Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BERLIN1126, U.S. 60-DAY REPORT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNSCR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERLIN1126.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERLIN1126 2007-06-05 16:09 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1126 1561609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051609Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8465
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0276
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0476
UNCLAS BERLIN 001126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR ISN, EB, NEA, IO, VCI, P, T, EUR, AND TREASURY-TFI 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP EFIN IR UNSC AORC ETRD TRGY GM
SUBJECT: U.S. 60-DAY REPORT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNSCR 
1747 (IRAN SANCTIONS) PASSED TO GERMANY 
 
REF: STATE 73219 
 
1. (SBU) Global Affairs officer conveyed ref demarche to 
German MFA UN Policy Division Desk Officer Mirko Schilbach 
June 1.  Schilbach said he will share the U.S. report with 
other appropriate officials in the German Government.  He, in 
turn, shared a copy of the report that Germany submitted to 
the UNSCR 1747 Sanctions Committee on German implementation 
of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747.  Schilbach noted that accompanying 
the German national report was a report submitted by Germany 
in its capacity as EU President to the UNSCR 1747 Sanctions 
Committee concerning EU-wide implementation of the sanctions, 
based on the EU Common Position adopted in April 2007. 
Despite the submission of this EU-wide report, however, each 
EU member state is responsible for submitting its own 
national report to the Sanctions Committee, Schilbach said. 
 
2. (SBU) Germany, Schilbach, said, did not need to pass new 
legislation to implement the UNSCR 1737 and 1747 sanctions on 
Iran, thanks to the EU's Common Position and corresponding 
Regulations on implementing the sanctions.  Furthermore, 
Germany had not exported any weapons to nor imported any arms 
from Iran in the time period well before the sanctions were 
approved by the UNSC, according to Schilbach.  Concerning 
action to freeze the assets of Bank Sepah in Frankfurt, 
Schilbach said the German Government had the necessary 
authority to do this in advance of the adoption of the EU 
Common Position.  He noted that although Bank Sepah continues 
to exist, the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Economics are monitoring its activities and only allowing it 
to pay necessary expenditures without allowing it to conduct 
any transactions in violation of the UN sanctions. 
 
3. (SBU) Germany strictly applies the visa restrictions on 
Iranians listed under the UNSC sanctions, Schilbach said. 
Nevertheless, Germany does not necessarily have reasons to 
bar the travel of Iranians who are not listed.  Schilbach 
noted that Iranians who are not listed could potentially 
obtain visas to visit Germany and attend arms fairs, but they 
would be unable to buy German arms or related material, 
because German exporters would be unable to obtain export 
licenses in such cases.  In addition, German Customs 
authorities have been alerted to check exports from Germany 
to Iran to ensure that no military goods or dual-use goods 
that could support WMD programs are shipped there.  Because 
of the German Government's oversight of exports to Iran and 
also because of the increasing uncertainty of doing business 
there, German firms are becoming more cautious in dealing 
with Iran, Schilbach added.  He said that German firms make 
more inquiries with the German Federal Economic and Export 
Licensing Agency (BAFA) about trade with Iran than before the 
UNSC sanctions were enacted. 
 
4. (SBU) On a separate issue, Schilbach commented on the May 
31 meeting in Madrid between Javier Solana, High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of 
the EU, and Ali Larijani, Iran's Secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator. 
Schilbach contended the EU was not naive in agreeing to the 
talks with Larijani.  Instead, the EU believes it is worth 
communicating with Iran concerning the impasse over the 
latter's nuclear program, and Larijani is seen as perhaps the 
only approachable high-level Iranian official at this point, 
according to Schilbach. 
TIMKEN JR