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Viewing cable 07BERLIN1142, GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERLIN1142 2007-06-07 15:02 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0028
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1142 1581502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071502Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8482
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1824
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0501
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0277
UNCLAS BERLIN 001142 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR ISN AND EUG/AGS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TRGY IN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY DISCUSSES U.S. POSITION ON RUSSIA'S SUPPLY 
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TARAPUR AND OTHER NSG-INDIA ISSUES 
 
REF: A. STATE 75597 
     B. BERLIN 1084 
 
1. (U) This message contains an action request -- please see 
paragraph 5. 
 
2. (SBU) Global Affairs officer delivered ref A response to 
ref B German query to Joerg Polster, German MFA International 
Energy and Nuclear Energy Policy Division desk officer, June 
5.  Polster said the U.S. position on Russia's supply of 
nuclear fuel in April 2007 to India's Tarapur nuclear power 
reactors was helpful.  Polster noted that Russia followed the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines by notifying the NSG 
of its decision to supply nuclear fuel to a state (India) 
which lacked International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards.  Nevertheless, Polster observed, notification in 
this case did not mean consultation, and Russia seemed to 
have decided regardless of other NSG partners' views. 
 
3. (SBU) Polster took the opportunity to discuss the 
U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative.  Germany 
favors bringing India closer to the NSG Guidelines, Polster 
said.  He observed, however, that if India fulfills its 
obligations and agrees to IAEA safeguards and signs the 
additional protocol, it would be eligible to receive nuclear 
fuel from suppliers other than the United States.  He 
suggested that NSG partners must be prepared to deal with 
each other should India decide to receive fuel from more than 
one supplier. 
 
4. (SBU) Polster made a request concerning India's presumed 
acceptance of IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol. 
Once India takes these two steps with the IAEA, the next step 
would be for the NSG to approve them.  In preparation for NSG 
approval, Polster assumed the United States would prepare 
some type of document for the NSG's consideration.  Polster 
requested that the German Government be consulted before the 
U.S. finalizes its document and presents it to the entire 
NSG. 
 
5. (U) Post requests guidance to respond to the German 
request contained in paragraph 4. 
TIMKEN JR