VZCZCXRO3242
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0987/01 1731323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221323Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7688
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR A VICTIM OF POOR GOVERNANCE, THE BUSINESS OF WAR 
 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging meeting with CDA Fernandez, two 
prominent Darfur civil society activists described war in Darfur as 
a business with many partners. Traditional leadership and 
negotiating mechanisms had been lost, they said, replaced by rebels 
with no real connection to Darfurians themselves. They cited the 
need for development, reconciliation and good governance efforts in 
Darfur, as well as political support for AMIS and a strong mandate 
for the hybrid force. End summary. 
 
------------------- 
WAR IS A "BUSINESS" 
------------------- 
 
¶2. In a June 20 meeting with CDA, Dr. Abdul Jabbar Fadul, activist 
and professor at El Fasher University, and Mr. Khalil Tukras, 
director of the North Darfur Sudan Social Development Office (SUDO), 
said that peace and security were the two biggest concerns for 
Darfurians. While the Sudanese government and its armed militias had 
originally been the greatest cause of insecurity in Darfur, they 
said, now every faction with a gun was to blame. Sudanese government 
forces were unable to control the situation in Darfur, they said, 
because they were ill-trained and poorly-equipped. They also said 
that most members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) who were 
deployed in Darfur were poor foot soldiers who had no real stake in 
the conflict. 
 
¶3. (SBU) War in Darfur was "business," according to Tukras, and the 
Sudanese government relied both on armed militias and SLA factions 
to exercise its tenuous control in the area. For the rebels, it was 
also a money-making enterprise. He portrayed the Sudanese government 
as giving support to some of the SLA factions, as well as playing 
certain janjaweed groups against each other. Tukras said that one of 
the Sudanese government's greatest fears was that if there were 
peace, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would physically come 
to Darfur so it was in their interest to continue fomenting 
violence. There was a "mafia of war," that transcended politics, 
working with the government, he said, comprised of Chad, Libya and 
Eritrea. 
 
-------------------------- 
TRIBAL ALLIANCES AND POWER 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) On land and water issues, Fadul thought they could be 
resolved through traditional mediation techniques. These traditional 
mechanisms were being lost, he said, and he urged the international 
community to work to restore power to civil society and IDP 
residents of Darfur. Traditional tribal leaders had been "castrated" 
by successive Sudanese governments going back decades, they said. 
The rebels spoke for no one but themselves, he said, and so the vast 
majority of Darfurians were left without any real representation. 
Fadul stressed the need for IDPs to organize themselves within the 
camps, and to establish representative committees. But because the 
Sudanese government opposed this type of organization, he continued, 
there needed to be a neutral third party or group who could 
intervene. When CDA asked how the Sudanese government could be 
convinced that this was in their interest, Fadul said that they were 
more likely to respond positively if presented with a clear, 
articulate proposal rather than a loose plan. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Speaking to the complicated alliances between tribal groups 
in Darfur, both Fadul and Tukras named the Nazir of the Bani Hussein 
as one of the remaining strong figures who had kept his tribe out of 
the fighting and still maintained credibility. He still maintained 
good relations with the Zaghawa and Fur tribes, they said, as well 
as pro-government Arab tribes. The "King" of the Meidoub tribe of 
Northern Darfur was another traditional leader who had survived and 
was worthy of attention.  He had been successful in mediating tribal 
conflicts without bloodshed and yet his region lacked development 
opportunities.  They noted increased tension among Arab groups while 
Tukras also linked janjaweed leader Musa Hilal to JEM commander 
Khalil Ibrahim, describing both of them as ostracized and outside of 
real power in Darfur and therefore looking for ways to cooperate. 
The biggest obstacle, however, was Abdul Wahid. Fadul and Tukras 
described his support as mostly lip service, and while his influence 
on the ground was minimal, he was still regarded by many people in 
the camps as a symbolic leader. Within the IDP camps, they said, 
people placed their trust in a trinity of sorts: Allah, the 
Foreigner, and Abdul Wahid, in declining order. 
 
-------------------------- 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IS THE KEY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) What Darfur needed most, Fadul and Tukras said, was good 
governance. The problems in Darfur weren't tribal, but a result of 
 
KHARTOUM 00000987  002 OF 002 
 
 
continued poor governance since independence. Darfurians had seen 
multiple armed tribal conflicts in recent history, Tukras noted, but 
had always managed to resolve such conflicts themselves. Both Fadul 
and Tukras said that the concept of power sharing was of little 
importance to rural Darfurians; resource sharing was much more 
crucial. Those who make power sharing a priority in negotiations, 
they said, were putting their own interests before those of the 
people of Darfur and hoping that foreigners would tip the balance in 
their favor. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the hybrid force, Tukras said that there had to be a 
very strong mandate to protect civilians, and to forcefully 
intervene when necessary. Fadul agreed, adding that civil society 
development needed to take place alongside the deployment of the 
hybrid force. He also urged the development of the AU's advisory 
capacity on the ground, saying that the mission desperately needed 
political advisors who came from Sudan itself. Current advisors knew 
nothing of Darfur, didn't speak Arabic, and never left their 
air-conditioned offices. Both cited the need to work to rebuild the 
strength of traditional tribal leadership as part of development 
efforts. 
 
FERNANDEZ