VZCZCXRO5937
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHAK #1941/01 2111337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301337Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PRO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3187
INFO RUCNEXC/EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC NJOHANSON 
CBP FOR RWATTS, BPICKETT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA PARM TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH CUSTOMS TARGETING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
OVERVIEW AND AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION 
 
 
¶1.  Summary: Turkish Customs places great importance on 
accurate and timely targeting and risk management of 
shipments coming to, leaving, and passing through the 
Republic of Turkey.  Due to the high volume of cargo which 
does pass through Turkish Customs areas, Turkish Customs has 
been working to improve its targeting approaches.  US Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) recently conducted a second 
Targeting and Risk Management Workshop focused on land border 
crossings.  Following the workshop, CBP personnel held 
detailed discussions with Turkish Customs Headquarters 
targeters in order to gain a better understanding of the 
Turkish system and identify possible areas of future 
cooperation. 
 
Overview 
 
¶2.  Turkish Customs places great importance on accurate and 
timely targeting and risk management of shipments coming to, 
leaving, and passing through the Republic of Turkey.  Due to 
the high volume of cargo which does pass through Turkish 
Customs areas, Turkish Customs has been working to improve 
their targeting approaches.  While the systems currently 
being utilized by Turkish Customs are effective, contributing 
to over 2 tons of heroin being seized in 2006 and over 1 ton 
so far this year, Turkish Customs officials recognize that 
they can be improved. 
 
¶3.  Last summer, CBP conducted a sea port targeting and risk 
management workshop at the Port of Mersin.  This was followed 
up with a visit to CBP facilities by a high level delegation 
of Turkish Customs officials this past November.  The visit 
included a tour of the National Targeting Center and 
presentations on US methods.  This summer another targeting 
and risk management workshop was conducted in Ankara for land 
border targeting. Turkey has also been working with EU 
nations, specifically Germany and the Netherlands, to 
incorporate their ideas and practices. 
 
Targeting and Risk Management Workshop 
 
¶4.  US Customs and Border Protection Service conducted a 
Targeting and Risk Management Workshop for 24 Turkish Customs 
officials in Ankara from July 9 - 13, 2007.  The focus of the 
workshop was the targeting of shipments through a land border 
crossing.  Members of Turkish Customs Headquarters along with 
representatives from key border locations were in attendance 
at the workshop.  The course included a day of practical 
exercises at the inland clearance station in Ankara.  Initial 
feedback from those in attendance was that the information 
was very useful and will be valuable as Turkish Customs 
continues to develop and improve its targeting and risk 
management procedures. 
 
¶5.  Following the one-week workshop, CBP instructors 
conducted meetings and discussions with members of Turkish 
Customs Headquarters operations and targeters.  Turkish 
officials were open in their discussion of their policies and 
procedures in regards to Targeting and Risk Management. 
Turkish Customs currently conducts targeting for two distinct 
reasons: 1) Customs Enforcement - to stop the illegal entry 
of goods into the Republic of Turkey; 2) General Directorate 
of Customs - to ensure that proper duties are paid for goods 
which are shipped to Turkey.  These two systems work 
independent of each other, with a very small amount of 
information being shared.  While these two systems have been 
successful in the detection of violators, they incorporate a 
significant amount of duplicative man-hours and could be 
improved. 
 
Risk Analysis - Directorate of Customs Enforcement 
 
¶6.  The Risk Analysis Department of the Directorate of 
Customs Enforcement was established seven months ago.  Prior 
to the establishment of this dedicated department, risk 
analysis was conducted by the customs enforcement 
headquarters watch officer following a review of information 
submitted by the shippers.  Now this new department is 
dedicated to reviewing not only information contained on the 
submitted manifest, but also information on companies, 
drivers, and from other relevant sources.  The computer 
system which is being used to collect and flag shipments of 
concern is about 6 years old and utilizes information input 
by the border locations and headquarters. 
 
