VZCZCXRO7752
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1772/01 1790020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280020Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5256
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0862
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1563
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6061
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 1824

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/ESC/IEC 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP 
DOE FOR CUTLER/PI-32 AND NAKANO/PI-42 
COMMERCE FOR USDOC 4430 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV EPET ELAB ENRG PGOV ASEC ID
SUBJECT: East Java: Mud Managers Informally Request USG Assistance 
 
REF:  JAKARTA 1038 (notal) 
 
JAKARTA 00001772  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. This is an action request.  See paragraph 11. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY. Following up on A/S Christopher Hill's recent 
inspection of the mudflow disaster, ConGen Surabaya met with 
Sidoarjo Mud Disaster Management Board (BPLS) leadership, who 
described their inability to formulate and implement a workable plan 
to stop the mudflow or manage the disaster.  BPLS Director of 
Operations Sofian Hadi directly requested USG technical assistance, 
identifying five priority areas where additional outside expertise 
is needed to identify experts and information to help them analyze 
and manage the mudflow disaster.  The BPLS identified the most 
pressing need as tectonic geologists and geophysicists to assess the 
possibility of a massive earthquake in the greater Surabaya region 
of East Java due to building tectonic pressure along the Watukosek 
fault line.  BPLS internal models show the remaining area of Porong 
flooded with mud over the next 18 months, if conditions remain 
constant.  To date, all efforts to stop or manipulate the mudflow 
have failed, prompting the request for fresh ideas on handling the 
disaster.  END SUMMARY 
 
Mudflow Disaster Background 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Mudflow disaster started as a gas well blowout 15 miles 
south of Surabaya, caused by errors of PT. Lapindo Brantas 
(Lapindo), a gas exploration company controlled by the Coordinating 
Minister for People's Welfare Aburizal Bakrie and family.  Over the 
past 12 months, Lapindo made several ineffective efforts to stop the 
mudflow.  Mismanagement, changing geological conditions and lack of 
funding stalled and eventually closed the best hopes of stopping the 
mudflow - relief wells -  which could continue another 20-30 years. 
Lapindo has built an extensive earthen dam system to capture the 55 
million cubic meters of mud already out of the well. Efforts to move 
the mud away from the densely populated and economically sensitive 
area failed due to the mud's dense viscosity.  Mud flows at a steady 
150,000 cubic meters per day.  The mud covers 4 square miles at an 
average depth of 15 feet, destroying over 12,000 homes and 
businesses, and is projected to grow to 6 square miles by the end of 
¶2007.  Around 40-60,000 residents require permanent resettlement and 
20-25,000 jobs have been lost.  The main transportation route for 
the southern half of East Java to the Surabaya Port is permanently 
closed.  National road and rail service adjacent to the mud are 
frequently disrupted, causing major transportation delays and 
threatening closure of hundreds of factories.  Water lines supplying 
20% of Surabaya's water and fiber-optic telecom lines serving East 
Java, Bali and two eastern provinces run under the mud and are under 
threat from new water and methane geysers stemming from the 
mudflow. 
 
BPLS Concerns Prompt Informal Request for Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a series of meetings with ConGen Surabaya over the last 
few weeks, BPLS Vice Chairman Hardi Prasetyo and BPLS Director of 
Operations Sofian Hadi described their inability to form a 
realistic, workable and effective plan for stopping or slowing the 
Lapindo mudflow and noted their increasing concerns over the 
environmental impact of dumping muddy water into the Madura Sea. 
They complained that there were too few competent geophysicists, 
mining and slurry engineers and environmental scientists and 
engineers to create and implement a workable mud management plan. 
They also lamented their lack of recent geological data which is 
hampering their ability to analyze the potential effectiveness of 
the various plans that have already been proposed.  BPLS is seeking 
experts in these fields who might be willing to help analyze the 
data they do have and advise on what further information is needed 
to formulate a realistic response. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a June 15 meeting with Sofian Hadi and PT. Energi Mega 
Persada (Note: Energi Mega Persada is Lapindo's managing partner) 
S.V.P. Bambang Istadi, the BPLS again raised the issue of technical 
assistance and specifically asked whether the USG, whether through 
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) or other USG or academic experts, 
could assist them in analyzing the mudflow disaster.  They said that 
they would put these requests in writing if needed.  BPLS identified 
the following problems/areas where specific technical expertise is 
needed: 
 
JAKARTA 00001772  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
a)  Earthquake analysis/prediction - Geologists with an expertise in 
tectonic geology. 
 
There is evidence of increasing tectonic pressures in the fault line 
running through the mud, as evidenced by a recent spike in the 
mudflow rate and several new mud geysers popping up in areas outside 
of the dam structures.  They are concerned that East Java could 
experience a massive, earthquake along the Watukosek fault line that 
runs from Mt. Arjuna, north through Lapindo, between Sidoarjo and 
Surabaya, through the Madura Strait and up in to Madura, devastating 
a densely populated area.  (N.B. Apparently there is a geologist 
named Dan Hillman from Cal Tech working with the Indonesian 
Institute of Science (LIPI), studying earthquakes in Sumatra whom 
they noted "predicted the Aceh quake.") 
 
b)  Modeling/Managing Pressuring Water Flow - Geophysicists with 
expertise in micro-seismic and micro-gravity measurement, tools and 
research. 
 
