VZCZCXRO2266
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0991/01 1941641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131641Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1173
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1382
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO WEEKLY UPDATE: RHETORIC HARDENS AS A/S FRIED AND FM 
KOUCHNER VISIT BELGRADE 
 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: A/S Fried and the French Foreign Minister both came to 
Belgrade this week to offer an additional 120 days of engagement on 
Kosovo, but also to confirm to Belgrade that without an agreement of 
the parties, Kosovo will be independent.  Both men expressed U.S. 
and French eagerness to help Serbia in the aftermath of a Kosovo 
decision.  (A/S Fried's visit reported septel.) Both visitors 
received the same myopic response from Serbian leaders: Kosovo 
independence is unacceptable, illegal and will endanger Serbia 
continuing as a democratic state.  Meanwhile, Serbian leaders 
categorically and preemptively rejected the latest UNSC draft 
resolution on the grounds that it proposes talks with a defined end 
and based on the Ahtisaari plan.  The Kosovo Ministry is scrambling 
to corral the major political parties, including the Radicals, to 
agree on a renewed mandate for the GOS' Kosovo policy and 
participation in new talks on the basis of strict adherence to 
Serbia's "territorial integrity."  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
KOUCHNER VISITS BELGRADE 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) French Foreign Minister Kouchner met in a two day visit to 
Belgrade with President Tadic, Prime Minister Kostunica, Foreign 
Minister Jeremic and Deputy Prime Minister Djelic.  He also engaged 
with members of Serbia's intellectual elite and a group of young 
Serbians.  The French Ambassador said that Kouchner delivered three 
clear messages:  Serbia should accept the (about to be tabled) new 
UNSCR resolution allowing for a new period of negotiation; if at the 
end of that period, no agreement was reached, France will support 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan; and finally, France fully 
supported Serbia's EU future, but in order for Serbia to enter the 
Union, it must have resolved the Kosovo status question. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GOS reaction was as tiresome as it was predictable. 
Kostunica offered his standard legal argument to which Kouchner 
replied to Kostunica's chagrin that international law was not a 
static element, but had to evolve with realities on the ground. 
Tadic (supported by his foreign minister) argued his standard 
destabilization argument, along with his usual prediction of 
endangerment of Serbian democracy.  To these concerns Kouchner 
responded that Kosovo settlement along Ahtisaari lines actually 
added, not detracted from stability and that France's position was 
based on friendship for Serbia -- an assertion that went over about 
as well as our own comments along exactly those lines. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Kouchner's assessment of his conversations in Belgrade was 
that Tadic called anxiously for a Kosovo solution, but had nothing 
to offer.  Neither did his Foreign Minister or Kostunica. 
Commenting on Belgrade's rejection of a new UNSCR, Kouchner 
sarcastically noted that Serbia had asked for new negotiations 
without preconditions.  This resolution offered just that and now 
Belgrade wanted to add its own precondition that it would only 
negotiate on explicit reference to UNSCR 1244. In Kouchner's working 
lunch with Jeremic and working dinner with Tadic, he probed the 
issue of partition and received a clear no.  In his conversation 
with Belgrade's thinking elite, Kouchner received the strong message 
that Serbia needed the international community to decide Kosovo, 
since it was unable to do so. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The French conclusion from the Kouchner visit is that 
Belgrade is continuing to make steps in the wrong direction.  In an 
aside to the Ambassador, the French Ambassador relayed Kouchner's 
deep satisfaction over his strong relationship with Secretary Rice 
and France's determination to go forward with the U.S. if this final 
attempt fails. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a meeting with poloff on July 13, Kosovo Ministry State 
Secretary Dusan Prorokovic laid out the Ministry's next steps on 
 
SIPDIS 
Kosovo.  He said the GOS' redlines on any new talks are that they 
must have "no timelines, no Ahtisaari and no Ahtisaari plan as its 
basis."  Prorokovic assessed that there are "interesting proposals 
out there" including talks under the auspices of the Contact Group 
or a U.S.-EU-Russia joint framework.  When reminded that the GOS had 
agreed to Ahtisaari's appointment in the first place, Prorokovic 
said Serbia had done so "to show it was willing to engage" in talks, 
but that it had become apparent that Ahtisaari "had his mind set" on 
independence during the talks.  According to Prorokovic, the GOS 
does not wish to postpone talks but does want to delay a deadline 
for implementing a solution they don't want. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ministry's main task at the moment is to work with all 
the major political parties to come to an agreement on a new 
negotiating platform to be discussed by parliament on July 24.  On 
July 13, Prorokovic said they would be talking with the Radicals, 
 