¶7.  The Directorate of Customs Enforcement utilizes two 
information systems to develop its list of high risk 
vehicles.  These systems are the Land Border Information 
System and the Intelligence Information System.  The Land 
 
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Border Information System provides basic information 
concerning the driver, companies, the product and other key 
information.  This information is screened against high risk 
criteria and provides a score.  If the score is above the 
allowable threshold, the vehicle is required to go through 
additional inspection. 
 
¶8.  There appear to be no standard rules for entering exam 
information and results.  Line inspectors may enter written 
exam results without the benefit of codes or a standard 
method, possibly leading to misinformation.  Results for 
negative exams are not always entered into the various 
systems.  CBP instructors commented that a significant 
historical data base and information can be gained from the 
negative exams as well as the positive exams.  This 
information can assist targeters in selection of the higher 
risk shipments, if a shipper has a strong record of negative 
results.  It was also noted that information not entered into 
the system was information that was lost for future 
evaluations. 
 
¶9.  The Directorate of Customs Enforcement also utilizes a 
vehicle tracking system for high risk trucks transiting 
through Turkey. This system utilizes a GPS tracking device 
being attached to the truck by a Customs official as the 
truck crosses the Turkish border.  The device provides a 
signal which is transmitted back to Customs Headquarters. The 
truck is then tracked as it proceeds through Turkey. 
Shipments that deviate from their intended routes are subject 
to additional inspections when they attempt to cross the 
border leaving Turkey.  The transmitting devices are then 
removed as the truck is processed out of the country. 
 
Risk Analysis - General Directorate of Customs 
 
¶10.  During meetings with members of the risk analysis 
department of the General Directorate of Customs, CBP 
instructors were given a presentation of the methods which 
are used to conduct risk analysis.  The process used by the 
General Directorate includes: 
 
a.  Information is currently being collected via paper forms 
which are manually input into an Excel database for storage 
and future review. 
 
b.  Individual targeters manually review the database for 
anomalies or other information which raise certain flags of 
concern.  The shipments that do become shipments of concern 
are then identified and this information is passed to the 
border location.  If the shipment has not already cleared the 
crossing, it is subject to additional inspections.  Because 
all reviews are done manually through the large databases, 
there have been cases where possibly at risk shipments have 
cleared the crossing before being identified by Custom 
Headquarters. 
 
c.  The database tracks inspections which uncover violations 
of Turkish laws or regulations but does not track negative 
inspections as reported from the field inspectors. 
 
d.  The database utilized by the General Directorate of 
Customs is not linked to any of the databases being utilized 
by Customs Enforcement. 
 
Suggested Areas of Future Cooperation 
 
¶11.  Improvements to the database storage and access.  The 
data which is being collected and stored by the General 
Directorate of Customs needs to be migrated from the current 
Excel files to a more modern database system.  CBP has 
developed a system which can access old databases to draw 
from this important historical information to assist in 
improving targeting.  If possible, a model or prototype of 
the US system could be shared with Turkish Customs which 
would greatly assist in their targeting procedures. 
 
¶12.  Information sharing is an important step in the 
targeting and risk management process. Turkish Customs would 
benefit from the linking of their targeting database 
information.  Information collected by Customs Enforcement 
officers could benefit the General Directorate of Customs in 
their targeting of shipments that are trying to elude taxes 
or tariffs.  Also, border locations would be able to receive 
one list of high risk vehicles which would allow them to 
focus more attention on the actual actions at the border 
location, which also could raise suspicions on a particular 
shipment.  CBP could provide additional information on the 
positive results of sharing of information and ways which 
 
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have succeeded in the US in improving results without 
diminishing authorities. 
 
¶13.  Collection methods for negative result inspections need 
to be implemented.  Turkish Customs now actively collects 
positive results information from inspections, however 
negative information is not collected.  This negative 
information is just as important as the positive inspections 
and needs to be collected and incorporated into historic 
files.  Turkish Customs would greatly benefit from assistance 
from IT experts in the development of databases which would 
allow easier collection and access to historic information. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON