VZCZCXRO9482
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0965 1701335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191335Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7658
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000965 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: CDA TO MFA: SUDAN MUST SHOW "NEW REALITY" 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 925 
 
KHARTOUM 947 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Sudan Lags in its Commitments 
----------------------------- 
 
¶1. (x) In an introductory meeting with Undersecretary of Foreign 
Affairs Siddiq Mutriff on June 16, CDA Fernandez said that many in 
the U.S. doubt Sudan's sincere commitment to resolve the Darfur 
conflict and instead viewed the Sudanese Government as responding 
only to pressure.  "Everything you do contributes to the idea that 
you're only doing these because you're forced," said the CDA. 
Mutriff expressed his government's view that Sudan was criticized 
regardless of its actions and recommended that discussions on the 
Darfur conflict be resolved through dialogue on "technical" issues 
rather than through political rhetoric. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Sudan Accepts "All Components" of Hybrid 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (x) Mutriff said that Sudan had accepted the United 
Nations/African Union hybrid peace-keeping force "in all its 
components" during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa.  He 
said that agreement between the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese 
Government on the force had been reached in "a neutral, 
professional, and technical manner."  Mutriff had later explained 
the agreement in the presence of President Bashir, who concurred 
that Sudan "must commit to what we've agreed to."  Mutriff suggested 
that acceptance of the hybrid be the basis for cooperation between 
Sudan and the U.S.  "We need to do things out of our convictions," 
he stated.  "If we do things because of sanctions or for improved 
relations, it won't work." 
 
----------------------------- 
Sudan Must Show "New Reality" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (x) The CDA said that the U.S. would be monitoring Sudan's 
adherence to the recent agreement with the UN and AU to show that it 
was interested in a "new reality."  In order to change international 
perceptions of Sudan formed since 2003 and break the cycle of mutual 
recriminations, Sudan must be "clear" its in sincerity to defuse the 
conflict by cooperating on the deployment of an effective 
peace-keeping force and contributing to a political solution. 
Pointing to Afghanistan and Palestine, the CDA noted the lasting 
repercussions of a generation of children growing up in camps and 
said it was "in Sudan's interest" to end the conflict.  "All the 
people of Darfur should have a role in political life, a role in the 
future," he said. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Street Opening: "A Terrible Idea" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (x) Calling the threat to open the street in front of the Embassy 
"a terrible idea," CDA said that the Sudanese Government would be 
blamed for any attack on diplomatic personnel.  Mutriff said that he 
had advised the Governor of Khartoum State to meet with CDA (Ref. A) 
to discuss the issue.  Recognizing that opponents of the Government 
could use the issue to "embarrass" Khartoum, Mutriff said that the 
security services were sympathetic to the problem and that security 
would be increased for the Embassy.  CDA explained that the security 
services had requested that a diplomatic note be sent to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ref. B).  Mutriff was unaware of this 
request. 
 
---------------------------- 
Conclusions from Addis Ababa 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (x) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mutriff passed a document 
to CDA, which represented the conclusions of the recent 
consultations in Addis Ababa.  In describing the mandate of the 
UN/AU hybrid, the document matched the UN/AU report on the mission 
with the exception of slight changes to the sections on rule of law 
and border security.  The document differs slightly in its 
description of options one and two for the force size and calls for 
651 fewer police officers.  An explicit reference to Sudan's 
facilitation of access to land and water for the force is also 
absent.  (Note: The document and a preliminary analysis of its 
contents was forwarded to AF/SPG on June 18.  End note.) 
 
FERNANDEZ