VZCZCXRO0186
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0970/01 1710410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200410Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7664
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000970 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS, NAIROBI FOR SFO, 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU AND FOR REFCOORD 
USUN FOR TMALY 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV SOCI SU KPKO
 
SUBJECT: Southern Sudan--Conflict Threats in Urban Areas 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000970  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: USAID implementing partner Pact conducted a conflict 
analysis and threat assessment in Southern Sudan and the Three 
Areas. The focus of the assessment was on urban areas. A variety of 
threats that could lead to conflict were identified and presented to 
the South Sudan Peace Commission, Pact's government partner. Pact 
will use this analysis to plan its interventions.  End Summary. 
 
2.(U) USAID's partner, Pact, is implementing a five year program 
designed to target and mitigate conflict threats in key urban 
centers in South Sudan (Malakal, Juba and Aweil), and in the Three 
Areas (Kauda, Kadugli and Abyei.) Pact conducted a series of 
on-the-ground assessments in each location. Based on this 
information, Pact identified local actors and interventions to 
address the conflicts.  Not all conflicts are within Pact's scope 
and mandate.  Some of the identified issues will need to be resolved 
at the governmental level.  The South Sudan Peace Commission 
supports Pact's analysis and has agreed to raise the issues to 
relevant GOSS and SPLA/M powerbrokers. 
 
¶3. (U) Some of the conflict sources identified in the assessment 
apply across South Sudan and the Three Areas and are related to 
long-standing inter-ethnic tensions, political rivalries, tribalism, 
and access and competition for resources. Others are grounded in 
current political competition between the National Congress Party 
(NCP) and SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) and tensions 
between SAF and SPLA forces in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). In 
addition, Pact identified conflict threats that are specific to each 
of the six locations in which they are working, some of which are 
outlined below. 
 
¶4. (U) Malakal, Upper Nile: Pact identified tensions between the 
Nuer and Shilluk communities in Malakal, which are based on 
long-standing historical conflicts, ethnic differences and false 
perceptions, as a potential source of localized conflict. There are 
issues of competition related to access to water and grazing rights, 
which are exacerbated by inter-ethnic tensions. Conflict related to 
county boundaries and tensions between Southern and Arab traders are 
based on competition for resources, inter-ethnic tensions, and the 
sense of historical inequity. The rivalry in Fangak (Jonglei state) 
between supporters of SSDF leader General Gabriel Chan (nicknamed 
Tangiena) and Commissioner John Maluit already led to violence in 
November 2006 and could lead to further conflict if not resolved. 
Conflicts between Dinka Ngok and Dinka Dongjol, as well as 
intra-Shilluk tensions are potentially more explosive due to the 
presence of arms among these groups.  The formation and deployment 
of GoS-supported Oil Defense Forces around oil fields in Maban and 
Malut counties in the northern part of Upper Nile are a further 
source of concern for residents of the state.  And finally, tensions 
between returnees and residents are growing due to cultural clashes, 
competition for resources, and general vulnerability and poverty. 
 
¶5. (U) Juba, Central Equatoria: Some of the potential areas of 
conflict in Juba are similar to those in other locations, such as 
the presence of armed groups, competition for land and grazing 
rights, tension around county boundaries, and competition for 
resources.  However, Juba has specific issues that are related to 
its function as the capitol of Southern Sudan.  Pact identified 
competition between the GOSS and the government of the state of 
Central Equatoria related to decentralization of power, lack of 
resources and inadequate service delivery, as a potential problem. 
Tensions around access to land and grazing rights are exacerbated by 
extensive "land grabbing" that is occurring in Juba town. SSPC 
concurred strongly with this point and even called land issues a 
complicated problem that could lead to violence and impact severely 
on both GOSS and the Government of Central Equatoria state. IDPs 
have established temporary accommodations around Juba and are being 
threatened with forcible removal. Corruption, the perception of 
tribal favoritism (perceived Dinka dominance of GOSS), alleged 
nepotism and economic changes (rise in prices of basic commodities, 
housing) highlight the gap between the wealthy and poor and could 
lead to lack of confidence in the GOSS and general discontent.  Pact 
flagged a number of issues as potential areas of conflict, such as: 
(1) the plan to lay off 7,000 state-level civil servants in Central 
Equatoria state; (2) the 4,000 ex-Sudan Armed Forces members who 
refuse to join SAF and move to the north and now remain in Juba; 
and (3) rumblings about perceived trade dominance by foreigners in 
Juba's markets. 
 
¶6. (U) Aweil, Northern Bahr e Ghazal: Aweil town, in which numerous 
tribes co-exist, has similar issues as Malakal and Juba.  Among 
these are the slow integration of the SPLA and SAF forces into the 
JIU, competition over resources and perceived inter-ethnic 
inequities, abundance of arms, and perceptions of corruption and 
nepotism among civil servants. In addition, Pact identified tensions 
 
KHARTOUM 00000970  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
among youth, who feel alienated and have contributed to a rise in 
crime, in some cases through organized criminal activity. Northern 
Bahr e Ghazal is receiving a large number of returnees, either IDPs 
or returning refugees, who are coming back with differing levels of 
support.  Many are being brought back by the state government, 
church groups or local organizations.  They are returning to an 
inhospitable environment that can barely support the existing 
population. This is creating increased tensions and hardship for 
residents and returnees. 
 
¶7. (U) Three Areas (Kauda, Kadugli, and Abyei): Pact noted that 
communities in the Three Areas were polarized around their 
affiliation with either the NCP or the SPLM.  Similar to other 
locations, there are tensions between the SAF and SPLA forces in the 
JIUs.  In Kauda and Agok, south of the Kiir River where the SPLA had 
its headquarters during the war, there are growing tensions within 
the SPLA due to pay discrepancies between SPLA "mother forces" and 
SPLA police. In Kadugli, there is friction between the SPLA and 
People's Defense Forces, a militia, which has not been disbanded or 
integrated into the SAF or SPLA.  Similar to Aweil, there are 
concerns in both Kadugli and Kauda over idle and unemployed youth, 
some of whom joined the SPLA with the expectation of filling SPLM 
posts after the integration of the civil service.  They are 
dissatisfied with the pace of the implementation of the CPA. Pact 
identified inter-ethnic conflicts and concerns about nepotism as a 
key issue in all three locations.  In Kadugli, Pact believes that 
some ethnic groups (Julud and Hawazma) are feeling under-represented 
in governmental structures.  In Kauda, according to Pact, the SPLA 
is under pressure to intervene to protect vulnerable Nuba 
communities from attacks by armed nomads in the areas of Kawaliib, 
Wernang, and Abu Kershola and the Goz area north west of Dilling. 
The lack of an agreed administration in Abyei is creating tensions 
among all ethnic groups and the lack of clarity on boundaries is 
intensifying competition and inter-ethnic rivalries for land access 
and grazing rights. In Kadugli, there are conflicts over access to 
gum Arabic harvesting. 
 
¶8. (U) Pact has identified a number of local organizations in each 
location with which they plan to work on localized conflict 
resolution and reconciliation activities.  Additionally, the SSPC 
will be utilizing the analysis to identify government-sponsored 
efforts to address conflicts and potential threats that are beyond 
the ability of Pact.  The partnership between Pact and SSPC is 
growing into a constructive and supportive relationship. Pact will 
continue to work on refining its efforts to work with local groups 
and activities to target key threats that could impact on the 
implementation of the CPA at the local level. 
 
FERNANDO