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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM930, APREZI RETURNS, SLM REP MELTS DOWN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM930 2007-06-12 16:30 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2983
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0930/01 1631630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121630Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0100
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU CD SU
 
SUBJECT:  APREZI RETURNS, SLM REP MELTS DOWN 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Lt. 
Gen. Luke Aprezi returned to AMIS Force Headquarters on June 11.  He 
expressed doubts that Gen. Martin Luther Agwai was a good selection 
to replace him as AMIS force commander, though admitted Agwai would 
be well-positioned to lead the UN/AU hybrid operation.  Within hours 
of Aprezi's return to El Fasher, a Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM)/Minawi sector observer waged a standoff at Force Headquarters 
to protest "underpayment" of his monthly subsistence allowance. 
AMIS soldiers later disarmed him.  End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Aprezi on Aqwai 
--------------- 
 
2. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Aprezi returned to AMIS Force 
Headquarters on June 11.  Speaking with Poloff following a First 
Chamber Ceasefire Commission meeting, Aprezi said that he expected 
incoming AMIS force commander Martin Luther Agwai to arrive within 
two weeks. 
 
3. (SBU) Aprezi confided that he did not believe that Agwai was the 
right man for the job as AMIS Force Commander.  He had worked for 
Agwai for over four years as his chief of operations in the Nigerian 
military. Agwai then became Chief of the Nigerian Defense Staff 
where he had "300 generals working for him."  Aprezi said that it 
was a mistake to send a senior military officer to El Fasher, who 
would quickly lose patience with the inexperienced "little boys" who 
make up the bulk of AMIS soldiers.  Aprezi confirmed that Agwai 
would be good for the Hybrid force, however. 
 
4. (SBU) As if to underscore his point, several of Aprezi's staff 
entered his office and reported that there was an armed SLM/Minawi 
soldier on the compound threatening the chief of staff.  Aprezi 
complained that the soldiers should not have bothered to ask him 
before acting on their standing orders.  He said they had only 
"informed" him of the event so they could blame any violence that 
ensued on him. 
 
5. (SBU) Aprezi complained that he had tried to work closely with 
U.S. field representatives in the past.  However, his warnings of 
certain trends, "such as the need to prop up Minawi to ensure the 
SLM would not implode," had yielded no guidance and or support. 
"I'm tired of being a scapegoat - that's why I'm retiring," he 
said. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Gunwielding Minawi Rep Demands Past MSA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) At around 11:30 a.m., the SLM Minawi rep from al-Daein, 
LTC Ali Hamid Noor Shogar (Sector 8) entered the AMIS Force 
Headquarters compound to demand a return to the original Monthly 
Subsistence Allowance (MSA) of 2,700 dollars before international 
donors lowered the MSA to 500 dollars in March.  He first held 
SLM/Minawi Ceasefire Commission representatives in their office at 
gunpoint.  A CFC Secretariat soldier, passing by the office to 
obtain a signature, was pulled inside by the gunman and kicked.  He 
reported that the SLA representatives shielded him from the gunmen 
with their own bodies, and it appeared at one point that Shogar 
would shoot SLM rep Musa Mohamed Dabo.  After speaking with them for 
about 15 minutes, Shogar attempted to lock the three SLA 
representatives and one AMIS soldier in the office and left. 
 
6.  (SBU) Shogar went to the office of AMIS Chief of Staff Col. 
Partington, who talked to him for about half an hour and explained 
that the decision to reduce the MSA was made with the concurrence of 
the international community.  Partington said Shogar had called the 
CFC SLA representatives "liars and criminals" for misleading him 
about the MSA.  Partington advised Shogar to collect his higher 
February MSA and wait to collect his March payment pending a review 
of the issue.  As Shogar exited Partington's office into the CFC 
conference room, AMIS soldiers surrounded him.  He fired a warning 
shot into the air but was then disarmed.  (Note: Payment of MSAs 
have been pending since February as the U.K. and Netherlands conduct 
an accounting review.  End note.) 
 
7.  (SBU) Soon after he was detained, several SLM/Minawi members 
arrived to ask for Shogar's release, and he was released into their 
custody.  AMIS did not contact the Sudanese police. 
 
8.  (SBU) Comment.  Signs continue to point to the growing rifts 
with the SLM and between the SLM and AMIS.  SLA Minawi CFC 
representatives have told S/CRS Poloff that they understand how 
 
KHARTOUM 00000930  002 OF 002 
 
 
events such as this have sullied SLA Minawi's reputation, weakened 
AMIS' peacekeeping role and undermined the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA).  However, they rationalize the behavior of SLM soldiers as a 
difference in "culture."  End Comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