VZCZCXRO4563
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2494/01 2081630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271630Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2481
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR PROVINCE -- THEN AND NOW 
 
¶1.  (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. 
 
¶2.  (U) Summary.  Provincial government officials re-opened 
parts of the war-damaged Government Center in central Ramadi 
on July 26 amid signs of continuing security improvements. 
According to MNF-West records, there were 82 security 
incidents in the province for the week ending July 25, the 
lowest weekly tally since records began in January 2005.  The 
reduced level of violence compares to the 450-480 incidents 
typically recorded on a weekly basis last summer and fall. 
Today the city of Ramadi, a battlefield six months ago, is no 
longer under insurgent control.  Last summer and fall, 
provincial and municipal governments were non-existent or in 
disarray.  Today, the Provincial Council has returned to 
Ramadi, virtually every city and town has a mayor and a 
functioning local council, there are more police recruits 
than there are places to train them at the police academy, 
tribal leaders have come off the fence and openly cooperate 
with us, and public opinion has turned against Al-Qaeda. 
There is a mood of rising expectations for the better 
delivery of essential services.  A missing piece in our 
counter-insurgency strategy is the flow of GOI funds for 
capital projects.  Money is flowing, but not in amounts to 
meet needs or satisfy expectations.  End summary. 
 
Return to Ramadi 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) In a low key ceremony in Ramadi on July 26, Anbar 
Governor Ma,amoun Sami Rasheed and Provincial Council 
Chairman Abdulsalam Abdullah cut the ribbon on the reopening 
of the Provincial Government Center, a complex of a dozen 
war-damaged buildings in the center of the city.  The event 
marked the formal return of the provincial government to its 
official seat of power.  Provincial officials abandoned the 
center in March 2006 amid insurgent violence.  Members of the 
Provincial Council fled to the relative safety of Baghdad and 
many civil servants went underground.   For much of the past 
15 months, Gov. Ma,amoun has been virtually the sole 
official to venture to the Government Center, and that was on 
an irregular basis and while guarded by a company of US 
Marines. 
 
¶4.  (U) However, with the recent improvement in Anbar,s 
security, the functions of government have begun to return to 
Ramadi.  After a year,s absence, the Provincial Council 
began meeting in the city last March, convening in rented 
villas or at MNF-West,s Camp Blue Diamond on the city 
outskirts.  The directors general and other civil servants 
re-emerged in May.  In recent weeks, Gov. Ma,amoun has held 
staff meetings attended by some 30 directors general.  Such 
meetings could not have been held six months ago. 
 
¶5. (U) At the ribbon-cutting, Ma,amoun formally re-opened 
the war-damaged governor,s office building, now partially 
restored with MNF-West CERP funds.  Plaster and a fresh coat 
of paint hide the hole in his office ceiling caused by the 
impact of an insurgent mortar shell last December.  Later, PC 
Chairman Abdulsalam cut the ribbon to the Provincial Council 
temporary chambers, also renovated with CERP funds.  USAID 
contractor RTI purchased the furniture and equipment.  Some 
35 Council members were present as Abdulsalam called the body 
to order for its inaugural session. 
 
Decline in Violence 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The rededication of the Government Center took place 
against the backdrop of continuing improvements in Anbar,s 
security.  According to MNF-West records, there were 82 
security incidents in the province for the week ending July 
25, the lowest weekly tally since records began in January 
¶2005.  It was the second consecutive week in which incidents 
fell into double digits, and compares to the 450-480 incident 
rate typically recorded on a weekly basis last summer and 
fall. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Ramadi area itself shows an even more dramatic 
decline in violence than the province as a whole.  The area 
recorded only eight security incidents for same reporting 
period, compared to the 130-180 weekly incidents last fall 
and winter.  Since June 1, there have been at least 14 days 
in the Ramadi area where no security incidents were recorded 
at all.  Today the city of Ramadi, a battlefield six months 
ago, is no longer under insurgent control. 
 
