SUBJECT: DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION STILL POLITICAL FOOTBALL 
 
REF:  BELGRADE 785 
 
BELGRADE 00000997  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Special prosecutor for organized crime Slobodan 
Radovinovic has opened an investigation into the political 
background of late Serbian PM Djindjic's assassination in response 
to competing accusations between the LDP and the DSS over who bore 
ultimate responsibility for creating the conditions under which such 
a killing could take place.  This latest episode will have little 
bearing on the Djindjic legacy, but it is a telling statement of the 
continued willingness of political parties to use the media and the 
courts as political tools in the absence of developed political 
institutions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
LEGIJA SENTENCING OPENS NEW CAN OF WORMS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  One month after the Special Court (SC) in Belgrade handed 
down maximum sentences to the perpetrators of the March, 2003 
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic (ref), special 
prosecutor for organized crime Slobodan Radovanovic opened an 
investigation into the political background of the crime. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Radovanovic announced that he had formed a special working 
group to investigate whether or not criminal or political interests 
had a role in the assassination.  He vowed to arrest anyone found to 
have been part of any conspiracy associated with the PM's murder, 
highlighting that he would closely investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the illegal release from prison of a group of criminals 
from the "Zemun clan" who, with logistical support from the Serbian 
Interior Ministry's Special Operations Unit (JSO), later organized 
Djindjic's murder.  Radovanovic further explained that his office 
would investigate the 2002 JSO "mutiny" to determine if it 
constituted a political challenge to the state or was merely a labor 
dispute. 
 
¶4. (U)  A formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding 
Djindjic's murder has been a long-standing request of the lawyers of 
the Djindjic family as well as of Djindjic's two closest associates 
- Cedomir Jovanovic, deputy PM in post-Djindjic's government (now an 
MP and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party), and Vladimir "Beba" 
Popovic, businessman and former chief of Djindjic's communications 
bureau.  Jovanovic and Popovic have consistently maintained that the 
main instigators of the murder included PM Kostunica and his 
advisors.  In her public explanation of the verdict in the Djindjic 
case, Judge Mesarevic specified that the panel of judges did not 
take up the question of the political circumstances surrounding the 
murder, as requested by Djindjic's lawyers, as it was not part of 
the original indictment.  However, the judge encouraged the 
possibility of opening such an investigation and, if appropriate, 
convicting and sentencing individuals who might have ordered or 
inspired the crime. 
 
ANATOMY OF A CONSPIRACY: LDP VERSION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Djindjic's closest allies, led by Jovanovic and Popovic, 
claim that the critical predecessor to subsequent events, notably 
the coordinated anti-government media campaign run by Kostunica 
advisor (and current head of RTS) Aleksander Tijanic and, 
ultimately, Djindjic's murder, was the 2002 JSO "mutiny." For 5 days 
starting November 8, hundreds of heavily armed, uniformed JSO 
officers staged protests, including blocking traffic in Belgrade 
November 11.  The JSO demanded the replacement of top officials in 
the Interior Ministry and the State Security Agency.  This "mutiny" 
was characterized by then-FRY President Kostunica as "a regular 
protest of dissatisfied state employees in their everyday gear," 
though many analysts and journalists saw it as a direct challenge to 
the PM's authority, with Kostunica's toleration of the mutiny and 
refusal to call out troops to intervene seen as tantamount to 
support for the mutiny against the PM.  The incident ended with 
Djindjic accepting most of the JSO demands, including replacement of 
the director and the deputy of the State Security Agency.  Zvezdan 
Jovanovic, who fired the bullet that killed Djindjic, was an active 
duty JSO commander when he shot the PM, while Milorad Lukovic 
"Legija," who organized the assassination, was the retired 
commander-in-chief of the unit. 
 
ANATOMY OF A CONSPIRACY: DSS VERSION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU)  According to Radovanovic, the initiative for investigating 
the political background of Djindjic's murder came from information 
produced as a result of the indictment and arrests of several 
individuals connected with a tobacco smuggling affair.  In 2003, 
Serbian police opened an investigation, codenamed "Operation 
Network," of at least eight tobacco smuggling groups that were 
active in the Balkans in the 1990's.  Most of these groups operated 
under the patronage of Milosevic's secret service and their illegal 
profits were used for financing the regime and the accumulation of 
 
