VZCZCXRO2312
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0517/01 1721857
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211857Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5434
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN:  JEM PERSPECTIVE 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 462 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Taljadine Niam, JEM representative in 
Chad, met the Ambassador June 20 at his request, seeking to 
maintain contact despite sanctions on JEM leader Khalil 
Ibrahim.  Khalil, he claimed, had departed Chad for Darfur 
with "all" the JEM forces.  He said JEM (contrary to its 
blocking role at Abuja in 2006) was urgent to see an end to 
SLM disunity and to move toward political resolution of the 
Darfur crisis.  JEM did not view Eritrea or SPLM as the right 
intermediaries.  Rapid demographic changes in Darfur were a 
key factor in JEM's sense of urgency.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Taljadine Niam, representative of the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) in Chad, accompanied by Issa Hassan, 
called on the Ambassador, with poloff, June 20.  He said that 
the JEM sought to continue contact despite the sanctions 
imposed on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim.  Taljadine regretted 
that Khalil had been penalized for his role in opposing the 
agreement signed in Abuja in May 2006, since, he claimed, 
"even your government now does not see the agreement as being 
a good agreement."  The Ambassador disputed this assertion, 
noting that the United States accepted that the agreement 
could be modified but believed that further negotiations 
should be based on it.  Taljadine said that the JEM did not 
want to start the negotiations from zero again.  In fact, 
"there were many good elements in the Abuja agreement -- the 
ceasefire, human rights, many things." 
 
"Easy" to negotiate modified accord 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Taljadine said that the American negotiators had 
been too impatient in Abuja.  If only they had accepted a 
higher compensation component and agreed to reconstituting 
Darfur as a unitary region, the JEM would have signed the 
agreement, even without obtaining a vice-presidential 
position.  The Americans had thought that SLM leader Minni 
Minawi was the "big boss," and subsequent events, with Minni 
isolated in Khartoum, had proved that he had not been and 
that JEM's position had been correct.  If only the parties 
could now get back to the table, the negotiating process 
would be "quick and easy."  For its part, all the JEM would 
ask for was a unitary Darfur region and "proper 
compensation," as had been its legitimate objectives in Abuja. 
 
If only the SLA could get its act together 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Taljadine regretted that the National Redemption 
Front (NRF) announced June 30, 2006, had never gotten off the 
ground.  The NRF had pulled together JEM and SLM's Khamis 
Abdallah Abakar, along with Ahmad Ibrahim Diraij and Sharif 
Harir, but without SLM's Abd al-Wahid Nur.  JEM had wanted to 
give life to the NRF and rope in the bulk of Darfur rebels. 
JEM had been willing to disband itself as an organization and 
had proposed the respected and noncontroversial Diraij (a 
Fur) as first rotating president.  But even the rump SLM with 
whom JEM attempted to negotiate had feared that JEM, being 
united and having the single strongest force on the ground, 
would dominate the organization, so they sought instead to 
unify SLM ranks first.  However, the SLM had been too 
disunified to find a way to unify itself.  JEM was more 
urgent than ever, Taljadine said, to get on with political 
negotiations.  Therefore, SLM unification was also in JEM's 
urgent interest, because it was SLM disunity that blocked any 
progress.  (Note:  See reftel for the Ambassador's May 31 
conversation with SLM's Adam Shogar, who presented a 
diametrically opposed view:  Shogar claimed that it was the 
SLM that had proposed disbanding the SLM and JEM in favor of 
a single organization and that Khalil had insisted on being 
president.  End Note.) 
 
Sense of urgency 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) To the question why JEM was now so urgent to get on 
with political negotiations to resolve the Darfur crisis, 
Taljadine said that there were several reasons.   The people 
of Darfur were stewing in their IDP and refugee camps, 
leading unnatural lives and suffering.  Sudan was 
establishing facts on the ground, giving land to the 
janjaweed.  Arabization was proceeding at an increasing pace, 
with the consequent withering of local languages and culture. 
 The longer the people stayed in camps, the less they would 
want or be able to go back to their homes.  Refugees in Chad 
were intermarrying and putting down roots in Chad. 
Post-crisis leaders in Darfur (read: JEM) would need as much 
time as possible before national elections in two years to 
organize themselves so that Darfur would have its optimal 
role in the unfolding national political process. 
Improvement in Chadian-Sudanese relations was having a 
 
NDJAMENA 00000517  002 OF 002 
 
 
negative effect on the rebel groups and, although it was more 
likely that that relationship would turn sour again, if those 
relations continued to stay on an even keel there would be 
long-term effects adverse to the rebels.  Finally, JEM had to 
take international views into consideration, as the 
international pressures to find a political solution were 
immense, Taljadine admitted. 
 
Not happy with Eritreans, SPLM, Qafhafi 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Taljadine reviewed with dissatisfaction recent 
regional efforts to unify the Darfur rebels.  Eritrea was not 
the right facilitator, in JEM's view.  It had brought an 
airplane to Ndjamena to collect rebels, and Khamis Abakar, 
Sharif Harir, and Khalil Abdallah had ridden to Asmara, with 
delegations, and were apparently still there.  The JEM did 
not go, although it had not refused absolutely, merely asked 
for more clarification on what Eritrea had in mind (not yet 
received).  According to Taljadine, Eritrea had placed its 
bet on Sharif Harir as the leader of a new SLM, but Sharif 
was a university professor not capable of uniting forces on 
the ground. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Meanwhile, Taljadine noted, the SPLM had sought to 
host a set of reconciliation conferences in Juba, but this 
effort had failed ("postponed" meant "failed," Taljadine 
insisted).  The SPLM had asked JEM to participate in Juba. 
JEM, which viewed the SPLM as having played a negative role 
in Abuja, had not refused, but as with Eritrea, JEM had asked 
for clarification on the SPLM's objectives (not received). 
Meanwhile, Qadhafi had summoned Chadian and Darfurian rebels 
to Tripoli.  JEM's Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Adam Lisan 
Tugoud were now there.  There was no way of knowing what 
Qadhafi had in mind, though the one sure thing was that 
Qadhafi was allergic to the presence of international forces 
in his back yard. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked the JEM's view of the effort 
of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) to bring SLM 
factions together in Nairobi.  Taljadine said that CHD had 
called him.  JEM viewed CHD's efforts positively and would be 
willing to be present in Nairobi.  He advised working through 
the AU to get Chad to agree to CHD's flying SLM leaders 
through Chad to Nairobi. 
 
The Chad angle 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Taljadine said that Khalil Ibrahim, following the 
Riyadh accord between Chad and Sudan, had removed himself 
with "all" the JEM forces to Darfur.  Only Taljadine and Issa 
Hassan remained in Chad, he claimed with a straight face. 
JEM's relations with Chad remained good, and JEM preferred 
Chad to all other regional intermediaries.  Chadian rebels 
were still present in Sudan and carrying out attacks 
("committing crimes") around Abeche and al-Geneina. 
Taljadine said he could not understand why the Chadian 
government was serious about its Riyadh obligations when the 
Sudanese government was not.  Meanwhile, he said, after the 
defection of Mahamat Nour, Chadian rebels were a weak and 
ineffective lot.  Their problem was not lack equipment or 
assistance from Khartoum, but lack of fighting spirit and, 
especially, lack of good intelligence from within Chad. 
Mahamat Nour had been extremely well informed by spies inside 
the Chadian military and intelligence. 
WALL