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Viewing cable 07ANKARA1899, TURKEY: SOUTHEAST ELECTION RESULTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA1899 2007-07-26 06:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2753
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #1899/01 2070633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260633Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3124
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001899 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER OSCE TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  SOUTHEAST ELECTION RESULTS 
 
REF: ANKARA 1875 
 
1.(SBU) Summary:  The Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society 
Party's (DTP) success in gaining 22 seats nation-wide 
demonstrates the continued salience of identity politics in 
southeastern Turkey.  The ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), however, did unexpectedly well in the region by 
combining traditional powers of incumbency while 
simultaneously running against the Ankara military and 
bureaucratic establishment.  The AKP's success also suggests 
that most southeast voters want to turn the page on the 
confrontational, violent politics that have dominated the 
region for 25 years.  End summary. 
 
Two-Party Race in Southeast 
--------------------------- 
 
2.(SBU) As expected, the election in the heavily Kurdish 
southeastern provinces of Turkey was a two-party contest 
between AKP and independent candidates endorsed by the 
Kurdish nationalist DTP.  Twenty-two DTP-backed candidates 
won across the country, a respectable showing given the 
built-in barriers in the Turkish election system to 
independent candidates.  In the Southeast, however, AKP put 
in a much stronger than expected performance, nearly equaling 
the DTP vote in Diyarbakir, the most important Kurdish 
province in the country.  Main opposition Republican People's 
Party (CHP) was the big loser, surrendering all 14 of its 
seats in 12 heavily Kurdish southeast provinces.  The 
stridently nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was 
never in contention there. 
 
AK:  Party of Protest, Power and Faith 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.(SBU) All of our contacts credit the Turkey General Staff 
(TGS) web-site memo of April 27, which was interpreted as an 
attack on both AKP and on democratic institutions, with 
generating huge sympathy for AKP among Kurdish voters, who 
reflexively support parties that are willing to challenge the 
power of Turkey's "deep state."  Siyar Ozsoy, an aide to 
Diyarbakir's (DTP) mayor, told us that "People identify with 
those who face 'injustice' as most people think that they are 
experiencing different forms of injustice." 
 
4.(SBU) While playing the victim in the final weeks of the 
campaign, throughout its four years in office AKP government 
used economic tools to win over voters; for example, the 
government instituted a program of providing cash incentives 
to poor, rural families to keep their children in school, 
which resulted in significant supplements to many families, 
particularly those with many children.  Payments are also 
made to elderly citizens and those with sons doing their 
military service.  Some conservative voters also supported 
AKP for religious reasons, believing it can resolve the 
headscarf issue. 
 
Competition on Kurdish Issue 
---------------------------- 
 
5.(SBU) According to Diyarbakir Bar Chairman Sezgin 
Tanrikoglu, many now believe that AKP is capable of 
addressing their core issues of expanding cultural and 
political rights.  He noted that AKP vote more than tripled 
in Diyarbakir in the last five years thanks in part to the 
feeling that AKP is making sincere efforts at 
democratization.  AK Party chairman (and now MP) in 
Diyarbakir, Abdurrahman Kurt, advocates many of the same 
policies favored by DTP, but carries none of the PKK baggage. 
 Some AKP candidates spoke Kurdish regularly on the campaign 
trail, reinforcing the fact that their party is not part of 
the traditional Ankara establishment.  The on-going violence 
between the PKK and the military also hurt the DTP vote, 
according to Tanrikoglu.  In Diyarbakir, he said, many Kurds 
blame the PKK for the March, 2006 rioting and are losing 
confidence in DTP's efforts to achieve political reforms. 
AKP leadership also won sympathy in the final weeks of the 
campaign for refusing to sanction an incursion into Northern 
Iraq against the PKK despite intense pressure to do so from 
the media and elements of the military. 
 
DTP: Projecting Moderation, Worried About Rowdy Constituents 
 
ANKARA 00001899  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
6.(SBU) DTP's campaign focused on Kurdish identity, and 
played up Kurds' absence from parliament for the last 14 
years as the main issue.  While this message resonated with 
about half the voters in the southeast, it did not travel 
well, even to regions that have seen massive Kurdish 
in-migration in the last ten years.  In the view of 
Diyarbakir-based development worker Nurcan Baysal, DTP's 
inability to engage on economic issues hurt it, since poverty 
is the principal preoccupation for many Kurdish households in 
the region.  AKP mayors in bordering regions such as 
Gaziantep, were able to capture the votes of many Kurdish 
migrants through a combination of generous assistance to the 
urban poor coupled with moderate, inclusive cultural 
policies.  As a consequence, DTP was unable to capture any 
seats in the "near-east" migration destinations such as 
Adiyaman, Elazig and Mersin, though they have filed a 
petition protesting a close race in Adana. 
 
7.(SBU) Free-lance journalist Yilmaz Akinci noted that DTP's 
success is already leading to high expectations among their 
supporters; a number of PKK sympathizers have used DTP 
victory rallies to chant pro-Ocalan slogans and they will 
likely be demanding rapid progress on their top priority 
issue of winning amnesty for PKK fighters.  DTP's leadership, 
however, wants to project an image of moderation and has 
already promised to participate in parliamentary voting to 
elect a new president, a move that will be welcome news to 
AKP. 
 
8.(SBU) Comment:  AKP's unexpectedly strong win shows that 
"normal" politics detached from the vexed Kurdish issue is 
possible in the southeast.  While AKP showed respect for 
Kurdish sensitivities, its success stemmed mainly from its 
ability to deliver services and provide economic assistance. 
PM Erdogan's July 24 declaration that AKP wants to win the 
mayoralty of Diyarbakir would have been laughable a week ago. 
 Today it is probably an even-money bet. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON