VZCZCXRO9336
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1585/01 1590636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080636Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4999
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 001585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA, DS/CC 
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ 
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON PHUM PINR ID
SUBJECT: CENTRAL SULAWESI ON THE ROAD TO NORMALCY 
 
 
¶1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.  THIS 
CABLE IS A JOINT REPORT FROM EMBASSY JAKARTA AND CONSULATE GENERAL 
SURABAYA. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a recent visit to Central Sulawesi's former 
conflict areas, Mission officers clearly saw the beginning of a 
return to normalcy. This was the fourth trip to Central Sulawesi by 
ConGen Surabaya officers in the last 2 years but it is the first 
time to the former conflict areas of Poso and Tentena without a 
police escort.  Local police and civil society contacts in the 
cities of Palu, Poso, and Tentena were confident that the communal 
violence was over and attributed the attacks since the 2001 Malino 
Peace Accords to criminal acts of terrorism sourced to a small band 
of local Muslim extremists.  Ethno-communal violence divided 
Christians and Muslims in the Poso regency and claimed over 1,000 
lives in spates of fighting in 1999-2001.  Burned out homes, 
churches and mosques remain throughout the Poso area as daily 
reminders of the past conflict, though we saw no obvious 
post-hostility finger pointing or rehashed grievnces during any of 
our d iscussions.  Contacts suggested that "s"d nts were eager to 
break with the past and move toward reo*nciliation but lacked the 
means to fully rebuil  their communities.  Although the security 
envirn*ment has improved due primarily to the resolution of  most of 
the recent terrorism cases and intercmmmunity relations were 
returning to normal, resie nts had many post-conflict issues to 
resolve an  economic redevelopment, social reconciliation andQ 
healing remain a long-term prospect.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Recent GOI/Police Action Brings Respite to Vioeence 
--------------------------------------------( ------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) GOI efforts since late 2005 haee at least temporarily 
improved the immediate seu rity environment and eased longstanding 
local frustration over Jakarta's perceived inattention to Cnntral 
Sulawesi's security plight.  Communal sectr"ian violence in the 
province broke out in 1999 iith a series of increasingly violent 
events betwe n local Muslim and Christian groups, including the 
highly publicized massacre of some 200 Muslims a  the Walisongo 
pesantren and mosque by Christianm(ilitia groups.  The two sides 
signed the Malinoppeace accords in 2001 but by 2004, Muslim 
extrems"t groups were again terrorizing the Poso/Tentena region.  In 
October 2005, the beheadings of three hhristian girls was a turning 
point, shocking locl( residents and authorities in Jakarta.  The 
reattion of President Yudhoyono and Vice President Kala  galvanized 
high level support for renewed INP action to address the violence 
with the formation of a special investigapv" taskforce in late 
¶2005. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Since that time, the INP has successfully arrested dozens 
of eerrorist suspects, including the May 2006 arrest o  Poso Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) cell leader Hassanudnn, which provided important 
information on the go*up's active in Central Sulawesi.  Several 
failed INP attempts in late 2006 to lure suspects out of iiding led 
to a tactical shift by INP investigatos" to conduct a more public 
campaign to explain tee cases against the top Tanah Runtuh and 
Kayamana  figures sought by the INP.  This approach ultimately 
secured the support of local community leader  and culminated in the 
January 2007 INP raids one xtremist strongholds, when 24 of the 29 
most watted TR members were captured or killed. Of the fiv  TR 
leaders who eluded capture, one was killed in a subsequent JI 
stronghold raid near Yogyakarta and INP believes the others are no 
longer in Central Sulawesi. 
 
Police and Political Leaders Show Support 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Our Muslim contacts in Poso applauded the January 2007 
crackdown and appeared well-informed by the INP on the details of 
the raids and the background of those involved.  Members of the 
Malino Working Group (MWG) and the Poso Muslim Cleric's Council 
(MUI) told us that they not only supported the police operations but 
felt that they were long overdue.  They criticized the INP as overly 
concerned about political and social ramifications of aggressively 
going after these "criminal" groups. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Central Sulawesi Police Chief Brigadier General Badrodin 
Haiti received high marks from local contacts since his arrival last 
September.  Haiti told us he had focused on building relationships 
in the former conflict area since he arrived and made monthly visits 
to meet with local leaders.  Amran Amir, a local reporter with the 
Association of Independent journalists, noted that Haiti was much 
stronger and more proactive than his predecessors and he 
complimented Haiti for strong action against the Tanah Runtuh 
extremists.  Haiti had an excellent reputation within the INP and 
was close to National Police Chief General Sutanto, according to INP 
contacts.  Deputy Chief INP Investigator (D/CID) Gories Mere told us 
that he personally recommended to Sutanto last year that Haiti 
 
JAKARTA 00001585  002 OF 006 
 
 
replace Brigadier General Oegroseno, whose handling of the Tibo 
execution case and terrorism cases had frustrated Sutanto. 
 
 
Returning to Normal but Tensions Remain as IDPs Come Home 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Our contacts pointed out significant improvements in the 
daily lives of Poso and Tentena residents since the crackdown on the 
Tanah Runtuh group earlier this year.  Several contacts expressed 
surprise at how quickly normal relations had returned between 
Christians and Muslims, including business and trade at the central 
marketplaces in Poso and Tentena, both of which were hit by 
terrorist bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively.  We counted 13 new 
mosques and churches under construction on the road from Poso to 
Tentena.  The largest Christian church in Poso recently reopened 
after being closed for over seven years due to security issues. 
Fadli, Director of the Poso Center for Conflict Resolution and 
Peace, told us he receives multiple calls per day from displaced 
Poso residents wanting to return home after hearing about the 
improving security situation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While our contacts were thrilled with the tremendous 
improvement in the security situation and more normalized relations 
between local Christians and Muslims, they warned that these 
positive changes mask lingering resentment and distrust that has 
impeded final settlement of the conflict.  A potential flashpoint 
for this is in local land disputes.  A key component of final 
reconciliation is the return/resolution of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) and the concurrent land ownership disputes.  MWG 
contacts told us that as a result of the Poso conflicts, there were 
an estimated 5,962 IDP families (or around 25 - 30,000 persons) that 
may need to return to their original land/homes.  Many of them have 
been in IDP camps in Manado, Parigi, Donggala and Palu for several 
years, although some have permanently resettled in those areas. 
Protestant Synod members told us that at the height of the violence 
there were as many as 50,000 IDPs in Tentena, a number they said was 
now around 10,000. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Among the thousands of families who have already returned 
to the Poso/Tentena area, many lack employment or funds to rebuild, 
and many have returned to find new occupants claiming ownership of 
their land.  There are no accurate records kept of land ownership in 
the regency and only a small percentage of land owners have legal 
certificates documenting their ownership.  Our contacts expressed 
the need for an impartial arbitration body to help quickly and 
fairly settle land disputes or there could easily be more flares of 
violence.  Although the GOI has funded the construction of some 
homes for returning IDPs, our contacts were unhappy that the 
TNI-controlled construction contracts had not gone to local firms, 
leading to accusations of graft and illegal logging by TNI members. 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Our contacts worried that many residents remained 
traumatized from years of violence and angry over the lack of 
compensation for lost property and the limited GOI assistance 
provided.  There are still dozens of burned out churches and mosques 
and thousands of destroyed homes left behind reminding locals of the 
conflict.  Both the INP and local conflict resolution centers told 
us that a trauma center in Poso was urgently needed to help foster 
post-conflict healing, including overcoming any lingering disharmony 
and suspicion, particularly as the IDPs return and attempt to 
reassimilate into the community. 
 
Residents Point to Outsider Role in Area's Violence 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Christians and Muslims we met equally acknowledged 
that outside militant groups from both sides had fanned the early 
conflict and that Muslim extremists from outside the area had played 
a critical role in orchestrating the attacks over the last several 
years.  Christian Synod leaders in Tentena noted that the influence 
of these outside groups was initially overlooked at the height of 
tensions, but said that local religious and civic leaders now worked 
together to filter out these radical external influences.  Local MWG 
and MUI members told us that Poso's Nadlahtul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, 
and Al Khairat organizations, in an effort led by MUI, had recently 
agreed to reject the fundamentalist teachings supported by the local 
Tanah Runtuh and Kayamanya groups they acknowledged as behind the 
area's violence. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Adnan Arsal, the main Muslim leader in Tanah Runtuh and 
the father-in-law to detained JI-cell leader Hasanuddin, owns the Al 
Amanah pesantren which was the base for the Tanah Runtuh group.  He 
actively countered the INP's efforts last year to apprehend the 
suspects on the INP's most wanted list, but his cooperation just 
prior to the January INP raids has kept him out of INP detention. 
Most of our contacts were defensive of accusations that Arsal was 
 
