VZCZCXRO4611
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1006/01 1760819
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250819Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7717
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0188
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER CD
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE PROCESS: UN/AU UPDATE ON THE EVE OF 
PARIS SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00953 
 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 00960 
 
KHARTOUM 00001006  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) On the eve of the June 25 ministerial summit in 
Paris, United Nations and African Union representatives in 
Khartoum provided detailed updates on the Darfur political 
process.  They said that the immediate focus should be on 
repairing the rift between the Darfur rebels' political and 
military wings and described a renewed willingness among most 
of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories to 
cooperate with the UN and AU in preparation for negotiations. 
 Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al-Nur was 
the exception, and the UN and AU recommended more strident 
action should he continue to obstruct the peace process. 
While warning that international attention on a UN 
peace-keeping force risked overshadowing the 
equally-important political process, UN and AU 
representatives urged the international community to press 
Sudan to cease its support for regional mediation efforts 
that rivaled the UN/AU lead and to discontinue attempts to 
conclude separate peace agreements with individual rebel 
factions in Darfur.  The UN and AU are re-evaluating the 
SPLM's role in the political process following the 
postponement of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
conference in Southern Sudan.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Political/Military Rift in Darfur 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a briefing for the Darfur Partners Group of 
Western ambassadors and in one-on-one meetings with the CDA 
on June 24, Pekka Haavisto, the senior advisor to UN Envoy 
Jan Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, head of the AU's Darfur Peace 
Agreement Implementation Team, provided updates on the Darfur 
political process and requested specific, coordinated 
messages from the international community.  They said that 
their immediate focus would be on repairing the rift between 
Darfur's political leaders and the commanders in the field. 
The UN and AU were examining the best format to accomplish 
this goal, which would likely be linked to the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) proposed meeting in Kenya for 
the factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM).  They 
viewed three broad categories of rebel groups at present: the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the new Sudan National 
Redemption Front (SNRF) emerging from consultations in 
Asmara, and one to three principal factions of the SLA.  Each 
of the groups had expressed a willingness to work with the UN 
and AU, with the exception of SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur. 
 
------------------------------- 
UN/AU Suggest Messages to Sudan 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Haavisto and Ibok stated that while Sudan appeared 
conciliatory it was obstructing the political process.  They 
asked for the international community to reinforce two 
messages with the Sudanese Government: 1) Cease support for 
the attempts of regional capitals, particularly Asmara, to 
mediate the political process and show a sustained commitment 
to the UN/AU lead as stipulated in the November Addis Ababa 
agreement and the Tripoli Consensus, and 2) Cease attempts to 
make individual agreements with rebel leaders in Darfur, 
which undermines the potential for a comprehensive peace. 
Ibok said that the international community's focus on a 
peace-keeping operation for Darfur risked undermining the 
equally-important political process.  "The Government wants 
to give on the peace-keeping operation and block the 
political process," he explained. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Describing a recent meeting with Presidential 
Advisor Maghzoub al-Khalifa as contentious, Ibok and Haavisto 
said that al-Khalifa had disputed accusations that Sudan had 
given a "double mandate" to both the UN/AU and Asmara and 
that it was "poaching rebel leaders."  Haavisto said that 
al-Khalifa "had clearly been instructed to be cooperative," 
but this cooperation broke down during more detailed 
discussions.  Al-Khalifa had rejected the possibility of 
changes to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and "would not 
entertain" proposals for re-consolidating Darfur into one 
region.  Despite al-Khalifa's assertions, Ibok was confident 
 
KHARTOUM 00001006  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that the UN/AU could convince him to shift these positions. 
He also urged the international community to consider other 
potential interlocutors in the National Congress Party (NCP). 
 While acknowledging that Director General of the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh appeared 
content to allow "confusion to reign" in Darfur for now, Ibok 
suggested that Ghosh was a "useful resource" who both 
maintained credibility in the NCP and could deal with the 
international community. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Only Minor Adjustments Needed to DPA 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UN and AU underscored that any negotiating 
process would not involve a fundamental re-tooling of the 
DPA.  Haavisto and Ibok's recent discussions in Darfur had 
shown that opposition to the DPA was mostly "psychological" 
and that even the most adamant among the DPA's detractors 
agreed with "80 percent of the document."  "In many cases, 
the Fur rejected the document because the Zaghawa signed," 
said Haavisto.  "We just a need a few new pages that they can 
show their people, which is much more important than detailed 
provisions that only experts can understand."  The UN/AU 
described a negotiating process where agreement between the 
NCP and the DPA non-signatories was reached on most key 
issues before the start of formal talks.  Final status 
negotiations would then be "short and intensive to close any 
lingering gaps," according to Haavisto.  If the on-again, 
off-again visit of President Deby to Khartoum occurred, it 
would be a "reason for optimism" on the political process. 
The French Ambassador reported, however, that discussions in 
Tripoli between the Chadian Government and the Chadian 
opposition were stalled, which could explain the delay in 
Deby's visit. 
 
