VZCZCXRO5600
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0884/01 1561126
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051126Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7487
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU CD SU
SUBJECT: AMIS AND SLA CLASH IN SOUTH DARFUR 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) A fatal road traffic accident on May 30 between an AMIS APC 
and an SLA/Minawi truck in South Darfur left one SLA dead and nine 
injured.  The accident sparked a reprisal from SLA fighters, who 
later shot three AMIS soldiers and commandeered 13 AMIS vehicles. 
The incident illustrates SLA leader Minni Minawi's declining 
influence in the absence of any leverage, such as non-military 
logistical support, over his fighters in the field.  End Summary. 
 
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AMIS-SLA Collision 
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¶2. (SBU) On May 30, a convoy of eight African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) vehicles was traveling near Labado, South Darfur when it 
intersected with a truck carrying 13 fighters affiliated with the 
Sudan Liberation Army/Minawi.  Without warning, an armored personnel 
carrier (APC) in the AMIS convoy veered into the SLA vehicle, 
killing two of the passengers and wounding nine.  AMIS Deputy Force 
Commander Ephrem Rurangwa ordered the Sector 8 commander to render 
medical assistance to the wounded SLA.  Believing that the collision 
was intentional and that AMIS reacted too slowly in providing 
medical services, SLA fighters shot three AMIS soldiers on the 
scene, stole eight AMIS vehicles from a market in Labado, and took 
another five AMIS vehicles from nearby Muhajeria.  AMIS later 
evacuated nine of the SLA wounded to El Fasher, four of whom were 
deemed in serious condition and were transported to Khartoum. 
(Note: The three AMIS soldiers shot by the SLA were not seriously 
wounded.  End note.) 
 
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CFC Investigation 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Rurangwa convened an emergency session of the Ceasefire 
Commission (CFC) on June 1, but due to a heavy dust storm, an 
investigation team was unable to make it to Labado Military Group 
Site (MGS) until the next day.  The team interviewed the Sector and 
Group Site commanders and spoke with local SLA representatives.  The 
SLA insisted that the collision was not an accident.  They refused 
to discuss the shooting of the AMIS soldiers or the seizure of the 
AMIS vehicles until a formal investigation of the original collision 
was undertaken. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On June 3, the CFC investigation team returned to Labado 
Group Site.  The team interviewed the APC driver, the convoy patrol 
leader, and an SLA representative who had accompanied the convoy. 
The SLA vehicle had been moved and stripped of its wheels and 
engine.  Local SLA crowded around to hear the testimony, but CFC SLA 
representatives helped distance them from the witnesses. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The investigation team plans to visit Muhajeria MGS on June 
5 to interview additional witnesses.  AMIS requested that their 
vehicles be returned but were told through back channels that 
several had already been "chopped up" and modified for SLA use. 
Based on the SLA CFC representative's statements linking the Labado 
incident with the deaths of SLA members in Haskanita, Umm Barru, and 
Graida, Rurangwa asserted that the SLA leadership must have directed 
the vehicle seizure. 
 
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SLA Command Breaks Down 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a June 3 meeting with Poloff in Khartoum, Senior 
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi explained that he had 
ordered the SLA fighters in Labado to return the vehicles.  The 
fighters explained to Minawi that AMIS' "attack" on the SLA 
represented the most recent in a string of killings for which 
neither the families nor the SLA had received compensation, 
including the incident in Umm Barru.  SLA Chief of Staff Jumma 
Haggar has also been unsuccessful at persuading the SLA fighters to 
return the vehicles. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (SBU) Though there is no evidence that the SLA leadership ordered 
the shooting of the three AMIS soldiers or the seizure of AMIS 
vehicles, the incident is illustrative of the breakdown of command 
and control within the SLA.  Without any leverage over his forces, 
such as non-military logistical support, Minawi's influence in the 
field declines while the disconnect grows between the political and 
military wings of the SLA.  End Comment. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000884  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
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