JAKARTA 00001585  003 OF 006 
 
 
involved in the terrorism linked to the group.  Even some INP 
contacts sympathetically regarded Arsal as someone who had been 
duped by several hard core JI-linked extremists from Java, most of 
whom he hosted as teachers at his school. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Several of our contacts who personally knew Arsaltold us 
that prior to 2000, he was much more moderate and only adopted more 
radical views after the May 2000 Walisongo Pesantren tragedy, and 
following a subsequent visit by JI network cofounder Abu Bakar 
Baasyir.  (Note: An INP officer in the precinct nearest the 
Walisongo pesantran told us that Arsal's family owned the land where 
the burned-out mosque and school now stand and that there were 
family gravesites nearby.  However, our other contacts could not 
confirm this information.) 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Evidence connecting extremists at Arsal's school with 
many of the area's terror attacks led to the closure of his Al 
Amanah Pesantren in February as a prerequisite to GOI construction 
of a new "modern" pesantran located several kilometers outside the 
city of Poso. An INP official commented that the GOI had learned a 
lesson from the strategic position of Al Amanah in the Tanah Runtuh 
residential area and intentionally selected the location for the new 
school away from residential areas and yet easily accessed from the 
main coastal road northwest of Poso.  Also as part of the GOI 
agreement, Arsal will not be allowed to have any role in the new 
school, according to local MUI contacts who told us that Arsal was 
spending his time in his now empty school with two of his remaining 
teachers, Ustad Ahmad and Ustad Fabian.  (Note: We drove past Al 
Amanah during a brief visit to the Tanah Runtuh neighborhood and 
there was no visible evidence of any activity at the school.) 
 
¶15. (SBU) Though trees had barely been cleared for the GOI's new 
school after an early May opening ceremony attended by President 
Yudhoyono, local MUI officials told us the new chair was already 
identified as the locally elected Deputy Regent (Wakil Bupati) Abdul 
Muthalib Rimi.  The GOI has announced that the school will be 
modeled after the Gontor Pesantren in Ponorogo, East Java.  In fact, 
during our visit to the site we saw a large sign that announced the 
construction of the school and that Gontor would serve as the 
school's model.  (Note: Gontor is a modern pesantren in East Java 
that follows the public school curriculum, although the Islamic 
studies section remains the biggest.  Students learn English in 
addition to the usual emphasis on Arabic.  The Gontor pesantren 
boasts alumni that include many prominent Indonesian Muslim figures 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Hasyim Muzadi, Muhammadiyah 
Chairman Din Syamsuddin, late moderate intellectual Nurcholish 
Madjid, and JI's Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.) 
 
JI Still Seeks Control Over Former Conflict Areas 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Poso Police Chief Adeni Muhan told us that the INP 
believed that Central Sulawesi remained a major component of the JI 
network's broader strategy to gain a foothold in the province that 
would serve as a training ground and a secure home base.  Recent INP 
investigations, he said, exposed several JI trained Muslim teachers 
(ustad) from Java who spent years in the Poso area forging a network 
of local recruits.  Although some of these JI ustad, such as Mahmud 
and Rian, were killed in INP operations, many remain at large and 
may have returned to Java after the January INP operations.  Others, 
he said, may have also returned to former conflict areas in Ambon or 
Maluku.  Though actively sought by the INP, the Deputy Chief of the 
local CT Detachment 88 explained to us that these JI ustad were not 
on the INP's most wanted list to keep them from going even deeper 
underground and to avoid provoking the Muslim community by targeting 
Muslim "teachers."  The March INP raids in Java further confirmed 
links between the Java and Sulawesi terrorist networks, for example 
the Central Java arrest of Mujadid (aka Brekele), a primary suspect 
in the May 2005 Tentena market bombings. 
 
Community Policing Produces Mixed Results 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Since last year, the INP's Community Police (Polisi 
Masyarakat or POLMAS) has been a core component of the current INP 
strategy to better engage with Poso's residents.  General Haiti 
explained to us that the INP began a pilot project in April 2006 
that placed a POLMAS post in each of Poso's 150 sub districts 
(desa).  Internal INP documents indicated that a total of 657 INP 
officers (approximately 4-5 per post) were assigned to the POLMAS 
project in the Poso area.  Haiti said this program was designed to 
decrease INP response time, help the INP keep better tabs on the 
area's trouble spots and identify and monitor new arrivals or 
groups. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) We met with INP officers at all levels throughout much of 
the Poso area and they all independently identified the POLMAS 
 
