VZCZCXRO9533
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #1107/01 1590933
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080933Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2718
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2783

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SPAIN/ETA: RUPTURE OF ETA CEASEFIRE BECOMES 
POLITICAL FOOTBALL 
 
REF: A. MADRID 1078 
     ¶B. MADRID 432 
 
MADRID 00001107  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Even as Spain braces for a new round of attacks in 
the wake of the Basque terrorist group ETA's June 6 decision 
to break its 15-month ceasefire (REFTEL A), Spanish 
government officials and opposition leaders have traded barbs 
and blamed each other for the breakdown in the peace process. 
 President Zapatero on June 6 appealed to the opposition 
Popular Party (PP) to put aside political differences and 
"lend a hand" to the government in the fight against ETA. 
Zapatero called for unity among political parties, but said 
that regardless of the PP,s actions, his government will act 
with "strength and intelligence" to counter the Basque 
terrorists.  Zapatero chided the PP for "criticizing the 
government above all else."  Jose Blanco, Secretary General 
of Zapatero's Socialist Party (PSOE), accused the PP of being 
"irresponsible and disloyal."  PSOE officials say that on the 
issue of fighting ETA terrorism, they remained loyal to the 
former PP government of President Aznar (1996-2004), and that 
the current PP opposition should do the same. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The PP for its part has demanded that Zapatero 
"rectify" his counterterrorism policies and return to the 
Anti-terrorist Pact that in the year 2000 laid out a common 
strategy between Spain's two main political parties to fight 
ETA.  PP leader Mariano Rajoy said that Zapatero's public 
statements made in the hours after the ETA announcement were 
"not clear and not enough."  PP leaders (and many Spanish 
pundits) believe that Zapatero's initial declarations were 
soft and focused more on his fight to achieve peace, without 
once mentioning his intention to defeat ETA.  Zapatero's 
opponents believe that he is refusing to rule out any chance 
of future peace negotiations with the terrorist group because 
he is a true believer in the process who has invested so much 
political capital in it. 
 
//What Might ETA Do?// 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Our contacts in the Spanish security forces say 
that ETA is preparing to commit a significant terrorist 
attack in the very near future, and Madrid could be the 
target.  Additional targets on ETA's list appear to be 
heavily-touristed areas along the Mediterranean coast 
(Valencia is a name that has appeared in the press).  Some 
ETA watchers believe that the group will launch a series of 
terrorist attacks without causing victims to pressure the 
Zapatero government to address its key demands, but without 
crippling Zapatero before national elections which must take 
place by March 2008.  There is disagreement in Spain over 
whether ETA prefers a Socialist government in power to better 
the chances of its goals being met, or whether ETA does not 
distinguish between either main political party when it comes 
to achieving Basque independence.  According to Spanish 
security forces quoted in the press, ETA currently has about 
100 active members, four operational commands (two in the 
Basque region, one in France and one in Madrid), and strong 
logistical and technical capabilities to make explosives and 
car bombs. 
 
//What Can the GOS Do?// 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Zapatero has promised that Spanish security forces 
will maintain and even increase their already high level of 
preparedness (along with French counterparts in southern 
France) against an ETA attack.  On June 7, French police 
arrested three ETA members in the town of Arbes, including 
one who was on the Spanish Civil Guard's most wanted list and 
who allegedly was the leader of ETA's recruiting apparatus. 
In addition to stepped up law enforcement efforts, one of the 
first tangible GOS actions taken in the wake of the ETA 
announcement was the remanding back to prison of convicted 
ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos to fulfill the remainder of 
his three-year sentence.  De Juana Chaos (as described in 
REFTEL B) completed an 18-year sentence for 25 murders but 
went on a hunger strike to protest being in jail on lesser 
charges of threatening public officials.  De Juana Chaos was 
close to death three months ago when the Spanish government 
allowed him to leave jail for a hospital near his hometown in 
the Basque region to receive treatment.  In recent weeks De 
Juana Chaos has been pictured taking strolls around the 
neighborhood near the hospital (and some would say virtually 
thumbing his nose at Spanish authorities), leading Spaniards 
to question how close to death he really was.  After the ETA 
announcement, Interior Minister Rubalcaba said that "in no 
case" would he be allowed to serve the remainder of his 
sentence at home (as Rubalcaba had previously considered), 
 
MADRID 00001107  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
and as of June 7 De Juana Chaos was on his way back to a jail 
in Aranjuez.  This decision appears to represent a drastic 
change in attitude on the part of the GOS since last March. 
Another possible action could include the jailing of Arnaldo 
Otegi, leader of ETA's political wing Batasuna, if the 
Spanish Supreme Court upholds a sentence handed to Otegi for 
his comments praising terrorism.  Zapatero had previously 
looked the other way when the Spanish Prosecutors office 
withdrew the charges against Otegi. 
 
//How Might the Spanish React?// 
 
¶5. (SBU) Many in Spain believe that Zapatero lost face in 
giving in to ETA on issues such as De Juana Chaos, allowing a 
political party with ties to Batasuna to participate in the 
May 27 municipal elections, and not cracking down harder 
after ETA killed two individuals in a December 30 bombing at 
Madrid's Barajas Airport.  Even some of the PSOE's own 
supporters have criticized Zapatero's vacillation in the wake 
of the December 30 bombing and some believe this fact 
contributed to the low voter turnout in the recent local and 
regional elections.  Spanish observers are saying that 
Zapatero offered major concessions to ETA yet still achieved 
the same thing as previous Spanish presidents: nothing.  The 
reaction of PP leader Rajoy ("I told you so!") is to be 
expected as his party's opposition over the past two years 
has been based mostly on a "Just Say No" policy of 
confrontation with the Zapatero government, with the ETA 
issue reigning supreme.  Rajoy will have to walk a fine line 
between legitimate policy disagreement with the government, 
and being seen as using the issue of terrorism to gain 
political points.  Zapatero is likely to make the case that 
he made a genuine good faith attempt to achieve lasting peace 
in the Basque region, but that ETA rejected the initiative 
and now Spain has no choice but to close ranks and take the 
fight to ETA.  If Zapatero takes this approach, the PP will 
probably need to get on board or risk losing support among 
moderate Spanish voters.  In any case, the PP will support 
tough measures against the terrorist group.  Some 
commentators have speculated that the end of the ETA peace 
process means that Zapatero should call for early elections 
this fall to give Spanish voters the chance to influence GOS 
CT policy, but thus far Zapatero has said that elections will 
still take place as scheduled in March 2008.  In order to 
win, Zapatero will have to be seen taking nothing but a 
strong, tough stand against the terrorist group from now 
until national elections. 
AGUIRRE