BELGRADE 00000991  002 OF 002 
 
 
who want the parliament to include stated consequences to a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, and GOS policy 
towards countries that recognize it.  Prorokovic said that Minister 
Samardzic was trying to avoid such references as it limits GOS 
policy, and admitted that this was exactly what the Radicals are 
seeking to do.  He also admitted, however, that there are no major 
Kosovo policy differences between the SRS and DSS. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Ministry's ultimate goal for the upcoming parliamentary 
session will be to re-approve the negotiating platform and renew the 
mandate for the GOS to participate in negotiations.  The Kosovo 
Ministry, per the law on ministries passed in May 2007, would 
oversee the composition of the new negotiating team.  Prorokovic 
assessed that it would still include the PM and President as the 
chief representatives, along with the Kosovo and Foreign Ministers. 
Referring to prominent Kosovo Serbs who were on the previous team as 
"party representatives from Kosovo," Prorokovic was not sure they 
would be included and that he preferred "experts" on issues such as 
Gordana Markovic and Aleksandra Fulgosi (both for cultural and 
religious protection issues), Dusko Celic (on decentralization) and 
agreed the Orthodox Church would be involved "primarily through 
Bishop Artemije." 
 
 
OTHER DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) UNMIK:  Our Econ chief met on July 12 with Fayez Risheg 
(protect throughout), UNMIK Pillar IV representative in Belgrade, to 
discuss the status of economic issues between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Risheg used the opportunity to spin his doomsday scenario for the 
coming months.  He sees continuing EU reluctance to act without a 
Security Council resolution gradually dissolving as the current 
deadlock drags out over the next 12 months. The only realistic 
scenario then, in his view, would be a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Pristina, followed by rapid recognition by Quint, 
and insertion of an EU mission on request of Pristina authorities. 
The Serbian reaction, he argued, would be hardline, a shutdown of 
the border and ejection of UNMIK police and customs by Serb enclave 
paramilitaries, in effect, eliminating the ABL, moving the boarder 
south to the Ibar, and establishing de facto partition.  The Serbs 
would be happy to leave responsibility for the enclaves on the 
international community, he noted.  Risheg, who meets with Belgrade 
officials on a regular basis, believes this is the Serbian Plan B. 
 
¶10. (U) NATO: NATO Secretary General Scheffer arrived in Belgrade on 
July 13 for a one-day visit during which he will see the President, 
Prime Minister, Defense and Foreign Ministers and Chief of Defense 
Staff Ponos. 
 
¶11. (U) Russia: Local press gave widespread coverage to comments 
this week by Russian FM Lavrov who renewed his call on July 13 for 
more Kosovo talks with "independent international mediators." 
 
¶12. (U) UK: On July 10, a British parliamentary delegation visited 
the Serbian Parliament to acquaint itself with the relations between 
Belgrade and the EU and Serbia's Kosovo policy. They met with the 
Deputy Speaker Radoljko Obradovic, a delegation from the Serbian 
Parliament's foreign affairs and European integrations committees 
headed by MP Dragoljub Micunovic. 
 
¶13. (U) EU: According to local media the EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Olli Rehn warned in Strasburg that postponement of defining Kosovo 
final status at the UN Security Council "would not lead anywhere". 
 
¶14. (U) Slovenia: Local media reported Slovenian FM Rupel's July 12 
comments in London that Slovenia supports the Ahtisaari plan as "the 
only sensible option" for a multi-ethnic Kosovo. 
 
¶15. (SBU) COMMENT:  Kostunica's strategy this week was clear -- 
reject any development from the USG, the Europeans, or the UN which 
did not meet his very specific demand: talks without Ahtisaari, 
without end, and with 1244 in place.  Still, however, he seeks to 
assure the international community that Serbia is willing to engage 
constructively in a process to resolve Kosovo status.  By leaping 
out in front of Russia to reject UNSC resolutions before they are 
submitted, and by spurning overtures of goodwill from senior 
representatives from the USG and France, Kostunica has shown again 
that he is not serious about engaging on Kosovo.  Tadic and his team 
are equally unenthusiastic and in addition, unable, to carry a new 
Serbian position. END COMMENT. 
 
POLT