VZCZCXRO6060
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0462/01 1561620
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051620Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5348
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0413

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SLM LEADER COMMENTS ON UNIFICATION EFFORTS 
 
NDJAMENA 00000462  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The prospects for leaders within the 
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) to unify appear to be dim 
and getting dimmer.  During a recent meeting with SLM leader 
Adam Shogar, he expressed dismay with recent unification 
efforts, and was focused on the differences between the 
various factions, rather than what they had in common.  Adam 
stated that he did not accept the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) as the basis for future talks, but said that both SLM 
political leader Dr. Sharif Harir and SLM commander Ahmed 
Abdulshafi might be ready to do so.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (U)  On the evening of 31 May, the Ambassador and Pol/Mil 
officer met with SLM leader Adam Shogar on an isolated rock 
outcropping on the outskirts of Abeche.  Over the course of 
the hour long meeting, Shogar provided his commentary on the 
state of unification efforts within the SLM and possible 
options for the future. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Failure of the National Redemption Front 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Shogar stated that the National Redemption Front 
(NRF) had failed and highlighted his belief that the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) wanted to use the NRF umbrella to 
augment their own organization.  Within the NRF, there were 
to be three key positions, the President, Secretary General, 
and the FieldQommander.  JEM wanted JEM leader Khalil 
Ibrahim to serve as President, with another JEM officer in 
the Field Commander position, and SLM taking the Secretary 
General position.  He acknowledged that JEM was also willing 
to share the leadership positions on a rotating basis, but 
said JEM insisted that Khalil serve as the first president. 
Shogar had suppQted electing individuals to the key 
positions based on proportional representation.  He had even 
proposed disbanding JEM and SLM entirely and creating a new 
organization.  JEM had rejected this proposal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Shogar noted that there would never be an 
agreement within the SLM to allow Khalil to serve in a 
leadership position within a unified opposition.  He stated 
that Khalil was not acceptable due to his relationship with 
Turabi.  When pressed on this issue, Shogar explained that 
elements within the SLM had requested Khalil declare to the 
media that he had no such relationship with Turabi, or the 
National Congress Party, and to condemn Turabi publicly, but 
that Khalil refused.  While not accepting Khalil as President 
within a unified opposition, Shogar noted that there would be 
no problem with Khalil serving in some other capacity.  He 
described his relationship with JEM official Ahmed Togoud as 
good, and mentioned that they had just talked that day, when 
Togoud called him from Europe. 
 
----------------------- 
SLM Unification Efforts 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Shogar suggested that SLM political leader Dr. 
Sharif Harir's participation in the recent Sudanese 
opposition unification conference in Ameri was a big mistake, 
and worked against SLM unification efforts.  Shogar stated 
that SLM commander Ahmed Abdulshafi and Sharif were both 
getting pressure from the Eritrean government to go into 
negotiations with the Government of Sudan.  He said that 
Khamis Abdulla, his SLM ally, was in Asmara for the meeting 
underway there, but that Khamis did not intend to enter into 
talks on unification.  Shogar was dismissive of some of his 
other SLM colleagues, calling into question their support 
base, noting that Abdulshafi had only three or four vehicles 
in his faction and Sharif, who was always wanting a 
leadership position, also had minimal support on the ground. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Shogar was well aware of the CHD's plans for a SLM 
unification conference in Nairobi.  Shogar suggested that 
these efforts were premature, and that prior to any such 
conference there needed to be additional "hard work" in order 
to bring the leaders together.  While Shogar appreciated the 
efforts of the CHD, he was not optimistic about this 
particular gathering.  Although he did not plan to attend, he 
had selected ten individuals from his group to participate. 
 
---------------- 
Views on the DPA 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Shogar stated that he does not accept using the 
DPA as a basis for talks, because he does not trust the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000462  002.6 OF 002 
 
 
Sudanese government's willingness to implement it.  Pressed 
 
by the Ambassador not to aim at starting negotiations from 
scratch, Shogar said it would be acceptable to return to the 
fifth round of the Abuja talks and start from the Declaration 
of Principles.  He noted that he believed both Sharif and 
Abdulshafi might support using an Abuja Plus formula as a 
basis for discussions. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Shogar saw little promise in the Ambassador's 
point about setting aside for now attempts at reuniting the 
SLM and instead entering into talks based on the substantial 
areas of agreement that already exist among the rebel 
factions on negotiating objectives.  Shogar argued instead 
that the SLM's unity was a necesary condition for successful 
talks.  Without it, he stated, it would be easy for Khartoum 
to further divide the rebel groups with its "big bags" of 
money. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  As night closed in and the meeting drew to a 
close, Shogar noted that he would be traveling next week to 
"the liberated area" in Darfur.  He said now he intended "to 
go his own way," working with other members of his group, 
including Khamis Abdulla and Adam Bakheit, and with 
representatives of the NMRD and various Arab groups now 
emerging in opposition to the Sudanese government. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Shogar, one of the most guileless of 
prominent SLM figures, is turning into one of their most 
uncompromising.  His comments highlight the continuing 
disarray in the SLM's ranks.  For the main contenders, the 
struggle for leadership of a unified movement is taking 
precedence over the search for peace in Darfur.  The Center 
for Humanitarian Dialogue will have its work cut out for it 
in seeking to bring Shogar's people on board at the 
conference in Nairobi.  END COMMENT 
 
¶10.  (U)  Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL