VZCZCXRO8745
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0900/01 1581649
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071649Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7517
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0174

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AF/SPG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND 
SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER CD
SUBJECT: UN/AU PROCESS FLAILING 
 
KHARTOUM 00000900  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The absence of a specific UN/AU plan for the 
Darfur political process has led to an increase in competing 
international initiatives.  The UN and AU appear unable to exert the 
necessary leadership to shape these initiatives into a coherent 
strategy.  They have wavered in their support for the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) effort to unite the factions of the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in preparation for a conference in 
Southern Sudan.  While the UN and AU claim that the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) Task Force on Darfur's proposal for the 
conference remains disjointed and unrealistic, their engagement with 
the SPLM's senior leadership has been limited.  SPLM leaders are 
likewise disappointed with the UN/AU's efforts to date.  The UN and 
AU have no plan to address a new "regional initiative" led by 
Eritrea.  France has announced it will hold a ministerial-level 
meeting in Paris on June 25 for the parties to the Tripoli Consensus 
plus other African governments. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: UN Envoy Jan Eliasson will present the 
latest version of the UN/AU roadmap to the UN Security Council on 
June 8.  UN sources indicate that the roadmap will lay out broad 
principles and dates rather than a strategy to realize these 
benchmarks.  While remaining the only impartial parties to lead the 
political process, the UN and AU must go beyond calls for 
coordinating international efforts.  The USG should urge the UN/AU 
to select those initiatives with the greatest chance of success and 
then support the UN/AU as it discourages efforts outside of its 
strategy.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
UN/AU Brief Darfur Partners 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) UN and AU representatives briefed Western donors on June 6 
in Khartoum.  Following the completion of consultations in Darfur 
and Eritrea, Pekka Haavisto, senior advisor to UN Envoy Jan 
Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, co-chair of the UN/AU Joint Mediation 
Support Team (JMST), described the various international initiatives 
to advance the Darfur political process.  They lamented that none of 
the individual initiatives could involve all of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) non-signatory leaders but did not articulate a 
strategy to confront this dilemma. 
 
--------------- 
SPLM Conference 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The senior SPLM leadership has proposed a conference in 
Southern Sudan to prepare the DPA non-signatories for negotiations. 
According to the UN and AU, however, the SPLM Darfur Taskforce has 
articulated a more expansive vision, including the participation of 
civil society, the reconciliation of Arab and African tribes, and 
other elements.  It is still unclear how these different visions of 
the SPLM initiative will be reconciled.  The JMST has only met with 
one senior SPLM official, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor. 
The UN/AU expressed concerns about the meeting proposed by the SPLM 
Taskforce.  JMST members in contact with key Darfur field commanders 
and political leaders said that the SPLM has not contacted them and 
has instead invited only civil society activists and traditional 
leaders to Southern Sudan.  Sources in the SPLM Task Force 
contradict these assertions and claim that they have met military 
commanders in N'djamena and "established contact" with commanders in 
Darfur. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UN and AU expressed a concern that Western donor 
backing for the SPLM Taskforce would encourage the Taskforce to 
circumvent rather than coordinate with the UN and AU.  Haavisto said 
that Alor had admitted that he feared the SPLM was drifting away 
from the UN/AU lead.  Alor had emphasized, however, that the SPLM 
leadership viewed the party's role as a facilitator rather than a 
mediator and that it would focus on preparing the non-signatories 
for negotiations.  The Norwegian ambassador suggested that the UN 
and AU speak directly to First Vice President Salva Kiir.  Poloff 
explained that the USG had conducted extensive discussions with the 
SPLM leadership.  The leadership understood that the Taskforce 
lacked direction and was taking steps to address this weakness. 
Echoing the Norwegian ambassador's suggestion, Poloff predicted that 
the SPLM taskforce would not launch a conference that was 
inconsistent with the party leadership's goals. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Some donors also expressed concern that Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim had told the JMST that 
he would not attend a conference in Southern Sudan.  Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) faction leader Abdulwahid al-Nur has similar 
reservations.  Other factions of the SLA, including SLA/Abdulwahid 
field commanders, insist that a meeting to unite the SLA should 
precede the SPLM meeting in Southern Sudan.  (Note: The SPLM claims 
to have received assurances from a wide variety of faction leaders, 
including Abdulwahid, that they will attend the SPLM conference. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000900  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
End note.) 
 