JAKARTA 00001585  004 OF 006 
 
 
program as the INP's key initiative in the area.  The INP 
intelligence officer at the Lage police precinct that covers the 
area around the former Walisongo pesantren accompanied us on a 
driving tour of his area and pointed out some of the precinct's 14 
POLMAS posts.  He later provided us a copy of a detailed set of 
instructions they received from INP Headquarters that outlined 
standards for monitoring and evaluating the precinct's 60-70 POLMAS 
officers.  He said they routinely submitted reports on the POLMAS 
posts to the INP's Poso District Headquarters and the INP's 
Provincial Headquarters in Palu. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The POLMAS project, however, has not been without its 
problems.  We met with some INP officers who admitted that the 
project's roll out last year lacked any real funding.  Most POLMAS 
posts were placed in houses abandoned during the conflict and lacked 
their own facilities and basic equipment.  For example, each of the 
14 POLMAS posts in the Lage precinct were given four cots, a cell 
phone, a megaphone, a camera, and a motorcycle. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Several of our contacts outside the police commended the 
concept behind the POLMAS project but said the young, inexperienced 
officers assigned to the local posts were from other parts of 
Indonesia and lacked an understanding of the local culture.  Some 
local residents had accused local POLMAS officers of public 
drinking, fighting, and sexual assault.  Mrs. Syamsiah of the Poso 
Inter-Faith Communications Forum told us that the young INP officers 
from the POLMAS post near her mosque in Tentena had routinely taken 
the money donated to the mosque during Friday prayer services. 
 
Full Reconciliation a Long Term Prospect 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Conspiracy theories posited by some of our contacts, as 
well as isolated remarks made during our discussions, also suggested 
that post-conflict sensitivities and a general paranoia remained 
just below the surface despite the area's significantly less 
polarized communities and improved security.  Reverend Onesimus 
Kambodji, a former Golkar party member of the provincial legislature 
(DPRD) and head of the Poso Inter-Faith Communications Forum, was 
convinced that GOI security forces were not only behind the original 
hostilities but some of the recent terrorist attacks, including the 
October 2005 beheadings; he cited statements attributed to the 
Christian schoolgirl who survived the attack that a man in uniform 
was present during the killings. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Though most conspiracy theories seemed far fetched, the 
sincere acceptance of them by many local residents suggested a 
lingering distrust of GOI security forces, probably supported by a 
long-standing perception by residents on both sides of the conflict 
of an imbalanced legal process.  Several of our contacts confirmed 
that residents felt victimized by the legal process.  Conflict 
resolution groups in both Palu and Poso told us that the consistent 
application of the law must be a centerpiece of any reconciliation 
strategy. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) An internal INP document we received likewise 
acknowledged injustice as a driving factor and indicated that INP 
detainees had revealed that revenge for perceived injustices, 
particularly the May 2000 Walisongo pesantren incident, had been a 
powerful motivator for the local extremists.  As noted above, the 
Walisongo killings (also known as the "Kilometer 9" incident because 
of where it occurred along the road between Poso City and Tentena) 
was cited by local contacts as a turning point for Arsal.  Basri, 
one of the top local terrorists arrested in February, has said 
publicly that he was also significantly influenced by his experience 
at the Walisongo pesantren, where he helped remove the bodies 
immediately after the attack. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Several contacts told us that the sense of injustice 
within the Muslim community stems from language agreed to in the 
2001 Malino Accords that resulted in charges not being brought for 
attacks prior to the Accords, which includes the majority of 
Christian-on-Muslim violence.  In the internal police document, the 
INP proposed that the signatories to the original Malino Accord 
renegotiate the agreement to allow the INP to open cases on the 
pre-2001 incidents that most enflame the local Muslim community. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) This deep sense of injustice has further motivated the 
INP to use its softer CT techniques to handle the local Poso 
extremists.  INP investigators told us that nearly half of those 
arrested in January were released in part to show that the INP was 
focusing on the top extremist figures.  Based on our discussions, we 
learned that as many as 15 of those released were placed on 
probation under the charge of local INP precincts, which required 
them to report twice a week and participate in group meetings to 
deprogram their antisocial and radical leanings.  According to INP 
records, some of those placed on probation included Nasir, Ateng 
Marjo, Yasin Lakita (aka Acin), Ayi Lakita, and Upik Kokong. 
 
