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DE RUCNDT #0481/01 1652138
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P 142138Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2066
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1345
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1112
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0165
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0844
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0087
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0282
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0616

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ADDIS ALSO PLEASE PASS TO USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ER ET SO UK UNSC PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: JUNE 14 SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON SOMALIA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1. (SBU) On June 14, Undersecretary for Political Affairs 
Lynn Pascoe briefed the Security Council in consultations on 
his recent trip to Mogadishu and to London, Addis, Asmara and 
Cairo.  While great difficulties remained, he believed that 
Somalia now had a "fighting chance" to regain stability.  But 
continued strong pressure and support from the international 
community was required. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The political process: this was the central element. 
The National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) needed to be 
inclusive (all clans and sub-clans and significant groups who 
renounced violence).  The NRC needed to be independent of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  TFG leaders had 
assured him they were committed to inclusiveness and were 
sending people out to talk to the clan and sub-clan 
leadership -- supported logistically in this by UNDP.  The 
presumption was that the NRC would address social, then 
political aspects of the situation.  Mr Pascoe was not 
distressed by the announcement that the NRC had been delayed 
until July 15, since contacts needed to be further pursued 
and facilities were not yet ready. However, Somalis needed to 
be told that the international community would not understand 
further delay. (The UNSC trip to Africa and the visit of 
Somalia's Prime Minister to New York would provide 
opportunities for further helpful pressure.)  The TFG 
 
complained of lack of funds for the NRC from the 
international community. Mr Pascoe noted that some of the 
funds had been conditioned in unhelpful ways: one sum was 
earmarked for the refurbishment of the meeting hall, but not 
to be spent until hostilities had ended -- not a realistic 
condition if strictly interpreted, given Somalia. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Security: Conditions were improving and the AU 
Special Envoy would shortly be posted permanently in 
Mogadishu.  Mr Pascoe thought that the Ugandans, the only 
deployed elements of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 
were doing a "good job" after a rough start.  They were now 
out patrolling, not hunkered down at the airport,and were 
gaining a reputation for evenhandedness.  But more troops 
were needed.  The Burundi contingent was next in line, but 
AMISOM needed money and logistical support.  Their mandate 
expired at the end of July, but even if a UN Peacekeeping 
Operation were to follow shortly, it would not be able to 
relieve AMISON before the end of the summer at the soonest. 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles had told him that Ethiopia 
wanted to withdraw her troops, but could not do so until 
AMISOM was properly deployed, and the AU Mission lacked the 
financial resources to complete its deployment at this point. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Humanitarian Issues: Mr Pascoe told TFG President 
Yusuf that humanitarian groups working out of Nairobi 
complained of TFG harassment.  President Yusuf replied that 
the TFG would not tolerate such moves, but humanitarian 
groups needed to understand that Somalia now had a government 
and earlier free-wheeling ways were no longer appropriate. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regional Implications: Stability in Somalia was 
linked to the larger regional issues, and in both Addis and 
Asmara Mr Pascoe had heard charges against the other's 
activities in Somalia.  Settling other regional disputes 
would also reduce meddling in Somalia. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In members' comments there was widespread support 
for maintaining pressure for political progress, for 
reinforcing AMISOM until a PKO could be launched, and for 
"early" deployment of a UNPKO.  No one spoke against the UK 
draft UNSC presidential statement which emphasized "the 
urgent need for appropriate contingency planning for a 
possible UN mission" and the PRST was therefore adopted. 
 
¶7. (U) Text of Presidential Statement approved June 14. 
 
The Security Council reiterates its previous resolutions and 
Presidential Statements on Somalia, in particular its 
resolution 1744 (2007) and Presidential Statement 
S/PRST/2007/13, adopted on 30 April 2007. 
 
The Security Council reiterates its support for the National 
Reconciliation Congress as a mechanism for much-needed 
political dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia. The 
 
Security Council calls on the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) and the National Governance and Reconciliation 
Committee to ensure that the Congress convenes as soon as 
practicable.  The Security Council appreciates the efforts of 
Member States and partners to support the early convening of 
the Congress and calls for further support. The Security 
Council underscores the importance of the Congress: 
- addressing the comprehensive and meaningful manner issues 
of political reconciliation, including representation in the 
Transitional Federal Institutions, and 
-  agreeing a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional 
political process, in line with the Transitional Federal 
Charter and as laid out in the Roadmap to Governance, 
National Dialogue, and Reconciliation in Somalia of 14 March 
¶2007. 
 
The Security Council expresses its grave concern regarding 
the recent pattern of attacks by extremist elements in 
Somalia, including the increased use of explosive devices, 
and condemns all attempts to use violence to undermine the 
political process and prevent the early convening of the 
National Reconciliation Congress.  The Security Council calls 
on all Member States to cease immediately any further support 
of extremist elements or those who seek to block progress by 
violent means, and to support ongoing efforts towards 
inclusive political dialogue. The Security Council recalls 
its readiness, as set out in its resolution 1744 (2007), to 
consider measures against those who block progress in the 
political process and threaten the Transitional Federal 
Institutions. 
 
The Security Council condemns the attack on the Prime 
Minister on 3 June 2007 and the attack on the forces of the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu on 16 
May 2007. The Security Council expresses its deepest 
sympathies to the families of the victims. 
 
The Security Council underlines its appreciation for the 
efforts of the Ugandan forces currently deployed in Mogadishu 
under AMISOM and Uganda's invaluable contributions to peace 
and stability in Somalia. The Security Council reiterates its 
call on Member States of the African Union to contribute 
troops for AMISOM, and on other States and partners to 
provide financial, technical and logistical support for this 
effort. 
 
The Security Council emphasizes the urgent need for 
appropriate contingency planning for a possible United 
Nations mission, to be deployed in Somalia if the Security 
Council decided to authorizes such a mission. The Security 
Council looks forward to receiving the report from the 
Secretary-General regarding progress in this regard by 
 
SIPDIS 
mid-June. 
 
The Security Council emphasizes again the need for 
strengthened efforts to provide humanitarian relief and 
assistance to Somalia, including assistance to the hundreds 
of thousands of displaced persons, urges Member States to 
support generously such operations, and demands that all 
parties ensure unfettered access for humanitarian assistance. 
KHALILZAD