VZCZCXRO6246
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0915/01 1771653
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261653Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1076
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1367
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PBTS KPAO SR MW YI
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF KOSOVO: KOSTUNICA'S FULCRUM 
 
REF: BELGRADE 668 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Serbia's Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija 
(MOK) emerged as a new ministry during the government 
coalition negotiations following Serbia's January 2007 
parliamentary elections.  The Ministry aims to coordinate 
Serbia's Kosovo policy by combining the operational 
elements of the existing Coordinating Center for Kosovo 
(CCK) with a new cabinet-level organization responsible for 
intra-GOS coordination as well as the GOS's bilateral and 
multilateral engagement on Kosovo issues.  The Ministry of 
Kosovo still has work to do before it is fully online, but 
it is clear that the Ministry is wholly Kostunica/DSS run 
and aims to manage Kosovo policy -- a considerable portion 
of the GOS' activity -- through its coordination of other 
(mostly Tadic/DS-run) ministries.  Interestingly, MOK 
officials draw from Parliament's empowerment of the Kosovo 
negotiating team rather than the Ministry's legal basis in 
order to bypass other governmental institutions in ways 
unavailable to ministries.  The way in which the GOS has 
handled their "secret plan" for the Russians to use at 
Kennebunkport as well as their hands-off approach to 
possible demonstrations by Serbs on Vitovdan (June 28) in 
Kosovo illustrate this process.  End Summary. 
 
Personnel and Logistics 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Serbia's Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija was 
created during the government formation discussions 
following the January 2007 parliamentary elections.  The 
Law of Ministries passed by the new parliament officially 
brought the MOK online (relevant section of Law in para 
13). Slobodan Samardzic, Prime Minister Kostunica's top 
Kosovo advisor and chief negotiator to the UNOSEK talks, is 
the Minister (official bio in paragraph 12).  In the weeks 
after the new Ministry was announced, Ljubomir Kljakic and 
Branislava Aleksander -- both longtime Samardzic associates 
(and DSS apparatchiks) -- were named Assistant Ministers. 
Dusan Prorokovic, another DSS member and formerly head of 
the Kosovo Committee in parliament, has been named state 
secretary.  The Coordinating Center for Kosovo (CCK) has 
 
SIPDIS 
been subsumed into the MOK and will be headed by Vuko 
Antonijevic, replacing Sanda Raskovic-Ivic.  Antonijevic, a 
member of the DSS, most recently was a deputy coordinator 
of CCK, and prior to that was chairman of the Serbian 
National Council (SNV). 
 
¶3. (U) The MOK does not have dedicated office space and is 
currently operating out of the Government Building 
(Nemanjina 11) where the Prime Minister's offices are 
located.  CCK continues to be based in the Federal Palace 
in New Belgrade. 
 
 
Substantive Mandate 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Assistant Minister Ljubomir Kljakic told poloff on 
June 5 that the Ministry's primary missions are to 
coordinate Kosovo policy throughout the GOS and "manage" 
relations with other countries and international 
organizations regarding Kosovo.  He specifically mentioned 
that the MOK would coordinate the Kosovo-related policies 
involving the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, 
Interior, International Economic Relations and 
Telecommunications. Kljakic said that, for example, if the 
Foreign Minister travels abroad and engages on the Kosovo 
issue, that his statements would be done in coordination 
with the MOK.  When asked directly, Kljakic said the 
Presidency would also be "coordinated in the same fashion." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Kljakic said the MOK would also oversee the GOS 
negotiating team for Kosovo for any future talks.  The 
substantive starting point for the Ministry is, as Kljakic 
said, that fresh talks are a "reasonable assumption" now 
that the EU and UNSC's "perspectives have matured" enough 
to be "ready to lower rigidity and question views" on 
Kosovo and be willing to approach Kosovo status "with open 
eyes." 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Kljakic, the technical nature of the 
CCK's existing work would remain unchanged.  The creation 
of the Ministry will simply add a layer on top of the CCK 
which will coordinate internal and international management 
of Kosovo policy, which is "intense" and "multifaceted" 
enough to require a whole ministry for coordination. 
 
