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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM985, SPLM Re-Assessing Darfur Initiative

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM985 2007-06-22 03:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2638
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0985/01 1730337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220337Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7684
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: SPLM Re-Assessing Darfur Initiative 
 
REFTEL: Khartoum 960 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The SPLM is re-assessing its effort to bring together 
Darfurians after postponing its planned conference in Rumbek. 
Clement Janda, the SPLM's Task Force on Darfur (TFD) Chairman, was 
disappointed by the failure of key rebel factions to attend and the 
lack of support it received from the international community, 
particularly the UN/AU.  The SPLM and the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GOSS) consider the Darfur issue important and appear 
committed to finding a way forward after last week's setback.  The 
international community, particularly the UN/AU, could play a 
positive role in promoting the SPLM conference if it accepts the 
SPLM's approach--including a probably irreduceable degree of 
uncertainty about how the conference will be structured and how the 
initiative will play out.  It would also be useful if the UN/AU 
could state clearly what role it wishes to play in the SPLM effort, 
rather than asking the SPLM to define it for them.  End Summary. 
 
------------ 
Reassessment 
------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Mission staff met with the Chairman of the SPLM's Task 
Force on Darfur (TFD) on June 20.  Janda said that the Task Force 
would reconvene in Juba to reassess its strategy in light of the 
refusal of rebel leaders to attend and lack of strong support from 
the UN/AU and the international community.  Despite this pause for 
reassessment, some activities continue.  Justice and Equality 
Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim had been trying to reach SPLM 
Secretary General Pagan Amum, Janda said.  The TFD had also received 
 
SIPDIS 
a fax from purported Darfurian commanders assembled in Tripoli. 
 
3. (SBU) Janda stated that the Darfur rebel movements were hostage 
to their external patrons.   He lamented that the more initiatives 
there are the more factions emerge.  GOSS President Salva Kiir 
traveled to N'Djamena, Asmara and throughout the region to encourage 
the outside patrons to promote unity, Janda said, and to discourage 
potential spoilers.  The SPLM had worked particularly hard to push 
Eritrea toward a more constructive role, Janda argued.  He opined 
that this has been misperceived, particularly by the UN/AU, as 
undermining the UN/AU role.  Eritrea wants to improve its regional 
relations, Janda said, and cooperation with the SPLM on Darfur is a 
means to that end. 
 
4. (SBU) The SPLM has a comparative advantage in attempting to bring 
the Darfur factions together, Janda continued.  As a part of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) it has access to President Omar 
el-Bashir and the leadership in Khartoum, and indeed won Bashir's 
agreement that the Rumbek conference could go forward.  The SPLM 
views itself as a facilitator, not a mediator, according to Janda. 
Despite membership in the GNU, its sympathies lie with the Darfurian 
people, and it can draw on its experience in overcoming serious 
internal divisions to help the Darfurians.  The SPLM is not an 
outside group interfering, Janda said, but a Sudanese entity with an 
understanding of rebel movements.  (Note: It is unclear just what 
kind of positive image the SPLM has among Darfurians, but it should 
continue to improve on this.  End note.) 
 
5. (SBU) The SPLM does not intend on replacing other initiatives or 
undermining the UN/AU, Janda emphasized.  The plethora of competing 
international and regional meetings and initiatives nevertheless 
contributed to the refusal by the rebels to attend the SPLM 
conference, Janda said.  If asked, the SPLM would attend the planned 
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) meeting of rebel factions in 
Mombasa or the June 25 ministerial in Paris, Janda claimed.  But the 
SPLM did not want to be in the position of approving or disapproving 
the efforts of others. 
 
------------------------------ 
Frustration With Rebels, UN/AU 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Janda expressed frustration with the rebel factions, which 
all claim to control the most men and territory as they jockey for 
the most seats at the table.  He explained that the involvement of 
the civil society in the SPLM initiative was designed to help 
mitigate the consequences of disunity among the rebels and provide 
input from Darfurians into the process.  The involvement of civil 
society or political elites was aimed at making the process more 
representative and limiting the ability of the rebel movements make 
grandiose claims of their relative strength.  He said that during 
the Abuja negotiations, the movements were unwilling and unable to 
name the locations and numbers of men under their control.  Many 
 
KHARTOUM 00000985  002 OF 002 
 
 
so-called faction leaders have only one car or five men and a 
Thuraya satellite telephone.  For outsiders, verification of 
relative strengths was difficult and required information from 
several sources. 
 
7. (SBU) Janda said that the SPLM was disappointed with the 
international community for scuttling its initiative without giving 
it a chance to work.  Only the U.S. and Norway committed funds. 
After receiving statements of support from the UN/AU and telling the 
SPLM to discourage bilateral donors from funding the SPLM initiative 
directly, the UN/AU then failed to deliver.  In Janda's view, the UN 
and AU paid lip service to the SPLM initiative and were not keen to 
see it move forward.  Janda predicted that without an initiative or 
effort being made in coming months to bring the Darfurians together, 
the rebel movements would disintegrate further. 
 
8. (SBU) Ambassador Pascal Ngoga, Senior Political Affairs Officer, 
UNMIS, met with the task force on June 19 to discuss the SPLM's 
views on the break-down of the initiative and find a way forward. 
Ngoga told us on June 20 that Janda had expressed his frustration 
with the lack of UN/AU coordination and support.  Janda complained 
that the international community told the SPLM to make "soup" but 
then disagreed over the ingredients.  Ngoga said that the crux of 
the problem was that the UN/AU wanted the SPLM to define the role it 
wanted the UN/AU to play.  UN advisor Abdul Mohammed expressed 
concern that the SPLM's involvement of civil society leaders could 
replicate or jeopardize the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, 
according to Ngoga.  He suggested that finding civilian and 
traditional leaders with ties to the rebel movements might make the 
SPLM's civil society concept more palatable. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) We do not view the damage or hard feelings caused by 
failure to launch the SPLM initiative as previously planned as 
irreparable.  Resolving the Darfur question remains a critical issue 
for both the Government of Southern Sudan and the SPLM, if for no 
other reason than Darfur directly impacts on the CPA and on 
international assistance for the South.  Janda and the task force 
will reconvene in the next week to determine a new game plan.  The 
outcomes of the ministerial in France on June 25 and the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue's gathering of rebel factions in Kenya might 
offer an opportunity for the SPLM to fine tune its approach and its 
place in the sequence of events leading to negotiations.  Perfect 
clarity will remain elusive, however, and some degree of uncertainty 
about the structure and outcome of SPLM effort is probably 
inevitable.  This setback has made it clear that coherent support 
among the international partners and the UN/AU is crucial for the 
SPLM's efforts to succeed.  A consistent message to the rebel 
factions and their external backers that the international 
community, especially the UN/AU, views the SPLM conference as a 
necessary stop on the roadmap to negotiations would be helpful.  For 
its part, the SPLM needs to engage the UN/AU at a senior level and 
agree once and for all the role the UN/AU will play in the SPLM 
initiative, and the relation between the SPLM's efforts and those of 
the UN/AU.  We will urge the SPLM to do this in a timely manner, 
which would allow the international community to encourage the rebel 
factions to attend and pre-empt other regional efforts.  End 
Comment.