Anbar Then and Now 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (U) The decline in violence is only one indicator in the 
generally favorable turn of events that has emerged in the 
past six to twelve months. 
 
BAGHDAD 00002494  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- Last winter Anbar,s provincial and municipal governments 
were non-existent or in disarray.  Today the Provincial 
Council has returned to the capital and virtually every city 
and town has a mayor and functioning municipal council. 
 
-- Last summer there were barely 4,000 police on the 
provincial rolls, recruitment drives were lucky to attract 
two dozen applicants, and several urban areas had no 
functioning police force at all.  Today, there are 21,000 
police on the rolls, the number of police recruits exceeds 
the available training slots, and every city and town has a 
functioning police force. 
 
-- Last summer many tribes were ambivalent towards the 
Coalition or aligned against us.  Today, tribal leaders 
openly cooperate with us and support Iraqi police recruitment 
drives.  Local residents who previously shunned contact with 
Coalition Forces today openly socialize with them. 
 
-- For the past several years, the criminal courts judges had 
ceased hearing major crimes cases because of insurgent 
threats.  But last month some 40 Anbari judges held an 
unprecedented conference in Ramadi and secured approval from 
Iraq,s chief judge to re-start major crimes trials. 
 
-- In the past, there was little financial and policy support 
from the central government.  GOI funding for capital 
projects was minimal or nil.  Today normal ties are being 
restored between Ramadi and Baghdad and ministerial spending 
is beginning to flow.  Anbar,s previous feelings of 
estrangement from the national scene have given way to a more 
pragmatic approach to dealing with Baghdad. 
 
-- Eyewitnesses say that in the past, Ramadi mosques spewed 
forth calls for insurrection.  Today typical Friday sermons 
dwell on traditional themes such as one,s religious beliefs 
and personal conduct.  The clerics have moderated their 
message.  In some cases, they took back mosques from radical 
preachers. 
 
Not Out of the Woods 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Nothing in this positive trend suggests that it is 
irreversible.  Al-Qaeda is still a present danger.  The enemy 
is looking for an opening and can strike.  In late June to 
early July, a force of some 100 insurgents sought to 
infiltrate the eastern part of the province, traveling from 
Salah El-Din Province, through Karbala, and around the 
southern edge of Lake Razazza.  Their aim was to assassinate 
tribal leaders and government officials in the Ramadi area. 
They were intercepted and destroyed by CF and Iraqi forces. 
Nonetheless, in general, the enemy has been pushed out of 
Anbar,s urban areas.  To the extent that Al-Qaeda is present 
in numbers, it is in rural areas and in the wadis. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Anbar,s story line has been picked up by the 
international press.  Al-Qaeda is on the defensive.  Public 
opinion has turned against it.  The tribes are mobilized to 
fight it.  Today Anbar is emerging from the long night of 
battle into a messy and still-dangerous transition period. 
But there is a mood of rising expectations.  As the violence 
abates, the public looks for the better delivery of essential 
services.  It wants jobs, economic recovery, and responsive 
government.  In a sense, those expectations themselves are 
evidence that public opinion has shifted from estrangement to 
getting on with the business of reconstruction. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) One feature of a successful counter-insurgency 
strategy is that the public must be made to feel that victory 
for the government side is inevitable and that the momentum 
of positive trends is irreversible.  The re-opening of the 
Ramadi Government Center is another step in that process. 
One key missing piece, however, is central government 
support.  The spigot of GOI capital spending has been turned 
on, but the flow is a trickle.  Funding is not flowing in 
amounts sufficient to satisfy needs or to meet public 
expectations.  Team Anbar has made great progress in 
brokering the reconnection of ties between Ramadi and 
Baghdad.  We are on it.  Getting the GOI to spend money on 
the recovery of a province that was recently a major 
battlefield would shore up the gains on security and deal 
another blow to Al-Qaeda,s dwindling power. 
 
Butenis 
 
 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002494  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
BUTENIS