VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1427/01 1562053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 052053Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MRS DEFECTORS PLAN NEW CAUCUS IN ASSEMBLY, 
ALLIANCES FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0070 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for 
reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: While Liberal infighting grabs the most 
headlines in Nicaragua, post-election squabbling has also 
fractured the reformist Left.  Many FSLN party activists 
who left the Sandinista Front to support former Managua 
mayor Herty Lewites' presidential bid later became 
disenchanted with the leadership of the Sandinista 
Renovation Movement (MRS) after Lewites' untimely death 
during the campaign.  The "Hertistas" are now searching for 
a political identity and strategy to contest the 2008 
municipal elections.  One Hertista National Assembly deputy 
plans to create an "independent caucus" by encouraging 
defections from the FSLN, Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC), and Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN).  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff held a series of meetings in late May with 
various "Hertistas" to discuss the direction of that 
movement.  Rivas departmental coordinator Miguel Angel 
Escoria is attempting to arrange a merger with the 
Citizens' Action Party (PAC), a political force with a 
legal identity that the Hertistas hope to take advantage 
of.  Escorcia requested a meeting with poloff on May 18 to 
discuss a possible merger of the Hertistas with the PAC and 
an alliance with the ALN.  He explained that the Hertistas, 
mostly local FSLN activists loyal to Lewites and fed up 
with Ortega's authoritarian domination of the party, once 
formed the largest bloc in the MRS alliance.  After 
Lewites' death, the Hertistas tussled with MRS leadership 
over the disposition of resources and party positions, but 
ultimately remained in the alliance at the request of 
Lewites' widow Carmen.  After the elections, many Hertistas 
exited the MRS to exist as a movement without a party. 
 
¶3. (C) In anticipation of the 2008 municipal elections, 
Escorcia commented that the Hertistas have entered 
negotiations with the PAC to provide electoral muscle and 
structure in exchange for the PAC's legal identity and 
"casilla" (voting box on the ballot).  He claimed that the 
Hertistas in Rivas will push the PAC to enter an alliance 
with the ALN.  ALN president Eduardo Montealegre is 
regarded as the leader of the opposition, and Montealegre's 
party will lead the charge against the FSLN, Escorcia said. 
 Escorcia identified Juan Ramon Jimenez and Mario Valle, 
deputies elected under the MRS ticket but subsequently 
expelled from the alliance, as Hertistas who support this 
project. 
 
¶4. (C) To investigate Escorcia's assertions, poloff 
requested meetings with Jimenez and Valle.  On May 25, 
Jimenez told poloff that he is "analyzing" a possible deal 
with the PAC, but has recently been preoccupied by this 
wife's struggle with breast cancer.  He commented that his 
citizen outreach efforts in his home department of Carazo 
have earned him considerable grass roots support over the 
years, which is why the MRS won a deputy seat in Carazo. 
(Note: Jimenez is the only deputy to have opened a 
constituents' affairs office and dedicates half his salary 
and most of his fuel allowance to charity.  To cut down on 
personal expenses, Jimenez drives a motorbike.  End Note.) 
Jimenez claimed that, because of his popular support, all 
parties are courting him -- the FSLN has even offered to 
pay for his wife's medical treatment. 
 
¶5. (C) When queried about the circumstances of his 
expulsion from the MRS alliance shortly after the 
elections, Jimenez explained that Enrique Saenz (the MRS 
candidate for the National Assembly's Executive Board) was 
unable to garner sufficient votes, so Jimenez emerged as a 
compromise candidate.  (Comment: At the time, Jimenez was 
accused by the MRS of cooperating with the FSLN against his 
own party -- see reftel.  Other contacts have asserted that 
the FSLN attempted to "tempt" Jimenez to join the governing 
party in exchange for a generous financial package to help 
him cover his wife's treatment.  End Comment.)  Despite his 
expulsion from the alliance, Jimenez decided to remain in 
the MRS caucus, though vote independently, because breaking 
with the caucus would have "pleased the FSLN." 
 
¶6. (C) Mario Valle is indeed actively pursuing projects 
with the PAC and within the National Assembly.  Valle 
informed poloff on May 30 that both the PAC and the 
Resistencia have proposed alliances with him.  He commented 
that Lewites' untimely death was a "disaster" for the MRS 
alliance, and that the MRS leaders alienated the Hertistas 
 
MANAGUA 00001427  002 OF 002 
 
 
by isolating them.  Valle is not as excited about teaming 
up with the ALN as Escorcia -- he stated that Montealegre 
is an "elitist banker" who could never be a "national 
leader" -- but agreed that some sort of opposition alliance 
is necessary to successfully contest the municipal 
elections. 
 
¶7. (C) Valle concurred that an alliance of independent 
parties is a much more plausible strategy for the municipal 
elections than a unified party.  He confided, however, that 
the FSLN drafted the current electoral law specifically to 
prevent such an "alianza de hecho" by requiring that allied 
parties run candidates under one name and casilla and run 
candidates in at least 80 percent of the municipalities in 
order to keep their legal identity.  Valle advised that the 
electoral law may be modified in a single session (unlike 
most constitutional changes, which require approval in two 
sessions of the Assembly), but by a super majority of 56 
votes for passage. 
 
¶8. (C) Valle shared that reaching the 56-vote threshold may 
not be impossible (the FSLN currently controls 38 of 92 
votes).  He is working on a project to create an 
"independent caucus" from the three non-affiliated deputies 
(Valle, Jimenez, and Salvador Talavera) and other deputies 
frustrated with their parties and seeking an independent 
voice.  Valle claimed to have commitments from two 
Convergencia deputies (Sandinista allies in the FSLN 
caucus), two ALN deputies, and one member of the PLC 
caucus.  If Valle is successful, the opposition caucuses 
would be within striking distance of a super majority. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Valle is correct that several deputies in 
all of the caucuses are frustrated with their leadership 
for different reasons -- but he was not able to articulate 
exactly what joint philosophy or goal would unite them. 
Valle implied that he would be the caucus chief, but only 
Jimenez (possibly) would be likely to trust Valle in such a 
position given his recent history as an FSLN activist. 
Moreover, the FSLN is famous for enforcing party discipline 
with bribes and threats, and the bloc rarely suffers stray 
votes or defections. 
TRIVELLI