VZCZCXRO7041
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0920/01 1781238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271238Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1083
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1370
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SERBIA UPDATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: During a trip to Presevo and Bujanovac on June 
19-20, poloff and polspec met with political leaders and various 
contacts from NGOs, the media and the Orthodox Church.  In general, 
the region is currently acceptably calm and secure.  Our contacts 
confirmed that the protest on June 15 advocating secession from 
Serbia was a failure, reflecting that most of the Valley's 
inhabitants do not think separating or using force are viable 
strategies for achieving their vision of the futures.   Politically, 
the region remains adrift with both municipalities wracked with 
internal divisions (often intra-party disputes) and competing 
strategies on how react to the two main local pressures: 
dissatisfaction with Belgrade and Kosovo final status. End Summary. 
 
The factors 
----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Kosovo: President Bush's statements in Tirana and Sofia 
still resonate throughout the Presevo Valley, with various leaders 
telling us the affirmation of the USG's support for Kosovo's 
independence "lowered the temperature" considerably in the region. 
Media contacts told us that prior to the President's statement; 
tensions had been much higher due to the talk of status delay at the 
G8 as well as the Sarkozy proposal.  Presevo Valley Albanians seem 
content to take the President's statement as a fiat and not worry 
further for now.  While there are rumors that Albin Kurti's 
"Self-determination" movement may have some contacts (probably 
through family ties) in the Valley, there is nothing close to 
grassroots support. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Belgrade: In general, Presevo Valley Albanians continue to 
support their MP, Riza Halimi, in his efforts to advance their 
interests in Belgrade.  The perception of Belgrade's interest in 
engaging with the region, however, is that the capital is steadily 
losing interest.  Albanian leaders complain of the increasing 
dysfunctionality of the GOS Coordinating Body for Southern Serbia 
(CB) and rumors of a cut in budgeted funds from Belgrade for next 
year.  In our assessment, Belgrade has actually performed moderately 
well in terms of investment over the last few years (although we 
agree that a cut in funding would be a clear step in the wrong 
direction).  Belgrade has abjectly failed to capitalize on any of 
its development assistance to the municipalities, probably another 
symptom of the lack of any clear leadership atop the CB.  Rasim 
Ljalic is technically still in charge, and Nenad Popovic is 
apparently still involved with the CB's Economic Team for Southern 
Serbia.  Hardly anyone in southern Serbia -- Albanian or Serb -- has 
high expectations for a revitalized CB or senior-level engagement in 
the region. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Internal politics: In both Bujanovac and Presevo, the 
parties continue to cope with the fragile majorities handed to them 
in last June's municipal elections.  In the case of Bujanovac, the 
assembly is essentially frozen in place after the division and 
walkout of one of the coalition parties (see LPD below).  The stasis 
in Bujanovac is actually a good thing -- the local government came 
to a halt before the Serbs in civic positions could be replaced (as 
was demanded by the hardline Albanian parties in the governing 
coalition), so Bujanovac remains with multi-ethnic appointments 
rather by accident.  In Presevo, most of the internal concerns are 
limited to Mustafa's intra-party struggles (see PDSh below) with 
most of the party supportive of Mustafa's anti-engagement stance and 
the rest considering a split for the next elections.  Interestingly, 
Mustafa has a very good relationship with Presevo CB representative 
Branko Delibasic, both of whom seem to have struck a mutually 
beneficial relationship: Mustafa keeps things relatively calm and 
tries to dissuade separatists while Delibasic can claim to the 
international community that all is well in Presevo.  Delibasic 
showed that he has not remained above the fray of local 
political/personal politics by questioning the Embassy's suspension 
of contact with Mustafa, while disparaging MP Halimi has "not having 
too much support" in Presevo. 
 
The players 
----------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Party of Democratic Action -- PVD (Bujanovac Mayor Arifi, 
MP Riza Halimi): Mayor Nagip Arifi remains understandably fixated on 
the aftermath of a bomb attack on his family home on June 1.  He 
continues to harbor reservations about whether the local police are 
doing their job, and is even suspicious that they were involved. 
Without doubt, this is a serious matter, but it does not seem like 
anything terribly amiss for now.  Arifi was out of the country at 
the time of the attack and there are questions as to why his family 
waited almost a day to report the event.  Still, we have reassured 
Arifi that we will monitor the situation and understand from him 
that he will not abandon any of the courageous stands he and his 
party have taken regarding engagement with Belgrade, supporting 
election participation and promoting multi-ethnic representation 
from the Serb community in Bujanovac.  We also met with Shaip 
Kamberi, who heads a human rights NGO and is a serious contender 
 
BELGRADE 00000920  002 OF 003 
 
 
within the PVD for a leadership role and/or Mayor.  He has stepped 
aside (twice) for Arifi, and in our analysis, has more political 
savvy, expertise on issues, and ability to work effectively with 
Belgrade and the international community.  Nevertheless, a power 
struggle between Arifi and Kamberi would result with serious crisis 
within the PVD.  Halimi is close to both, and it might come down to 
his intervention -- and he might be inclined to give Kamberi his 
shot at last. 
 
