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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

UNCLAS SEOUL 001689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EAP/K FOR BOB ARMSTRONG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF LABOR STRUGGLES IN KOREA 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) In a meeting with poloff on May 23, Korea Labor & 
Society Institute Chairman Lee Won-bo said that labor union 
leaders in Korea continue to be arrested, but reluctantly 
conceded that police had legitimate reasons for doing so. 
Although Korea's labor laws have undergone some serious 
reform in the past two decades, labor unions remained 
dissatisfied with the amount of progress and would continue 
to demand further changes.  According to Lee, as long as 
people perceive that labor laws do not adequately protect the 
worker, unions were likely to use strikes and demonstrations 
as common forms of public protest to draw attention to 
otherwise under-publicized issues.  Lee also opined that even 
the largest labor union umbrella organization would not shy 
away from its propensity for strikes; contrary to what was 
widely reported in the media when the new union leader took 
office in January of this year.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------- 
KLSI'S MISSION 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Formed in the year before Korea's democratization 
officially began in 1987, the Korea Labor & Society Institute 
(KLSI) has transformed itself from an education center to a 
think-tank.  Formed by several key leaders in the labor 
movement including Kim Keum-soo (current President of KLSI) 
and Chun Young-se (current General Secretary of the 
Democratic Labor Party), KLSI was originally named the Korea 
Labor Education Association (KLEA).  The original mission was 
to educate a new cadre of labor union officials to begin an 
era of labor movements.  Their efforts culminated in the 
"Great Worker's Struggle" of 1987. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In May 1995, KLEA shifted gears toward research and 
KLSI was born.  Not coincidentally, the second largest trade 
union organization in Korea, the Korean Confederation of 
Trade Unions (KCTU) was formed six months later in November 
1995 with the strong support of KLSI's leaders.  (Note: The 
largest trade union umbrella organization, the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions, or FKTU, was formed in August 1961.  End 
note.)  With the labor union movement making good strides to 
secure more rights from employers and more importantly to 
secure more comprehensive legislation from the government, 
the change from KLEA to KLSI was made to better serve the new 
demands of the labor union members.  Scholars and academics 
were added to the staff and the focus shifted to informing 
members about general issues of mutual concern and proposing 
new labor policies to present to the central government. 
KLSI is funded through member dues and revenue obtained from 
sales of educational materials.  KLSI has a reported 800 
members and is managed by a 40-person board of advisors 
representing a cross-section of civil society groups, 
academics and lawyers. 
 
------------------------ 
THE GREAT LABOR STRUGGLE 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The labor movement of 1987 had strong connections 
to the democracy movement of the same year.  In this context 
of political democratization, the government, which faced 
strong pressures from the labor movement and opposition 
parties to reform the existing legal framework for 
authoritarian labor control, revised the Trade Union Act in 
November 1987.  The revised Trade Union Act promoted workers' 
rights to organize by abolishing existing requirements and 
various restrictions placed on labor unions.  However, since 
the revised law prohibited the establishment of multiple 
unions, it was harshly criticized for the following ten years 
by union activists at home and by international labor 
organizations. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Workers welcomed this new era of labor freedom by 
joining labor unions at an unprecedented rate.  Unionization 
rates increased from 12.4 percent in 1985 to 18.6 percent in 
¶1989.  The number of strikes also jumped during this period 
with approximately 3,500 labor conflicts between July and 
September 1987 alone. 
 
-------------------------- 
LABOR RELATIONS: 1987-1997 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to KLSI's statistics, between 1987 and 
1996, 2,807 union officials were arrested or indicted.  The 
most common grounds for these arrests were violation of the 
third party provision, obstruction of business and failure to 
comply with compulsory arbitration.  The third party 
provision stipulated that a third party organization or 
individual could not interfere in a dispute between an 
employer and an employee.  At the time, the government felt 
many labor unions and civil right's groups acted 
"irresponsibly" in these matters and therefore the 
legislation was designed to exclude all outside forces from 
intervening in contentious labor situations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) After a decade of pressure and extensive media 
coverage of the arrest of union officials, the ROKG passed 
the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act in March 
¶1997.  This law was a substantial and full-scale reform of 
the existing legal framework to administer industrial 
relations and labor markets.  The Act allowed the 
establishment of multiple unions, removed the provision 
banning unions' political activities and third party 
intervention and prohibited wage payments to full-time union 
official beginning in 2002.  (Note: The multiple union and 
wage payment issues remain points of contention as the 
enactment was once again postponed until January 2010.  End 
note.) 
 