Influence without responsibility 
 
BELGRADE 00000915  002 OF 003 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a separate meeting on June 26, Prorokovic told 
polcouns that the MOK would "influence" the other 
ministries involved in Kosovo while indicating that 
responsibility for implementation would stay with the 
relevant ministry.  For example, Prorokovic said, if a 
school or hospital needed to be built in Kosovo, the 
Education or Health Ministries would carry out the task. 
The MOK, however, would be allocated a budget and 
appropriate funds and "advise" the relevant ministry.  Two 
real examples of how the MOK's influence without 
responsibility were immediately available (paras 8 and 9). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Polcouns asked Prorokovic directly about the GOS 
plan allegedly passed to the Russians in advance of 
Kennebunkport.  Prorokovic called it a "technical 
document...written in response to Putin's request" to 
Kostunica for a Serbian plan for Kosovo and that he could 
not share the contents.  He maintained, though, that there 
was "nothing new" in the points passed to Moscow that was 
not already contained in the GoS proposal delivered to the 
UNSC during its recent visit to Belgrade.  He further 
explained that it had not been circulated to other 
institutions because Minister Samardzic gave it to the 
Russian Ambassador "in his capacity empowered by the 
parliament," referring to the 2/14/07 reaffirmation of the 
GOS negotiating team by the newly elected MPs (but well 
before a government formation).  Therefore, Prorokovic 
said, it was not a government document and did not need to 
be circulated throughout the various ministries, parliament 
or the Presidency.  Post nevertheless requested a copy, as 
has been done with the Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs and the President's office (all of which did not 
have one). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Polcouns also raised the publicized plans for 
groups of Serbs to march into Kosovo for Vitovdan on June 
28, and that the USG wanted to make clear to the GOS that 
Belgrade must do everything in its power to rein in 
extremist elements and any other destabilizing factor 
associated with the march.  Prorokovic shrugged off the 
representation, essentially saying the actions of any 
marchers were not his ministry's responsibility.  He added 
that Serbia could not be responsible for the actions of any 
non-state group on a non-state trip.  Polcouns reiterated 
the expectation, noting that similar clear messages had 
been made to the Interior Ministry. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As an interagency body responsible for 
coordinating several Ministries' Kosovo policy, the MOK 
effectively accomplishes two things for Kostunica: it is 
his tool to manage GOS Kosovo policy without competition 
and a political structure which keeps the coalition parties 
in line both on Kosovo and in government.  The Presidency 
appears to have been willingly removed from any shared 
responsibility on Kosovo.  Tadic currently has no permanent 
Kosovo advisor and he works from the same talking points as 
Kostunica in public comments. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment con't:  As demonstrated by the MOK's 
handling of the "secret plan" and Vitovdan, the Ministry 
can make its mandate suit its needs depending on the 
circumstance.  The MOK gives Kostunica the ability to 
advise, comment on, and control almost all of the GOS' 
policy inside Kosovo, as well as to deflect any real 
accountability to other Serbian institutions or away from 
Serbia entirely. End comment. 
 
¶12. (U) Begin text of official bio of Serbian Minister for 
Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic: 
 
Born in Belgrade in 1953. He graduated from the Faculty of 
Political Sciences in Belgrade, where he also obtained his 
PhD. He was editor of scientific and political program at 
Radio Belgrade from 1982 to 1984. He is a regular professor 
at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He was 
advisor for political issues to former Yugoslav president 
and later Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. He 
headed the Serbian government's committee for 
decentralization and is member of the state negotiating 
team on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija. Speaks 
English and German. Married, with three children. 
 
End text. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000915  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶13. (U) Begin excerpt of GOS Law on Ministries 
 
Article 24 
 
The Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija is responsible for 
government administration related to: functioning of the 
institutions of the Republic of Serbia on the territory of 
Kosovo and Metohija; education, health care, social policy, 
culture, infrastructure and telecommunications in Serbian 
regions of Kosovo and Metohija; activities of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church; renewal of spiritual and cultural 
heritage; financial, legal, technical and human resources 
assistance in all fields significant for Serbs and other 
non-Albanian communities on the territory of Kosovo and 
Metohija; cooperation with the Commissioner for Refugees in 
the segment relating to internal displaced persons from 
Kosovo and Metohija; formulating proposal of  law 
regulating the essential autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija; 
cooperation with the civil and military mission of the UN 
on Kosovo and Metohija (UNMIK and KFOR); recommending to 
the Government the new negotiating team tasked with all 
international activities relating to continuation of 
negotiations for resolving the future status of Kosovo and 
Metohija; managing activities of the State negotiating 
team; maintaining constant international contacts with 
participants in the international negotiating process for 
defining the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, as well 
as other tasks defined by law. 
 
End text. 
 
 
POLT