VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTG #1112/01 1721820
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211820Z JUN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6205
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0563
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0479

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 001112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA/FO TSHANNON AND WHA/CEN JFEELEY AND BDOHERTY 
ALSO FOR WHA/PDA MPROCTOR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY OVER MANDATORY HONDURAN GOVERNMENT 
BROADCASTS FADES BUT UNDERLYING PROBLEMS REMAIN 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 923 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:   Honduran President Mel Zelaya decreased 
the number of government mandated broadcasts, which he 
originally ordered on May 23, 2007, from ten to three amid 
intense public controversy among broadcasters, political 
leaders, and civil society (reftel).  The government 
propaganda, initially planned for two hours a day for ten 
days, occurred just three times on May 28 and 30 and June 1 
for one hour or less each time.  The Zelaya Administration 
defended the broadcasts by claiming that the press was 
minimizing the President's accomplishments by 
sensationalizing reports on crime and violence and thereby 
discouraging economic investment and development in the 
country.  However, his three media appearances only addressed 
national telephone, energy, and tax related issues.  In the 
context of Chavez' actions against RCTV in Venezuela, most 
public attention was focused on the decision to require 
government broadcasts in the first place rather than their 
content.  In this determined attempt to confront "powerful 
centers" such as the media, the Zelaya Administration 
miscalculated public reaction in a losing game to gain 
popular support.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On May 23, 2007, President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya ordered 
private television and radio stations to broadcast a series 
of ten simultaneous broadcasts for two hours each from May 28 
to June 7 (reftel); however, under intense public scrutiny he 
later reduced the number to three shorter broadcasts.  The 
Zelaya Administration argued that the broadcast transmissions 
mandated by the Government of Honduras (GOH) were permitted 
according to a 1995 telecommunications law.  Although the 
National Commission of Telecommunications in Honduras 
(CONATEL) usually allows for only seven minutes of 
non-emergency government broadcasting at a time, CONATEL 
President Rasel Tome defended their legitimacy and argued 
they were not endangering any form of free speech.  Tome 
later announced that, if media stations did not air the 
complete broadcasts, they would face fines from CONATEL. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The first government broadcast on May 28, which was 
shortened to an hour in length, began with Zelaya's defending 
his decision to require the broadcasts.  Accompanied by Tome 
and Marcelo Chimirri, Acting Administrator of HONDUTEL and a 
self-described mafia type leader, President Zelaya then 
turned to problems at the state-owned telephone company 
HONDUTEL and answered questions from two reporters invited by 
him to attend.  The second broadcast on May 30 for half an 
hour focused on problems at the National Electric Energy 
Company ENEE.  The President was accompanied by Minister of 
Defense Aristides Mejia, Labor Minister Rixi Moncada, and 
Finance Minister Rebeca Santos, with questions from 
journalists friendly to the Administration.  The final 
broadcast on June 1, which also lasted for a half hour, dealt 
with issues at the Honduran tax collection agency DEI. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Foreign Minister Milton Jimenez, who may be the one 
behind Zelaya's media blitz, led a meeting with the press and 
diplomatic corps on June 1 attended by EmbOff in which he 
made further legal arguments as to why it was within the 
Administration,s right to require the broadcasts.  During 
the meeting, Jimenez mentioned a newspaper story covering the 
Taiwan, El Salvador and Honduras trade deal in which Zelaya 
was cut out of the picture with the other officials.  (NOTE: 
Jimenez recounted the same incident on June 18 in a live 
televised debate, which leads Post to believe that it was the 
catalyst for the media blitz.  END NOTE.)  Jimenez also 
criticized the "power centers" consisting of press owners 
such as Jaime Rosenthal, Rafael Ferrari, and Jorge Canahuati, 
who, according to Jimenez, manipulate information yet lack 
the status of elected officials.  Jimenez did not offer the 
other side of the story surrounding these issues, nor did he 
mention any other possible remedies that Zelaya could have 
taken. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Honduran television and radio stations lashed out 
against the national broadcasts.  The Honduran Journalism 
Association (CPH) and other media sources characterized the 
events as major impositions on free speech, infringements on 
private business, and breaches of human rights.  The CPH 
reminded President Zelaya that excesses in the media are 
generally less harmful than restrictions.  The press also 
compared these broadcasts to Chavez's decision not to renew 
RCTV's license in Venezuela.  In protest of Zelaya's 
decision, Honduran newspapers refused to cover and/or print 
the transcripts of the obligatory broadcasts.  On June 2, the 
 
Ambassador held his annual media day reception at the 
official residence for prominent Honduran journalists in 
which he and many of the attendees discussed freedom of 
speech in Honduras. 
 
¶6.  (U) While Zelaya's decision engendered ardent opposition 
in the media, the response in the political arena was more 
mixed.  Before the broadcasts began, National Congress 
President Roberto Michelleti of the Liberal Party publicly 
urged the President not to require their airing.  Congressman 
Antonio Rivera also unsucessfully motioned to overrule the 
decision by Zelaya.  National Party President Lobo criticized 
Zelaya for never addressing the question of corruption in 
HONDUTEL during the first broadcast.  Several politicians, 
including former Presidential candidate Olban Valladares, 
referred to the broadcast requirement as authoritarian, 
comparing it to similar measures taken in Ecuador and 
Venezuela.  Political supporters of the broadcasts framed the 
issue as a matter of allowing the GOH its own right to 
practice free speech. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT:  Despite intense attention from media and 
political players, much of the public response has focused on 
the decision to require national broadcasting by the GOH 
rather than the content of the broadcasts themselves.  This 
emphasis occurred not only as a result of public resistance 
to the idea but also because of the newspapers' refusal to 
cover the substance of the broadcasts.  The Administration's 
ultimate goal of reaching out to the public and countering 
negative publicity by means of television and radio has 
proven largely ineffective and counterproductive. Zelaya's 
controversial broadcasting has come at a vulnerable time in 
his Administration; recent gallup poll results reveal that 
confidence in the President has decreased significantly. 
Only fifty percent of those polled responded that Zelaya 
"always or almost always does what is best for the country", 
showing a sixteen point decrease in popularity since January 
¶2007. The fact that the Administration's media blitz occurred 
at the same time as the termination of RCTV in Venezuela may 
be purely coincidental, but Zelaya recently referred to 
Chavez in terms of oil as a "friend" and has called for 
Honduras to distance itself from transnationals like Texaco 
and Shell. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT (CONT.):  Zelaya's mandatory national 
broadcasts reflect a weakened President anxious to regain 
control of and trust from a skeptical and pessimistic 
population, but there is some truth to what the Zelaya 
Administration is saying about the press.  On the cover of 
the June 16 edition of the local conservative newspaper, El 
Heraldo, the headline read, "Torrijos Signs Free Trade with 
Honduras" (not "with Zelaya") and included a photo of 
Panamanian President Torrijos alone that cut out Zelaya next 
to him.  Over the last few months the press has largely been 
ignoring President Zelaya and friction with him continues in 
the aftermath of the media blitz.  The remedy that the Zelaya 
Administration used to seek support and respect was 
misguided, but the underlying problems of a weakened 
Presidency and tension with the press remain.  END COMMENT. 
WILLIARD