----------------------------- 
LABOR RELATIONS: 1997-PRESENT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) According to KLSI's Lee, even after the provision 
banning third party intervention was repealed, police 
continued to arrest union officials on other charges. 
Officials continued to be arrested primarily on the grounds 
that they violated the terms of compulsory arbitration or 
obstructed business.  Additionally, police began to use more 
common provisions such as trespassing and traffic violations 
in order to arrest union officials participating in 
demonstrations in public areas.  KLSI noted that, on average, 
more than 200 union officials have been arrested every year 
since 1997.  Although slightly lower than the previous 
decade, Lee said the detention of union officials continues 
to be a serious concern for his organization and the trade 
union umbrella organizations. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Lee conceded that media reports were correct in 
reporting that police generally refrained from arresting 
union officials who participated in illegal demonstrations or 
strikes as long as their actions remained peaceful. 
Additionally, police tended to arrest union officials 
responsible for organizing violent protests rather than the 
actual participants of the protests.  An example of this 
occurred in 2003 when union officials responsible for 
organizing an illegal hospital strike were arrested for 
failing to comply with compulsory arbitration.  Although 
numerous hospital workers also participated in the strike, 
only the union officials were arrested. 
 
------------------ 
WHY UNIONS PROTEST 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) According to Lee, labor unions protested for 
several different reasons.  Although some of the causes were 
internal to the workplace and the worker, others had an 
external element or focus.  In the past 20 years of labor 
struggles, the most commonly cited reasons for union 
uprisings were lack of good faith on the part of the employer 
and a lack of responsiveness by the ROKG to the complaints of 
workers.  In Lee's opinion, the majority of demonstrations 
focused externally at the ROKG and labor policies in general 
as opposed to internal working conditions or labor issues of 
a specific workplace. 
 
-------------- 
FUTURE OF KCTU 
 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Poloff inquired what the future of the KCTU was 
and the probability that it would rely less on strikes as the 
predominant method of interaction with the ROKG.  Lee said 
that although the new president of KCTU was more moderate 
that past presidents, there remained a strong likelihood of 
strikes in the upcoming annual wage negotiation period in 
July.  Despite public statements by KCTU's president Lee 
Seok-haeng that he would not take lightly the decision of 
whether or not to hold a strike (Seoul 306), he allegedly 
meant that he will be better prepared and will work to rally 
more support from KCTU affiliates throughout the country 
before launching a strike.  Along a more conciliatory line, 
Lee apparently continues to try to build closer relationships 
with several government ministries (namely the Ministry of 
Construction and the Ministry of Transportation) to broaden 
his contacts and influence within official circles. 
 
------------------------------- 
IMPACT OF LABOR REFORMS IN 2010 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In December 2006, the National Assembly's Labor 
Committee passed several bills, including a delay in the 
implementation of multiple unions and the ban on direct pay 
of union officials until 2010.  The delay was justified on 
the grounds that Korea's labor market was not suitably 
prepared to handle the tough adjustments that will be 
necessary once the laws go into effect.  Despite reports that 
the MOL is working to minimize the impact of the laws, Lee 
said that there will be widespread confusion when the laws 
take effect.  Some of the questions that remained unanswered 
were: How will multiple unions organize their collective 
bargaining actions?  How will unions finance the hefty 
payroll of union officials?  According to Lee, one effect 
will be a stronger trend toward regional or industrial-based 
unions and a continued erosion of workplace-based unions.  It 
also remained to be seen how the government will interact 
with labor groups.  If the ROKG cannot find the correct 
balance between flexibility and security, or "flexicurity", 
then Lee predicted that there will be even more strikes and 
protests as workers voice their discontent with the new 
arrangement. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Although KLSI and Lee's opinions are closely and 
unabashedly aligned with labor unions, his perspectives are 
useful as they offer insight into the thinking of labor 
unions that are often reluctant to meet with embassy 
officers.  Of particular note was Lee's admission that union 
officials were normally arrested on legitimate legal grounds 
as opposed to trumped up charges.  As torch-bearers for the 
broader union membership, union officials are likely to 
continue to pursue public actions (demonstrations, protests 
and strikes) that will draw increased attention to their 
plight; actions that may often land them in jail as well. 
Many union officials feel this is an obligation that goes 
along with their leadership position in the union and do not 
have reservations about arrest or a criminal record as these 
are looked upon as badges of courage among leaders at all 
levels of Korean society. 
VERSHBOW