VZCZCXRO3894
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0935/01 1641208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131208Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7592
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0179

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER CD LY
SUBJECT: SPLM/DARFUR: AMUM REITERATES FOCUS ON REBELS, SUPPORT FOR 
CHD 
 
Ref: Khartoum 929 
 
KHARTOUM 00000935  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Amum Shares Concerns on Phase 1 
------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Meeting with Acting CG Juba and Poloff on June 13, Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Secretary General Pagan Amum 
said that he shared U.S. concerns about the first phase of the 
SPLM's conference on Darfur.  As outlined by the SPLM, phase one 
would bring together civil society groups, traditional leaders, and 
Arab representatives (reftel).  Amum said that the intention was for 
the Darfur rebel factions to hear the concerns of these groups, 
particularly their demands for peace, and be "emboldened" to reflect 
these views during the negotiation phase.  Amum said that some 
Darfur groups have already objected to this approach and the net 
effect "may be negative." 
 
¶2. (SBU) Amum acknowledged that inviting Arab leaders associated 
with some of the atrocities in Darfur, such as notorious Janjaweed 
leader Musa Hillal, risked alienating the rebel factions and was a 
"big mistake."  He noted that the non-signatories are reluctant to 
join a process that might appear to absolve the Janjaweed.  Amum 
also said that some of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
non-signatories feared that the SPLM conference "would pull the rug 
out from under them" by allowing other groups to claim legitimacy. 
Amum reiterated that the SPLM's focus should be on facilitating 
negotiations with the non-signatories and the National Congress 
Party (NCP).  "My central idea was to make it quiet," said Amum. 
"The goal is for the non-signatories to negotiate.  We have no other 
reason."  Now that invitations have been issued to a wide range of 
participants, Amum said he would try to control the process and 
"minimize the damage." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Amum criticized the chairman of the SPLM Taskforce on 
Darfur (TFD) Clement Janda for making "public remarks" about the 
difficulties of securing the attendance of Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) leader Abdulwahid al-Nur at the conference.  The Secretary 
General said that he had told Janda "you are not a mediator, you are 
a facilitator."  He suggested that the SPLM should focus on "doing 
everything we can so that he (Abdulwahid) comes" rather than losing 
leverage by criticizing him. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Eritrea: Breaking the Strategic Siege 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Amum expressed some concern that the United Nations/Africa 
Union-led mediation process conflicted with the "regional mediation" 
involving Eritrea, Chad, and Libya.  Amum suggested that effective 
cooperation on the Darfur conflict could improve the contentious 
bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Eritrea.  "I see it as 
an opportunity," said Amum.  He explained that Eritrea was isolated 
from its neighbors--Ethiopia, Sudan, and Yemen--and wanted to "break 
its strategic siege."  Asmara viewed Sudan as "the weakest link" in 
this siege and had determined that brokering peace in Darfur would 
earn Khartoum's gratitude. 
 
------------------------------ 
SPLM Encourages CHD to Proceed 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) A representative of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(CHD), Theo Murphy, met with Amum just after his meeting with U.S. 
officials.  According to Murphy, Amum reiterated his support for 
CHD's proposed meeting in Nairobi for the factions of the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA).  While saying that Presidential Advisor 
Maghzoub Al Khalifa still objected to bringing rebel leaders outside 
of Sudan, Amum said that he would serve as a point of contact for 
the Kenyan Government to confirm the SPLM's support for CHD's 
effort.  Explaining that the SPLM Taskforce had spoken to rebel 
leaders in Darfur using intermediaries, Amum asked Murphy to put him 
in direct contact with the field commanders so that he could better 
explain the SPLM's initiative and address their concerns about the 
meeting in Southern Sudan.  Murphy had met earlier with SPLM 
Taskforce chairman Janda, who had also voiced support for CHD's 
initiative.  Murphy reported that Janda did not view the Nairobi 
meeting as conflicting with the SPLM conference and urged CHD to 
proceed.  Janda acknowledged that the logistical difficulties facing 
both efforts prevent a precise sequencing of the two meetings, and 
both should go forward. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: There are substantive differences, and a simple 
lack of coordination, among the various SPLM elements engaged in 
this process to date.  Amum's leadership and close engagement is 
key, and so is that of SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir--both to keep the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000935  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
process on track and to minimize SPLM disagreements.  We will 
continue to press both on this urgent priority.  End comment. 
 
¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