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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI1599, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI1599 2007-07-17 09:20 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1599/01 1980920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170920Z JUL 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6021
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7034
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8280
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - BROOKE SPELLMAN 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  As the 2008 presidential election continued to remain 
in the spotlight of the Taiwan media, news coverage on July 17 also 
focused on a nationwide amnesty, under which around 10,000 inmates 
were released Monday.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a 
news story on page four with the headline "The United States Demands 
That Taiwan Abandon R&D of Its Offensive Missiles."  A separate 
"United Daily News" story also quoted a U.S. "Defense News" report 
as saying that the terms under which Washington will sell Taiwan 
F-16 C/D fighter jets is for Taiwan to abandon its development of 
the Hsiungfeng 2E cruise missiles. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a news analysis in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" discussed the upcoming trips to 
the United States by DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh and KMT 
presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou, respectively.  The article said 
both Ma and Hsieh not only will have to prove to their voters that 
they highly value the Taiwan-centered awareness but will have to 
pledge to Washington that they will not cross the red line drawn by 
the United States.  An editorial in the conservative, 
pro-unification, English-language "China Post" discussed an 
undeclared alliance formed by the European Union, the United States 
and China to thwart President Chen Shui-bian's plan to hold a 
referendum on Taiwan's UN bid under the name "Taiwan."  An op-ed 
piece in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," 
written by an Australia-based writer, on the other hand, urged the 
United States to "reorient its military policies lest China end up 
filling the gap by default -- as is happening in the Asia Pacific." 
End summary. 
 
A) "Diplomatic Battles between Ma and Hsieh Are a Condensed Version 
of the Blue and the Green Camps' Cross-Strait Policy" 
 
Journalist Lee Ming-hsien noted in an analysis in the 
pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (7/17): 
 
"Frank Hsieh is scheduled to depart for a visit to the United States 
this coming Friday, and if everything goes smoothly, Ma Ying-jeou 
will visit Washington again in September at the earliest.  The fact 
that both Ma and Hsieh are trying to promote and expand Taiwan's 
relations [with the United States] is in reality a typical skirmish 
prior to the 2008 presidential poll. ... 
 
"Ma had won high approval during his trip to the United States in 
March 2007, and his visit to the United States again this time in 
the capacity as a presidential candidate will naturally be viewed as 
a race with Hsieh.  In particular, the results of Hsieh's trip to 
the United States this time will become an important indicator for 
the Blue camp -- namely, the key to determine whether Ma's U.S. trip 
in September will help to boost his campaign lies in whether Ma can 
prove to [Washington] that he is capable of adopting a more 
pragmatic and open-minded approach in terms of cross-Strait 
relations, and of unifying and creating a consensus among the Taiwan 
people. 
 
"The fact that Hsieh's cross-Strait policy has become more 
conservative was related to the intense primary of the DPP.  Hsieh 
will have to indicate clearly his support for the referendum on 
Taiwan's UN bid in an attempt to avoid a backlash from the party's 
fundamentalists.  On the other hand, Ma proposed a referendum on 
Taiwan rejoining the United Nations in order to pander to the 
light-Green or even the nativist voters.  The two proposed referenda 
are basically a condensed version of the Blue and the Green camps' 
cross-Strait policy. 
 
"Washington, however, is concerned about whether in the subtle 
interaction among Washington, Beijing and Taipei, the fervent 
campaigning in Taiwan for the 2008 poll will result in a race of 
policies between Ma and Hsieh and thus trigger disturbances in the 
Taiwan Strait.  This is one of the reasons why Washington has 
invited Ma and Hsieh to visit the United States.  The diplomatic 
battlefield of both Ma and Hsieh is in reality their discourse on 
Taiwan's sovereignty, an issue that follows from the referenda on 
the island's UN bid.  Ma and Hsieh will not only have to prove to 
their Taiwan voters that they highly value the Taiwan-centered 
awareness, but will have to pledge to the United States that they 
will not cross the red line drawn by Washington, regardless of how 
intense the campaign gets." 
 
B) "Can the EU, U.S. Stop Chen?" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (7/17): 
 
"An undeclared alliance of the European Union (27 states), the 
United States and the People's Republic of China appears to be 
taking shape to thwart President Chen Shui-bian's plan to hold a 
referendum on Taiwan's United Nations bid alongside the island's 
2008 presidential elections. ...  The island republic is about to 
receive a stern EU injunction to act 'sensibly and responsibly' by 
 
scrapping a planned referendum asking voters whether they would like 
the island to seek membership of the U.N. under its historic name, 
the 'Republic of China,' or just 'Taiwan.' ... 
 
"America, which has many reasons to seek China's diplomatic 
goodwill, has publicly rebuked Taiwan over the referendum.  The EU, 
in contrast, will stick to private warnings for the moment, to avoid 
'playing into the hands' of Taiwan's 'populist' president, Chen 
Shui-bian, by giving him 'undesirable' publicity. ... U.N. 
membership for Taiwan is a long-lost cause, says the Economist, and 
Chen's referendum plan is at heart an electoral ploy ahead of next 
year's presidential poll.  Meanwhile, Taipei's United Daily News 
reported Sunday that Washington is so angry at President Chen's U.N. 
referendum plan that it has halted the sale of 66 F-16C/D 
jetfighters to Taiwan.  The U.S., an avowed defender of Taiwan, 
won't provide any ammunition for Chen, who will leave office next 
May." 
 
C) "China filling up Military Power Gap Left by US" 
 
Sushil Seth, a writer based in Australia, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (7/17): 
 
"While the US is over-stretched in Iraq and increasingly mired in 
domestic politics, China is systematically modernizing and expanding 
its military capability.  Its defense budget has seen double-digit 
annual increases in recent years.  It is working to develop 
anti-satellite missile capability, as well as a nuclear submarine 
fleet equipped with long-range nuclear missiles. ...  This has 
consequences not only for the US for the region.  China might not 
yet be ready to directly challenge US military supremacy, but its 
military capability will increasingly make it difficult for the US 
to confront it without serious costs.  In short, China's power is 
likely to progressively neutralize US military power. ... 
 
"In the Asia-Pacific region, China is increasingly seen with a 
mixture of awe and admiration.  Its rapid economic growth, its sheer 
size in economic and political terms and its growing military power 
appear to be overwhelming.  With much of world news concentrated on 
the perceived US debacle in Iraq and a sense of its declining power, 
China increasingly appears to be the new rising superpower.  It is 
no wonder then that more and more countries in the region are 
accommodating themselves to this new 'reality,' while ignoring 
China's enormous social, economic and political problems and 
contradictions that make it very fragile. ...  The US needs to 
reorient its military policies lest China end up filling the gap by 
default -- as is happening in the Asia Pacific." 
 
YOUNG