--------------- 
NGO Initiatives 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The JMST said there was a lack of coordination among the 
initiatives proposed by non-governmental organizations.  While 
noting the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's proposal to facilitate 
greater cohesion within the SLA in preparation for a conference, the 
JMST was concerned that its meeting in Nairobi could overlap with 
the SPLM's conference in Southern Sudan.  Haavisto reported that 
Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa had objected to allowing 
rebel leaders to attend a meeting outside Sudan.  Given National 
Congress Party (NCP) opposition, the UN and AU said that Chad was 
reticent to permit the SLA field commanders to transit their country 
en route to Nairobi while Kenya was concerned that allowing the 
meeting could jeopardize their proposed summit for IGAD. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Haavisto said that some rebel leaders were in Asmara for 
Eritrean-sponsored talks and were unlikely to leave for Nairobi.  He 
also said that faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafi had refused to attend 
the CHD meeting, preferring instead a proposal from the Community of 
Sant Egidio to hold talks in Rome.  The UN/AU asked that CHD and 
Sant Egidio coordinate and emphasized that any NGO initiatives 
should complement SPLM efforts.  (Note: Poloff met with Sant' Egidio 
representatives on June 5.  Unlike CHD, which has long-standing 
relationships with Darfur political leaders and field commanders, 
they had not made contact with any rebel leaders except Abdulshafi. 
Reporting from Embassy Kampala indicates that Abdulshafi is willing 
to attend the CHD meeting.  SPLM Taskforce members also say 
Abdulshafi is willing to attend the SPLM conference.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Poloff reported that CHD was coordinating with the SPLM and 
that its proposal was necessary to make the meeting in Southern 
Sudan successful given SLA commanders request for unity talks. 
Dialogue with SPLM Taskforce members in Juba, however, indicates 
little effective coordination to date.  He questioned the military 
and political weight of the rebel leaders in Asmara, explaining that 
the value of including them in SLA organizational talks was to avoid 
them becoming spoilers.  However, they should not be allowed to 
prevent a constructive meeting.  Poloff further noted that the NCP 
should not be allowed to dictate the UN/AU process.  He said that 
CHD had selected Nairobi because Abdulwahid had said he would not 
come to Sudan.  Poloff suggested that an explicit UN/AU endorsement 
of CHD was likely to persuade Chad and Kenya to provide assistance. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Eritrea and the "Regional Initiative" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Having returned from two days of meetings in Asmara, 
Haavisto and Ibok reported that the Eritrean government was holding 
unity talks for SLA faction leaders Khamis Abdullah, Sharif Harir, 
and Abdullah Yehia under a "regional initiative" that included Chad 
and Libya.  Eritrean officials Yemane Ghareab and Abdullah Jabr had 
stated that these talks would last until the end of June and had 
said that they had a mandate from the NCP for their initiative. 
They then wanted to send the group to Southern Sudan to attend the 
SPLM conference with other rebel groups.  This conference would lead 
to formal negotiations between the rebels and the NCP in Asmara. 
Ghareab and Jabr admitted that Abdulwahid, Abdulshafi, and Ibrahim 
would not participate in an Eritrean-led process or go to Asmara. 
(Note: While the UN/AU said it was unable to reign in Eritrea, 
Asmara may be emboldened by the tacit support of some Western 
donors, particularly Norway.  End note.) 
 
---------------------- 
UN/AU Roadmap Flailing 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The donors asked for precise timelines delineating a 
strategy, requested "more guidance from the UN and AU," and 
suggested that the UN/AU serve as a "clearinghouse" for the 
international efforts.  Ibok responded that "it was difficult to say 
which initiatives had a comparative advantage."  The UN and AU 
stated that they had originally envisaged a three-stage roadmap for 
the political process: 1) The CHD meeting in Nairobi to bring 
greater organization to the SLA; 2) The SPLM meeting in Southern 
Sudan to prepare the rebel movements for negotiations with the NCP; 
3) Negotiations. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Overwhelmed by events, however, the UN/AU has drifted. 
Interference by Sant' Egidio has obscured the momentum generated by 
CHD for an SLA meeting.  The NCP's opposition to rebel leaders 
leaving Darfur raises real concerns within the UN/AU.  The 
disconnects within the SPLM--which will be resolved in time--have 
led the UN/AU to "rethink" the SPLM's role.  However, the JMST 
 
KHARTOUM 00000900  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
continues to insist that all NGO initiatives, such as CHD, should 
feed into the SPLM meeting.  While emphasizing that Eritrea must 
play a part in the political process to prevent it from being a 
spoiler, the UN and AU have not shaped its role, either directly or 
by calling for assistance from countries that can influence Asmara. 
The UN/AU's role as chairman of the regular contact group meetings 
based on the Tripoli format has been undermined by France's 
announcement that FM Kouchner will convene a ministerial-level 
meeting of the "Tripoli Plus" in Paris on July 25.  (Note: The 
French Political Counselor told Poloff that this group would include 
representatives from the April conference in Tripoli and other 
African countries, including Ghana.  End note.)  Though UNSYG Ban Ki 
Moon has been invited, France did not consult the UN in advance. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The international community, including the Sudanese 
Government and the regional actors, gave the UN and AU a mandate for 
the Darfur political process in the Addis Ababa agreement of 
November and reiterated it in the Tripoli Consensus of April.  The 
UN and AU have yet to act on this mandate to channel the efforts of 
Western donors, regional governments, and NGOs.  The USG should 
press the UN/AU to return to its three-stage strategy: A CHD meeting 
to bring more organization to the SLA, an SPLM meeting to prepare 
the rebel movements for negotiations with the NCP, and negotiations 
involving UN/AU--not Eritrean--mediation. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment continued: Strong UN/AU endorsement of a strategy 
would pressure the disparate factions to participate in the process; 
garner Kenyan and Chadian support for the CHD meeting; facilitate 
coordination with the SPLM and increase the chances of success of 
its conference; encourage France to push Abdulwahid to attend both 
the CHD meeting and the SPLM conference; and weaken support for 
Eritrea, which is exploiting the UN/AU disarray.  A UN/AU strategy 
will show the Sudanese Government--and its backers such as 
China--that the international community is serious about both an 
effective political process and an effective peacekeeping operation 
for Darfur.  This strategy will also hold the Sudanese Government 
accountable to its commitment to support the UN/AU lead and engage 
in serious negotiations with the non-signatories.  End comment. 
 
¶15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.