The pressurized salt water reservoir (essentially an old pocket of 
trapped ocean) which is the source of the mudflow does not behave 
like an oil reservoir.  There is no experience with dealing with 
this phenomenon and none of their oil reservoir assumptions is 
working to deal with the mudflow. 
 
c) Mud Volcanoes - Experts on the origin, geology and management of 
mud volcanoes. 
 
There are 7-8 mud volcanoes along the same fault line where the 
Lapindo disaster is located.  (The others are all small and do not 
begin to approach the scope of the Lapindo site.)  There are no 
domestic experts on mud volcano behavior. 
 
d)  Mud Content/Mechanics - Geochemists to help with analyzing and 
modeling the mud to predict its future composition and behavior. 
 
They are having difficulty analyzing the composition of the mud and 
are unable to predict its rapidly changing nature. 
 
e)  Geological Data - Experts with access to any existing geological 
satellite data and/or guidance on accessing improved data. 
 
They have limited and/or poor quality geological data to base their 
modeling of the mudflow and future damage estimates. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The problems described have a direct and immediate 
relevance to the health and safety of the remaining 50-60,000 
residents of Porong and to the greater Surabaya area.  Istadi 
presented two computer models; one projecting the surface behavior 
of the mud over the next 36 months and the other forecasting 
subsidence of the ground underneath the mud.  These models have not 
been made public and are considered highly sensitive.  BPLS predicts 
that the Porong area in its entirety may be buried in mud within the 
next 18-24 months, assuming a constant flow rate of 111,000 cubic 
meters per day and that the mud will be breach the earth dams, 
overflow the Porong River banks and flow in an unstoppable manner 
directly into the river.  The subsidence model was more startling, 
projecting the land in a two mile radius around Porong subsiding up 
to 1,000 feet and everything around the disaster getting sucked into 
a pit of hot mud.  However, the models are based on old and 
incomplete geological data.  The models will be used as a tool to 
help prepare BPLS evacuation plans for Porong. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the end of the meeting, Istadi stated, "Sofian Hadi is 
appointed by the President and speaks for the BPLS."  We take this 
to mean that the assistance request was authorized to be made by 
BPLS leadership or at least broached with us in an informal manner 
to test the waters. Eventually the BPLS hopes that with enough 
people working on the mud issue, a solution will present itself and 
further devastation could be avoided. 
 
Summary of Efforts to Stop or Control the Mudflow 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Over the past year, a number of strategies to stop the 
mudflow have been attempted and many others in various stages of 
planning.  After the original gas well blowout, Lapindo tried a 
snubbing unit and a sidetracking well both of which failed.  Two 
 
JAKARTA 00001772  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
relief wells were started using predominantly U.S. well control 
contractors.  The relief well plan eventually failed because lack of 
funding stopped the wells from being put into operation.  Lapindo 
dismissed the contractors and closed down the relief well project, 
stating publicly the project had failed for technical reasons.  U.S. 
relief well contractors disputed the claim, stating that the relief 
wells would work if completed.  The 396 concrete balls dropped in to 
the mouth of the volcano with the intention of plugging it were 
unsuccessful, as expected by most experts.  In April 2007, U.S. 
relief well engineers were brought back to assess the likelihood of 
success of restarting the relief well project.  According to 
contacts, political pressure from Bakrie put the relief wells on the 
back burner, due to the estimated cost of $100 - 300 million each. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The newest idea under consideration is a double steel 
walled coffer dam system.  Tempo magazine reported that in a fit of 
frustration at a cabinet meeting over the lack of progress on 
stopping the mud, SBY ordered implementation of the Japanese 
designed system. Our BPLS contacts confirm they met with the 
designers of the system but are highly skeptical of the coffer dam, 
assessing a low likelihood of success and great risk of mud being 
forced through cracks in the earth and irreparably damaging 
sensitive infrastructure adjacent to the mud pond such as 
telecommunication, gas and water lines, the Porong Road and the 
national rail line.  Vice President Kalla publicly rejected a 
Japanese offer to finance the coffer dam project for the GOI stating 
that Lapindo was financially responsible for all mud management 
activities. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The inability to stop or slow the mudflow has prompted 
creation of a number of mud control schemes.  The BPLS and the 
National Mud Disaster Management Team (Timnas) before it have 
devised pipelines, channels, pump systems, detention ponds, 
irrigation channels, screw pumps and mud thinning systems to try to 
move the mud out of the earthen dam system away from densely 
populated Porong and the nearby critical infrastructure.  The nature 
of the mud has defeated all efforts to manipulate it. Containing 
high levels of salt and sulphur, the mud is highly corrosive 
destroying pump systems.  When water is added to thin the 225 degree 
mud, it cools the mud, which then solidifies and will not flow.  The 
BPLS has recently begun pumping muddy water separated from the 
cooling mud solids into the Porong River.  This is not considered a 
long term solution, as only 15-20% of the mud volume separates as 
water. 
 
¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  From our discussions, it is clear that 
the most immediate need is for impartial experts who can advise the 
BPLS.  Post requests that the Department to reach out to the 
U.S.G.S. to determine what resources/interest it has, if any, to 
assist the BPLS in assessing its existing data and determining what 
additional data may be needed.   In addition, BPLS would be 
interested in any recommendations regarding contact with leading 
public or private experts in the five priority areas, with tectonic 
geologists and geophysicists clearly the most urgent need. 
 
HEFFERN