BELGRADE 00000997  002 OF 003 
 
 
personal wealth.  The "Network" file had been in cold storage until 
early June, 2007, when police arrested eight persons and issued 
international warrants for a number of others.  The most significant 
names that are still at large but connected with this case are 
controversial businessman Stanko Subotic "Cane" as a leader of one 
smuggling group (see bio notes at end) and Milosevic's wife and son 
Mira Markovic and Marko Milosevic as leaders of a second group. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Immediately after the arrests of Subotic's business 
associates, some media re-opened stories about his connection with 
Djindjic.  Former DOS Interior Minister, Dusan Mihajlovic, was 
identified by the media as the source who leaked information to 
Subotic on "Network" in 2003.  In response, Mihajlovic attacked 
Popovic, who introduced Subotic to Mihajlovic, and accused Jovanovic 
of using his influence to secure the early release from prison of 
members of Zemun criminal clan in November, 2002, just four months 
before they killed Djindjic.  Many of Serbia's main media outlets, 
including dailies Press, Kurir, Vecernje Novosti and even 
pro-government Politika, weekly Standard and NIN, and the public 
broadcasting service TV RTS have all given wide coverage to 
Mihajlovic's claims. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Four years after the fact, and with the perpetrators 
convicted, Djindjic's assassination remains a powerful weapon to be 
used by all sides in the intensely personal power politics of 
Serbia.  The democratic opposition (which includes many ex-Djindjic 
supporters and officials) saw the Legija conviction as an opening to 
pursue claims long held against the DSS and PM Kostunica for the 
role they believe Kostunica played in inciting the JSO to kill the 
then-PM. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The DSS, in turn, has used the fortuitously-timed 
re-opening of the "Network" case to launch a vicious media campaign 
against Jovanovic and Popovic, personal enemies of high-ranking 
people in the DSS (the "Network" investigation also implicates 
former Montenegrin PM Milo Djukanovic, another DSS enemy).  Some in 
the journalistic and analytical communities have remarked that this 
kind of media campaign resembles that against Djindjic and his 
government in 2002/03.  They note that the indictment for the 
tobacco smuggling operation was on hold for almost four years, and 
so far is directed against only two out of eight smuggling groups. 
It is also suspicious, they say, that despite the repeated requests 
by Djindjic's lawyers to expand the investigation of the 
assassination to include the political background, the special 
prosecutor initiated the investigation only after Mihajlovic accused 
Jovanovic of connections with the Zemun clan. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Tadic's DS, meanwhile, seems to be content to enjoy the 
show.  The DS is certainly unlikely to leap to the support of their 
biggest political rivals in the LDP.  Moreover, Tadic would be 
thrilled to have Popovic discredited, especially as rumors intensify 
in Belgrade that Popovic may be preparing to reveal "proof" that 
Tadic was an informer for the VBA while a prominent member of the 
student movement. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  It is unlikely that the investigation into the political 
circumstances surrounding Djindjic's assassination will produce 
concrete results.  Radovanovic's objectivity is questionable, given 
that he was directly appointed by the BIA and the DSS to replace the 
original Organized Crime Prosecutor, the extremely capable Jovan 
Prijic.  As so often before, this episode is another sad reminder of 
the willingness of political parties in Serbia - absent developed 
political institutions - to manipulate the courts and the media to 
act out personal vendettas.  Getting to the truth of the Djindjic 
case will remain secondary to using it to damage political 
opponents. END COMMENT. 
 
BIO NOTES: STANKO SUBOTIC "CANE" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU)  According to available open sources and media, Subotic 
started his career in the Paris fashion industry in the late 1980's. 
 With the assistance of the head of Serbian Intelligence Jovica 
Stanisic and the director of customs Mihalj Kertez - both close 
Milosevic associates - Subotic established in the 1990's a 
widespread cigarette smuggling ring involving Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Kosovo, and Croatia, with Serbia and Montenegro as final 
destinations.  This is the same ring that former Montenegro PM 
Djukanovic was allegedly involved in.  Part of the profit from the 
operation went to Stanisic, but Subotic also established good 
connections with the Serbian democratic opposition (DOS), especially 
with the Democratic Party and with people close to Zoran Djindjic. 
When DOS ousted Milosevic in October, 2000, and the state ceased its 
support for smuggling operations, Subotic legalized his activities, 
mostly through privatization of the two biggest chains of kiosks, 
which secured virtually the entire Serbian market of newspaper and 
cigarette distribution.  It is something of an open secret that 
Subotic generously supported both post-Milosevic democratic 
governments, Djindjic's and Kostunica's. 
 
BELGRADE 00000997  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
POLT