VZCZCXRO4404
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0878/01 1551325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041325Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7475
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000878 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - TAWILA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ON THE VERGE OF 
COLLAPSE 
 
KHARTOUM 00000878  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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(U) Following deteriorating security conditions in Tawila and the 
surrounding area of El Fasher locality, North Darfur, the two 
remaining relief agencies engaged in health programs withdrew staff 
and closed operations in mid May.  While the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues to provide health services using 
mobile health units, USAID staff note the potential for a worsening 
humanitarian situation and population movements towards El Fasher 
town for additional services.  The recent withdrawal of relief 
organizations from the Tawila area has the potential to jeopardize 
humanitarian achievements to date and further strain limited 
resources for communities in the El Fasher area.  Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have asked that the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provide a part-time 
presence in Tawila in order to better understand local dynamics and 
provide a buffer for the humanitarian community in the event of a 
return of NGO staff.  End summary. 
 
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TAWILA IN CONTEXT 
----------------- 
 
¶1. (U) Maintaining a humanitarian presence in Tawila is crucial to 
preventing a deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the 
potential movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to nearby 
El Fasher.  In May 2007, a sustained and worsening trend of 
carjackings and attacks on relief agencies and staff members led the 
UN to classify Tawila as the most dangerous area in Darfur. 
 
¶2. (U) Securing safe access for humanitarian operations in Tawila is 
hampered by the presence of four of the major armed factions in 
Darfur, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions under 
Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi), Abdul Wahid (SLA/Wahid), and Abdul Shafi 
(SLA/Shafi), the National Redemption Front (NRF), as well as the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).  In addition, increased banditry, 
targeted attacks against humanitarian workers and assets, and 
confusion among aid agencies over which commanders to negotiate 
with, have created an unstable and unsafe operating environment for 
humanitarian agencies. 
 
¶3. (U) Following the signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
in May 2006, a significant split among SLA leadership led to 
factional clashes in Tawila and surrounding villages.  Currently, 
SLA/Minawi controls Tawila town while most of the surrounding 
villages are controlled by field commanders loyal to SLA/Wahid.  The 
Sudanese government controls the area surrounding the Tawila police 
force base. 
 
¶4. (U) In August 2006, the last two humanitarian agencies in Tawila, 
USAID partner Relief International (RI) and Save the Children/Sweden 
(SC/Sweden), relocated staff and suspended activities following the 
carjacking at gunpoint of two RI vehicles from inside the NGO 
compound.  In October 2006, OCHA advocated for a return to Tawila 
area.  Several organizations, including RI, SC/Sweden, and the 
German NGO Partner Aid International (PAI), resumed activities in 
January and February 2007. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CURRENT SITUATION - NGOS WITHDRAW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Between late April and early May 2007, the last two NGOs 
providing health services in Tawila ceased all operations and 
withdrew from the area following multiple carjackings and attacks on 
staff members.  Although the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) will continue to provide basic medical services through 
mobile health clinics, the lack of a sustained presence in Tawila 
jeopardizes previous gains in humanitarian indicators and could lead 
to a deterioration in conditions for residents and IDPs. 
 
¶6. (U) On April 25, armed men abducted and severely beat an RI 
vaccination team in Dabaneyra village, located in rural Tawila.  RI 
had operated in the Tawila area since March 2005, and maintained 
relationships with local leaders, health committees, and armed 
opposition groups to build support for relief activities and secure 
safe passage for humanitarian staff.  However, the growing number of 
armed groups active in the area made it increasingly difficult to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000878  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
sustain operations.  Within the past 13 months, assailants 
threatened or attacked RI health and nutrition staff 11 times and 
stole four RI vehicles.  The NGO suspended operations for safety and 
security reasons on at least four occasions.  Following the recent 
attack, RI officially closed operations in Tawila. 
 
¶7. (U) On May 14, armed assailants carjacked two PAI vehicles in two 
separate incidents in the Tawila area.  The first incident occurred 
between Khanzan Tunjur and Tarni during a medical assistance trip. 
The second carjacking took place in the PAI medical facility, where 
the carjackers shot and injured a PAI national staff member.  The 
two attacks left PAI without a means of communicating and without 
vehicles needed to run mobile health clinics in the Tawila area.  As 
a result, PAI has ceased health activities in Tawila.  ICRC remains 
the only organization providing health services in the region 
through mobile health units.  The UN World Food Program plans to 
continue food aid distribution in Tawila via the Sudanese Red 
Crescent. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
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¶8. (U) Without improvements in the security environment which may 
ultimately lead to the return of relief agencies to Tawila, 
displaced populations in Tawila risk going without adequate services 
and may seek services in nearby El Fasher.  The result would be a 
strain on already limited resources in El Fasher, may possibly 
require the creation of a new camp to support new arrivals in El 
Fasher, and will further complicate humanitarian service delivery. 
 
 
¶9. (U) NGOs have requested OCHA to establish a part-time presence in 
the Tawila area.  Possible benefits of an OCHA presence include 
improved understanding of the dynamic security situation in Tawila 
and nearby villages through regular communication with local leaders 
and armed opposition groups.  In the event of a renewed NGO presence 
in Tawila, OCHA would be well positioned to serve as a buffer for 
the humanitarian community, potentially resulting in fewer security 
incidents against aid workers. 
 
POWERS