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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD LY SU
SUBJECT: CHAD:  FISSURES IN OPPOSITION RANKS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 499 
 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 516 
 
NDJAMENA 00000544  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Two tracks of government-opposition talks 
have been under way for the past week, one with the Chadian 
rebels in Tripoli, the other a continuation of the internal 
dialogue in Ndjamena.  Preliminary indications suggest that 
serious fissures are developing within the formerly cohesive 
internal opposition coalition -- possibly bad news for the 
democratic leap forward that many hope for.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Negotiations opened a week ago in Tripoli between 
Chadian rebels and the Chadian government.  We know from 
press reports that rebel leaders Mahamat Nouri, Timane 
Erdimi, and Hassan Saleh al-Djenedi arrived some days before 
the official Chadian delegation led by Minister of State 
Adoum Younousmi.  Younousmi only stayed for two days before 
returning to Ndjamena and then going to Khartoum to prepare 
the way for Deby's trip to Khartoum, which was canceled at 
the last moment due to the death of senior Sudanese official 
Majzub al-Khalifa.  It first appeared that the talks in 
Tripoli with the rebels had broken off, due to rebel demands 
for Deby's resignation and for including the internal 
opposition in the talks.  But now we know that the talks have 
continued, with the government delegation led by Minister of 
Interior Ahmat Mahamat Bachir.  (Key Deby security advisor 
Abderaman Moussa, who has led past discussions with rebels in 
Tripoli, is part of the delegation.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Three of our sources in the moderate opposition 
coalition CPDC (Coordination of the Political Parties of the 
Democratic Opposition) give us somewhat conflicting reports, 
but the bottom line is that events in Tripoli have put huge 
pressure on the internal dialogue, with a resultant split 
among the principal leaders in the CPDC. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Former President Lol Mahamat Choua, perhaps the 
most substantial figure in the opposition, tells us that the 
six most substantial figures in the CPDC have split down the 
middle:  Lol, along with Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh and Salibu 
Garba, on one side, and Jean Bawoyeu Alingue, Wadal 
Abdelkader Kamougue, and Saleh Kebzabo on the other.  Lol's 
"faction" is holding tight to the position that it will not 
sign an agreement with the ruling party (the dialogue thus 
far has officially taken place only among parties) unless 
Deby concedes on several fundamental issues, among them: 
naming of a true government of consensus with an independent 
prime minister, inclusion of the rebels in the dialogue, 
establishment of an international watchdog committee, and 
signing of the document only by the principal parties (not 
the raft of minor parties created by or allied to the 
government). 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Salibu Garba has given us a similar account, adding 
that internal CPDC discussions have broken down amid 
recriminations (accusations that the Alingue "faction" has 
been "bought off" by Deby).  On the issue of including rebels 
in the dialogue, Garba says that, while it is essential to 
include the rebels, Tripoli was not the correct venue and it 
would be better to conclude the present CPDC-ruling party 
dialogue before roping in the rebels.  In a conversation with 
the Ambassador June 27, civil-society leader Delphine 
Kemneloum also strongly underlined the view that, given 
Qadhafi's long history of meddling in Chad, Libya was an 
unacceptable venue and Qadhafi an unacceptable mediator. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Ahmat Mahamat Hassan, a legal advisor to Alingue, 
told us June 29 that Alingue was in close contact with 
Mahamat Nouri in Tripoli.  Ahmat said that the rebels had 
dropped their show-stopping preconditions and that 
discussions were on-going in Tripoli.  Alingue would have 
been willing to go to Tripoli, but Deby refused the idea. 
Alingue had discussed by telephone with Nouri the idea of 
accepting a "gouvernement d'ouverture" rather than a 
government of consensus or national unity, the former 
implying that Deby would retain greater authority than the 
latter.  Alingue tapped Ahmat to draft a decree stiplulating 
the powers of a prime minister, heretofore only vaguely set 
forth in the constitution -- the idea being that the new 
prime minister and his cabinet would be more independent than 
the present.  Ahmat said that Alingue's focus was on having a 
competent, professional, technocratic government of experts 
 
NDJAMENA 00000544  002 OF 002 
 
 
that will clean up the massive corruption and inefficiency, 
make effective use of the oil money, and clean up and 
professionalize the army.  Ahmat implied that Alingue would 
prefer not to have a true government of national unity, as it 
would, by definition, by a politically-oriented cabinet 
balancing political parties rather than focusing on expertise 
needed to clean up the administration.  (In a conversation 
with the Ambassador June 19, Alingue focused on two issues: 
the calamitous maladministration of the country and the 
difficulty of making progress in an environment of rebellion 
and insecurity.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ahmat said that it appeared that both the CPDC and 
the rebels would break up.  Among the rebels, Djennedi would 
"surely" sign and Nouri probably would, but Deby was not 
likely to be reconciled to the Erdimis.  Among the CPDC, Lol 
was holding back, insisting on a government of consensus and 
not trusting anything else.  Ahmat believed that the other 
CPDC leaders would follow Alingue, to include Ibni Oumar as 
well as Kamougue and Kebzabo.  He believed that Lol might 
give in at the end.  He said that none of them now trusted 
Salibu Garba, as they believed he had sent messages directly 
to Deby on the positions of the CPDC leaders.  He said that 
Deby wanted Alingue to be the new prime minister, but Alingue 
"wanted to be a candidate" (i.e., to run for president in 
2011), which, it was generally thought, would disqualify him 
as prime minister.  Lol, Kamougue, and Kebzabu all also 
"wanted to be a candidate."  Salibu wanted to be prime 
minister but was deemed unacceptable by the others in the 
CPDC.  A possible compromise candidate for prime minister 
would be Yusuf Saleh Abbas, who serves as a diplomatic 
advisor to Deby at present and is respected by all sides. 
Ahmat anticipated that there would be a resolution of the two 
tracks, internal and at Tripoli, in relatively short order -- 
"maybe a week." 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  It is too early to tell how crippling 
this fissure in the opposition ranks is, or how much Deby has 
"won" and the cause of a democratic opening has lost, but any 
fissure in the CPDC is troubling news. 
WALL