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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM883, SUDANESE OFFICIALS REACT TO U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM883 2007-06-05 11:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0883/01 1561123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051123Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7485
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000883 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EPS, AF/PD, EB/IFD, AND EB/ESC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON EAID SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE OFFICIALS REACT TO U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Many Sudanese officials have quickly and publicly 
responded to the May 29 announcement of tightening U.S. economic 
sanctions on Sudan.  Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir stated that 
he believes the sanctions will most dramatically affect the Sudanese 
poor.  Others, such as Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice President of 
the Government of National Unity and President of the Government of 
Southern Sudan (GoSS), criticized the economic sanctions and stated 
that they will not help achieve peace in Darfur, but will only harm 
Sudanese citizens in other parts of the country.  While uniformly 
pessimistic, responses focus on varying themes such as Sudanese 
resilience and defiance, the sanctions' alleged negative impact on 
humanitarian efforts and the poor, and the timing of the 
announcement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
1. (U) All remarks are taken from four Sudanese Arabic newspapers 
from May 30 to June 2:  Al-Ayaam, Akbar Lahza, Al-Sharia' Al-Siasi: 
 
 
2. (U) President Al-Bashir stated that the US economic sanctions 
actually target Sudanese citizens.  He declared that most of the 
companies added to the sanctions list are agricultural and have no 
relation to Darfur. He added that sanctions have also caused great 
damage to many U.S. companies, especially in the oil and mining 
sectors. He commented that the Government of Sudan has replaced 
these American companies with Asian firms. 
 
3. (U) First Vice President Kiir, criticized the economic sanctions 
and stated that they will not help achieve peace in Darfur, but will 
only harm Sudanese citizens in other parts of the country. 
 
4. (U) Dr. Magzoub El-Khalifa, President Bashir's advisor and the 
chair of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Commission, 
stated that the GoS will not bow to U.S. sanctions.  He added that 
Sudan will contact its friends to overcome the sanctions' effects. 
He commented that the sanctions will have a negative impact on the 
DPA and that they may hamper the upcoming negotiations between 
Darfur rebels, the AU, and the UN. 
 
5. (U) Mohamed Ali El-Mardi, Minister of Justice, described the 
sanctions as unfair.  He added that President Bush is trying to 
divert U.S. citizens' attention from his failure in Iraq and the 
casualties of U.S. soldiers there. 
 
6. (U) Abdel Rahim Hamdi, Ex-Minister of Finance and National 
Economy and the National Congress Party (NCP) economic advisor 
described the sanctions as fragile and merely a political 
distraction.  He stated that the sanctions will have no impact on 
Sudan's economy, hinting that there have been no financial 
transactions between Sudan and the U.S. since 1997. He stated that 
most of the targeted companies are privately owned. For example, 
El-Sunut Development Co. is owned by the agent of Coca-Cola in Sudan 
and 70% of SUDATEL, AAAID, and GIAD companies are owned by 
expatriates. Hamdi further noted that sanctions do not include the 
Chinese or Malaysian oil companies. 
 
7. (U) Dr. Izz El-Din Ibrahim, Ex-State Minister of the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, stated that the sanctions are merely a 
renewal of the previous economic sanctions instituted in 1997. 
 
8. (U) Bader El-Din Mahmmoud Abbas, Deputy Governor of the Central 
Bank of Sudan (CBOS), stated that U.S. sanctions are not new.  He 
added that because sanctions were imposed by the U.S. alone, they 
will not hamper Sudan's economy. In his opinion, the sanctions are a 
psychological tactic for prompting greater divestment from Sudan. 
He stated that the CBOS is exploring options for using a currency 
other than the U.S. dollar for international commercial 
transactions. 
 
9. (U) Dr. Ahmed El-Magzoub, State Minister at the Ministry of 
Finance, and Ms. Nagat Mohamed Salih, Undersecretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade, stated that sanctions will not have any impact on 
Sudan's economy. 
 
10. (U) Dr. Babiker M. Tom, Deputy Chairman of the Economic 
Committee, National Assembly, criticized the U.S. sanctions and 
described them as unfair.  He opined that the sanctions will likely 
have more of a symbolic or psychological effect than an economic 
one, since Sudan has not had commercial ties with the U.S. since 
1997. 
 
11. (U) Hashim El-Bashir of the Sudanese Workers Trade Union 
Federation (SWTUF) criticized the sanctions and stated that Sudan 
will not bow or kneel to the U.S. 
 
12. (U) COMMENT:  The sanctions' effect on the poor, the perceived 
ill-timing of the announcement, and the call for Sudanese resilience 
are all different themes running through these remarks.  Many 
Sudanese politicians have questioned the efficacy of sanctions on 
Sudan, its effect on the Darfur Peace Agreement, and its relation to 
the war in Iraq.  Public Diplomacy efforts highlighting the U.S. 
contribution to Sudanese humanitarian relief and development may 
provide a resource for countering some of the positions espoused 
above. END COMMENT.