¶6. (SBU) PDSh (Presevo Mayor Mustafa):  Our policy of non-engagement 
with Mustafa appears to be having a clear effect.  In his most 
recent party elections, former Presevo assembly Speaker Naser Aziri 
ran against Mustafa on the platform that Mustafa's alienation of the 
international community -- the US in particular -- was too costly 
and damaging for the party.  Mustafa defeated Aziri 98-57, but many 
local contacts agree with Aziri's assessment that Mustafa leveraged 
financial resources from his backers (notably a Gnjilan-based juice 
factory) to sway votes with cash.  Nevertheless, Aziri told us that 
he will make another push for the party to change its policy before 
the next elections, and if it doesn't he will split from the party 
and run.  We reaffirmed our policy to work with any party that 
supports Contact Group principles, but also stressed that there can 
be no change in the Embassy's dealings with the PDSh while Mustafa 
remains in charge and against those same principles. 
 
¶7. (SBU) LPD (Bujanovac Deputy Mayor Jonuz Musliu):  It is hard to 
say whether it is because of our non-engagement policy, but Musliu's 
LPD party is simply falling apart.  Four of his nine MPs (out of 41) 
have walked out of the assembly, apparently no longer supportive of 
Musliu.  Musliu and the LPD lack any political expertise (Musliu was 
previously headed the UCPMB's political wing) and their current 
collapse is likely more due to a lack of any real party management 
rather than a studied reconsideration by party factions of external 
factors like US Embassy policy. 
 
¶8. (SBU) GOS Coordinating Body (Sima Gazikalovic in Bujanovac, 
Branko Delibasic in Presevo):  To most observers the CB is going 
nowhere fast, but this actually seems to be largely the GOS' fault. 
The CB has actually poured a considerable amount of funds into 
developing the region, often in partnership with AID and the UK's 
DFID, but has not bothered to translate that into any successful PR 
campaign.  For example, the CB (along with AID) contributed to a 
school in Bujanovac which, despite aspirations to the contrary, 
ended up a mono-ethnic Albanian school.  The CB reacted strongly 
when others, like the municipal government and AID partners, were 
recognized for their contributions but not the GOS and CB.  We 
pressed the Albanian leaders, including Arifi, to correct this (he 
regretted it too, casting blame on the school director), but at the 
same time it is clear the GOS simply cannot advertise the good it is 
doing.  The inability is probably directly linked to the absence of 
leadership at the top of the organization, and lack of interest from 
top-level GOS officials to do anything about it. 
 
¶9. (U) The media: Both Presevo and Bujanovac now have private TV 
stations -- TV ALDI in Presevo and TV SPEKTRI in Bujanovac -- to go 
with the two state run stations.  The Serbian broadcasting authority 
will be determining who will receive the two licenses available (one 
for each municipality) and both private stations are concerned they 
may lose out to their state-run rivals. 
 
¶10. (SBU) UCPMB veterans: The veterans of the defunct Liberation 
Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) have tried to make 
themselves political relevant again through protests and have thus 
far failed.  They are currently marginalized because neither the 
politicians nor the citizens seem to want them involved in politics 
and do not see value (for now) in their message of unilateral 
separation from Serbia. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Valley is calm because there is a sense that the 
international community is committed to remaining involved in 
southern Serbia and that Kosovo will become independent soon (mostly 
because the USG has said it will).  The UCPMB insurrection in 2001 
showed that things can turn bad quickly in southern Serbia.  For 
now, the failure of the veterans' protest shows that there is 
neither a spark nor fuel for instability.  However, delay and lack 
of clarity on the next steps forward by the international community 
on Kosovo will lead to doubts among the inhabitants of the Valley 
about their own future.  The moderates like Arifi, Halimi and others 
have held the line thus far on countering separatism, but the 
support for "eastern Kosovo" by political or militant means will 
increase as clarity decreases.  Moreover, we have often counted on 
Kosovo leaders to calm tensions and call on Presevo Valley Albanians 
to constructively engage with Belgrade.  If the status uncertainty 
drags on, we would expect them to be preoccupied with their own 
political futures, leaving them with scant resources or attention to 
bring to bear on destabilizing influences in southern Serbia. End 
 
BELGRADE 00000920  003 OF 003 
 
 
comment. 
POLT