-------------------- 
The Abulwahid Factor 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) SLA leader Abdulwahid al-Nur's continued refusal to 
cooperate with the UN/AU, the SPLM, and CHD was now the 
principal obstacle to the political process, the UN and AU 
asserted.  In a phone call with Haavisto on June 24, al-Nur 
refused to attend the upcoming CHD meeting in Kenya. 
Haavisto had told al-Nur that his commanders in Darfur had 
"begged" him to communicate with them and that he could visit 
Sudan with UN/AU security guarantees.  Al-Nur had refused 
this offer.  "It is time that serious and frank messages be 
sent to Abdulwahid," said Haavisto, adding that al-Nur had 
"been one of the spoilers of the Umm Rai meeting" of rebel 
commanders in North Darfur in January.  Ibok said that he had 
asked UN Envoy Jan Eliasson to "read Abulwahid the riot act" 
when he meets with him on the margins of the June 25 Paris 
summit.  Doubting the sincerity of French pressure on al-Nur 
to be a constructive actor, Haavisto and Ibok urged the 
international community to reinforce the strong messages from 
the UN and AU that al-Nur must be a constructive actor in the 
peace process--or face international condemnation.  The UN/AU 
are finalizing logistical arrangements for al-Nur to meet 
with his field commanders in Kenya as part of the CHD 
initiative.  If al-Nur failed to attend this meeting, the 
UN/AU said that the international community should regard 
this intransigence as a trigger for more strident action. 
(Note: In a June 23 meeting with the CDA, Senior Assistant to 
the President Minni Minawi predicted that al-Nur, who he 
referred to affectionately as "my friend," would never return 
to Darfur, "even if the NCP made him a vice president."  End 
note.) 
 
----------------------- 
Rise of Fur Nationalism 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Despite his intransigence, al-Nur's popularity among 
the Fur continues to rise.   CDA Fernandez observed that in 
some cases the "rebels gain more by doing less" and supported 
the UN/AU's calls for clear redlines on the political 
process.  According to Abdel Mohammed, the chairman of the 
preparatory committee for the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC), the Fur population in the 
internally-displaced persons (IDP) camps is "extremely 
politicized" and consider al-Nur "their virtual leader."  He 
said that the Fur had historically been the least 
militarized--and thus the most vulnerable--population and had 
 
KHARTOUM 00001006  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
suffered the brunt of the conflict.  However, the camps were 
no longer "just for helpless people" but had become a 
"politicized platform where serious problems were being 
discussed" and the vanguard of a resurgent Fur nationalism. 
"I have not seen such energy in Darfur for a long time," said 
Mohammed.  He predicted that a new organization, the Fur 
Cultural Club, would evolve into a political party, which 
al-Nur was "following closely."  Mohammed attributed some of 
this politicization to resentment at the influx of foreign 
Arab populations from other parts of the Sahel.  He said that 
the Minister of the Interior had admitted in front of the 
National Assembly that 75,000 to 100,000 Arabs from Niger had 
relocated to Darfur.  The Fur population viewed this 
immigration as the NCP's attempt to bolster its support in 
preparation for the 2009 elections.  The Umma and Communist 
parties were exploiting the ensuing resentment to create 
opposition to the census.  (Note:  In an earlier meeting, 
Minawi told the CDA that the Umma, Communist, and Democratic 
Unionist parties were attempting to undermine NCP influence 
in Darfur by encouraging political agitation in the IDP 
camps.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
SPLM Initiative Stalled? 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UN and AU characterized the SPLM initiative as 
in disarray and suffering from internal SPLM political 
conflicts.  According to the UN and AU, the "failure" of the 
SPLM conference to get off the ground had resulted from a 
disconnect between the SPLM leadership's goal for the 
conference--preparing the non-signatories for 
negotiations--and the SPLM Taskforce on Darfur's (TFD) 
unwillingness to deviate from a broader meeting that would 
include elements of civil society, traditional leaders, and 
Arab tribal representatives.  The UN and AU acknowledged, 
however, that the TFD now blamed them for the delay in the 
SPLM conference.  They maintained that the SPLM must have a 
prominent role in the political process and that the NCP had 
"scored a point" with the collapse of the SPLM conference. 
In a reversal of the UN/AU's previous position, they 
suggested that the SPLM could work with civil society groups 
while the UN/AU and CHD concentrated on preparing the 
non-signatories for negotiations. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UK Ambassador said "it was odd that the 
Taskforce could blame the UN and AU," explaining that her 
impression during the June 15 meeting with First Vice 
President Salva Kiir was that he delayed the conference 
because of key Darfur rebel leader's refusal to attend (Ref. 
A).  Having just returned from Juba, where she had met with 
Kiir, the UK Ambassador said she had the impression that the 
SPLM initiative was "deadlocked."  Kiir had told her that 
even Darfur rebel leader Ahmed Abdulshafi, a former member of 
the SPLM who maintains close ties to the movement, had said 
he would not attend a conference in Southern Sudan until he 
bolstered his military strength.  The UN/AU reported that 
Abdulshafi had felt that the SPLM initiative was unclear and 
did not add anything to the process.  The CDA cautioned that 
work with civil society groups was "easy to do badly," 
despite its importance.  He also noted the absence of 
independent civil society organizations in Darfur and said 
that one academic had told him "the Government has castrated 
us."  The CDA encouraged the UN/AU to coordinate closely with 
the SPLM to define their role.  (Note: Per Ref. B, recent 
Embassy reporting indicates that the SPLM is re-focusing and 
restructuring its initiative in a renewed effort to focus on 
preparing the non-signatories for negotiations.  End note.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