VZCZCXRO3004
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0986/01 1731038
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221038Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7686
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000986 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT: Darfurians Worry About and Welcome the Hybrid 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In his inaugural trip to Nyala and El Fasher June 
18-20, CDA Fernandez met with a wide range of Darfurian actors, 
including IDPs, tribal elders, INGOs and UN agencies and Sudanese 
government officials. While all welcomed the recent announcement 
that the Sudanese government would accept the AU/UN hybrid force, 
expectations of the hybrid's mandate were varied. IDP 
representatives voiced high expectations for the hybrid force, 
equating their presence with stronger social services as well as 
security. The NGO and donor community, cognizant that expectations 
were running too high, urged for serious development planning to 
occur in tandem with hybrid deployment. End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
HIGH EXPECATIONS FOR HYBRID 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a June 18 meeting with CDA, youth representatives from 
the Kalma and Otash IDP camps in South Darfur described a grim 
social reality within the camps, with extremely limited access to 
basic education and a very volatile security environment. They also 
confessed to an almost total reliance on the international community 
for basic services such as food and healthcare. Though 
understandably unfamiliar with the details of the Addis tripartite 
agreement on the hybrid force, the youth were very clear as to what 
they expected from the presence of any UN force on the ground in 
Darfur. They first cited improved security, with an increased chance 
of some IDPs returning to their native homes. More telling, however, 
was the youths' expectation that UN forces would also provide 
greater access to education, employment opportunities and other 
social services. Though CDA cautioned them that the hybrid force's 
mandate was restricted to protection activities, this advice did not 
seem to alter their inflated expectations. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DEVELOPMENT, NOT JUST DEPLOYMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a July 19 meeting with Magdoum Ahmad Rijal, a leading 
traditional Fur tribal chief in South Darfur, and a small group of 
his advisors, a more tempered view of the role of the hybrid force 
was expressed. While welcoming the tripartite agreement, one of the 
Magdoum's advisors said that the hybrid force, even if it were on 
the ground in three to six months, would be "too late." The hybrid 
could help advance peace, he said, but the Sudanese government had 
already forced many people, especially African tribes, from their 
lands and begun repopulating them with Arab tribes (many of them 
expelled from Chad and Niger) who he said supported the government. 
The Magdoum and his advisors stressed that development planning for 
Darfur should occur in tandem with continued humanitarian assistance 
and political negotiations, and should not be left until after the 
resolution of the political process. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Sudanese government itself also viewed the hybrid force 
as a means to greater development within Darfur. The wali of South 
Darfur, Al-Hajii Aba El-Manna Idriss, reliably voiced the government 
party line and depicted the overall security situation as stable. He 
blamed small groups of "bandits" for security violations. The wali 
said that "spontaneous returns" of IDPs were already occurring in 
South Darfur, and he expected to see more as security continued to 
improve. He invited CDA to visit these returnees in their villages. 
(Note: The wali was also of the opinion that INGOs didn't want to 
see IDPs returning to their villages, fearing the loss of donor 
money for their organizations. Strangely enough, some IDPs seem to 
feel the same way. End note.) However, he said, IDPs in the camps 
had better access to water, healthcare, food and education than 
residents in the villages. Without real reconstruction and 
development efforts, most IDPs would be reluctant to return. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Subsequent meetings with the donor community and UN country 
teams in Nyala and El Fasher revealed that they too were concerned 
with the unrealistic expectations facing the hybrid force. The head 
of OCHA in Nyala pointed out that while IDPs currently viewed the 
international community as an "honest broker," that could change 
when UN forces arrived. A better security situation could encourage 
IDPs to return to their homes, he said, but they would expect to see 
the same provision of basic services in their villages of origin as 
they had in the camps. A representative from IRC described IDPs as 
very worried that UN forces would consume all available water, an 
assumption that unless corrected could also undermine IDPs' trust in 
the hybrid force. He noted that 20,000 peacekeepers would consume as 
much water as 800,000 IDPs. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The NGOs and UN country teams also emphasized that military 
operations must not sideline international humanitarian efforts. 
They described fears of "donor fatigue," and urged the US and the 
international community to continue funding humanitarian work. The 
 
KHARTOUM 00000986  002 OF 002 
 
 
NGOS pushed for more focus on development -- and reconciliation -- 
strategies, which would support and augment both the political 
process and the peacekeeping operations. They asked for greater 
effort to pressure various rebel groups (both signatories and 
non-signatories) who were currently the greatest source of violence 
in Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) They added that the security situation was "relatively calm 
but unpredictable." The greatest element of instability was the 
explosion of carjacking. UN Security noted that organized crime 
rings were stealing cars in Darfur and trafficking them as far away 
as Cameroon. International aid workers, GoS officials and other 
Darfur residents all noted the increase in violence within 
communities: inside and among IDP populations, clashes between Arab 
tribes allied to the GoS, and rebel groups preying on their own 
ethnic groups. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The IDP community in Darfur, and in some cases 
rural Darfurians who have remained in their villages, is almost 
wholly dependent on the donor community for basic services. IDPs 
feel better protected by INGOs than by any other actor in Darfur, 
including rebel movements and the Sudanese government. While the 
hybrid force will provide protection, and ostensibly lead to an 
improved security situation, it will not fulfill Darfurians' 
expectations of greater social services. To enhance the success of 
the hybrid mission and secure the trust of those it is meant to 
protect, there should be also be a coordinated element of 
development and a focus on reconciliation and strengthening civil 
society within Darfur. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