JAKARTA 00001585  005 OF 006 
 
 
However, INP investigators told us that this program was poorly 
funded and admitted that little was done to ensure that the local 
precincts maintained contact with the suspects after the first 
several weeks. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) We were told that the Christian community was closely 
watching the trials of the 17 local Christian suspects accused of 
killing two Muslims last September.  The two Muslims were killed 
during widespread demonstrations surrounding the execution of three 
Christians convicted of orchestrating the killings of Muslims in the 
early days of the conflict.  The local Christian community was 
keenly aware of the sentences handed down last year to Hasanuddin 
and the other perpetrators of the October 2005 Christian schoolgirl 
beheadings, and Rev. Kambodji told us he hoped the sentences were 
commensurate with the nature of the crimes (meaning that the 
sentences of the 17 suspects would not approach the 20-year sentence 
that Hasanuddin received).  The sentence hearings for the 17 
Christian suspects were expected by mid-June. 
 
Communities Eager for Recovery But Lack Funding 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Our trip came just one week after Indonesian President 
Yudhoyono visited the former conflict areas to symbolically roll out 
a GOI assistance package to help in the province's recovery.  The 
President's visit was a tribute to the improved security situation 
and his public pledges of aid signaled Jakarta's good intentions. 
Yudhoyono publicly stated the need for the central government to 
facilitate Poso's healing process and announced that Jakarta had 
earmarked Rp 56 billion (approximately $6 million) for economic 
development.  We could not confirm if this figure includes the Rp 
27.5 billion (approximately $3 million) the GOI had promised to 
allocate for development projects in the province, including the new 
Poso pesantran and the extension of a Poso theology institute. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) It was clear from our discussions that this type of 
promised economic development will be a key to recovery, 
reconciliation and maintaining a lasting peace.  Some recovery has 
naturally occurred and businesses appeared active throughout the 
former conflict zone and the surrounding fields were in various 
stages of cocoa and rice production. However, the level of economic 
activity remained far below that of the late 1990s.  Our contacts 
agreed that access to capital, in particular micro lending programs, 
would allow residents and IDPs to rebuild and pushed that as a key 
feature of any potential assistance. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Contacts also complained that the GOI promised $6 million 
from the Malino accords to rebuild housing and help restart 
businesses but that much of those funds have not been delivered. 
Examples abound of misappropriation of GOI relief funding for the 
area's displaced persons, which has universally frustrated 
residents.  Several local religious and political leaders have been 
accused of pocketing the funds, including former Synod leader Father 
Damanik.  Pleas for international assistance in rebuilding the 
region's economy, infrastructure, agricultural business, and 
job-skill training were a feature of nearly all our discussions. 
Christian Synod leaders in Tentena told us they had not yet received 
promised GOI funding for at least part of a $3 million university 
construction project, though Yudhoyono attended the groundbreaking 
during his visit, and said they hoped that international donors and 
Christian organizations would provide additional assistance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶30.  (SBU) It remains difficult to gauge the Yudhoyono 
Administration's commitment to Central Sulawesi reconstruction. 
There has been increased attention and promises of assistance but so 
far little follow through.  A few weeks after the President's visit, 
we asked senior Administration staffers about the presidential 
decree mentioned by Yudhoyono and they were not aware of any such 
document in the works related to Poso reconstruction.  Local 
residents seemed surprisingly indifferent about the President's 
visit and did not seem to hold out much hope that Jakarta would send 
the needed assistance.  Locals seemed to respect both Yudhoyono and 
Kalla and remembered them for their role in negotiating an end to 
the early communal fighting.  One contact commented that Kalla was 
generally regarded as opportunistic and was noted locally for his 
involvement in a scheme related to a dam project between Poso and 
Tentena. 
 
¶31.  (SBU) The good news is that Central Sulawesi residents were 
optimistic about the future and were looking forward trying to 
reclaim their pre-1999 lives.  We were mildly surprised to see how 
quickly the improved security situation was translating into 
increased economic activity.  Much like the return to normalcy in 
Maluku, the determination by the INP to actively engage the 
troublemakers and terrorists has given Central Sulawesi residents a 
chance to regroup.  However, unlike Maluku, we do not yet see real 
 
JAKARTA 00001585  006 OF 006 
 
 
commitment to "peace at all costs" by the local people or leaders, 
who still chew on the real or perceived injustices of the last 
several years.  The situation in Poso remains complex and will 
require a committed effort by national and local authorities to push 
economic development, equitable solutions to land disputes, and a 
more integrated law enforcement presence. 
 
HEFFERN