VZCZCXRO8507
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1537/01 1691538
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181538Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0574
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PARM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE PLANS MINISTRY PURGE, 
IDEOLOGICAL OVERSIGHT OF ARMED FORCES 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1223 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 0531 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 0081 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Brennan for reasons 1.4 (b and d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: According to an internal memorandum obtained 
by post, Acting Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Ruth Tapia Roa 
plans to fire the few remaining officials from the previous 
administration and replace them with Army-approved loyalists. 
 She also alerts President Ortega to the Army's "new 
interests" and suggests a much closer relationship with 
junior officers to assess their loyalties.  Tapia's 
suggestions would eliminate the historical memory and 
residual technical capacity of the Ministry of Defense and 
convert her into the ideological overseer of the armed 
forces.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On June 13, post obtained a sensitive internal 
memorandum from the Ministry of Defense, addressed to 
President Daniel Ortega, that outlines recently-appointed 
Acting Minister Ruth Tapia's plans for the future.  In the 
memo, Tapia recommends firing the few remaining functionaries 
from the previous administration and keeping an eye on junior 
military officers to measure their loyalty to the Sandinista 
cause.  She also refers to her June 4 meeting with Ambassador 
Trivelli (septel) and describes relations with the Embassy as 
"cordial."  Notably, ours is the only foreign mission 
referred to specifically in the memo.  In addition, Tapia 
recommends the creation of a Directorship of Correspondence 
to ensure "improved control and security" of Ministry 
information. 
 
Government of "Peace and Reconciliation" Plans More Dismissals 
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- 
 
¶3. (C) In her report, Tapia recommends the dismissal of 
several senior officials from the previous administration, 
including Director of Inter-Institutional Affairs Silvio Diaz 
and Legal Advisor Gerardo Bravo.  Tapia justifies these 
firings by calling into question the competence and loyalty 
of the officers without providing any specific information. 
She assures Ortega that the Ministry will not violate labor 
laws as she will designate the posts as "positions of 
confidence." 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: Diaz and Bravo have been key contacts of post 
for many years.  They survived the previous Army-induced 
purges of ex-Minister of Defense Jose Adan Guerra's team only 
thanks to the direct intervention of the Embassy (ref B). 
Ever since Guerra's forced resignation in 2005, the Army has 
plotted to eliminate his pro-modernization/civilian control 
group of senior advisors from the Ministry.  Diaz and Bravo 
specifically were involved in the Defense White Paper 
process, anti-terrorism legislation, and several New Horizons 
and other military exercises.  They have both received 
extensive training from the USG. 
 
¶5. (C) Tapia mentions in her report that armed forces chief 
General Omar Halleslevens has recommended replacements for 
Diaz and Bravo -- Bismark Vanegas and Denis Palma.  She 
comments that Vanegas has "an attitude of complete obedience" 
to General Halleslevens, and Palma "spends his free time as a 
technical advisor for the FSLN Secretariat." 
 
The Army's "New Interests" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (C) Despite her apparent trust of General Halleslevens 
recommendations for her senior staff, Tapia's memo indicates 
that this sentiment does not extend to the Army in general. 
She writes: "You know more than I that mentalities have 
changed since the times of the Sandinista Popular Army.  In 
the senior ranks... people have new and self-interested 
ideas..."  Tapia suggests visits to military units to "better 
understand with whom we need to work closely" and develop 
"close relations" with the junior officers and rank-and-file. 
 She also implies that international assistance should be 
directed to officers and units that are ideologically 
suitable. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶7. (C) If Tapia carries out her proposals, the Ministry of 
Defense will be converted into President Ortega's ideological 
babysitter for the Army.  Ironically, the Army's efforts to 
eliminate Guerra's influence could do far more damage to the 
armed force's cherished independence than Guerra's plans for 
modernization and institutionalization.  Post will continue 
to monitor the evolution of the Ministry-Army relationship, 
though this will now be much more difficult with the loss of 
key contacts. 
BRENNAN