VZCZCXRO0609
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0898/01 1711230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201230Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8547
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1262

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER 
 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  As you visit Lebanon, the much-buffeted democratic 
government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is fully engaged 
on a number of critical issues.  The Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) are now locked in close combat with Sunni extremists 
who profess affiliation with Al Qaida, but who many believe 
are directed by the Syrian regime, in the northern 
Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid.  The 57,000 
personnel of the LAF are stretched thin:  guarding the 
country's 450 kilometer border; patrolling south Lebanon for 
the first time in 30 years; engaged with Sunni extremists in 
the north and patrolling the perimeters of 11 other refugee 
camps elsewhere in the country; and perhaps most importantly, 
protecting democratic institutions from Hizballah-led 
opposition elements that have already tried to overrun the 
government in both December 2006 and January 2007. 
Politically, the Siniora government continues to search for 
an acceptable resolution to a now-seven-month-old crisis 
brought on by the November 2006 walk-out of six opposition 
ministers.  While negotiations to resolve the dilemma are 
accelerating, the price the opposition is trying to extract 
from Sinora's pro-reform democratic majority, known as the 
March 14th coalition, remains too high. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Add to this intimidating list of challenges the 
need to move quickly to maintain the momentum of UNSCR 1757, 
which authorized the establishment as of June 10 of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon under Chapter VII, a parliament 
blocked from meeting by its pro-Syrian Speaker, and a very 
real threat by the pro-Syrian president of Lebanon to create 
a competing, destabilizing parallel government.  Amazingly, 
these issues actually make the other tasks faced by the 
Siniora government -- reducing a USD 44 billion national 
debt, reconstructing an infrastructure damaged by last 
summer's conflict between Israel and Hizballah, and 
revitalization of a struggling economy -- pale by comparison. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On the plus side of the ledger, it is difficult to 
imagine a more resilient people or economy.  Despite repeated 
blows from an imposing list of unsavory characters -- Syria, 
Iran, Palestinian rejectionists, Hizballah, pro-Syrian 
sympathizers -- the government of Siniora keeps plodding 
steadily forward.  We may view with dismay the pace of 
reform, but it is undeniable that Siniora and his beleaguered 
ministers and allied members of parliament have by and large 
doggedly pursued policies that they hope will lead to a 
democratic, secure, and prosperous country.  Particularly 
with regard to matters that concern the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, we believe you will discern trends both good 
and bad, but on the whole you will see a country that has an 
almost unlimited potential to become a model in a very tough 
neighborhood. 
 
SECURITY SERVICES UNDER GREAT STRAIN 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU)  As of June 19, elite units of the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) are nearing the end of a month-long, hard fought 
battle against Sunni extremists in the dense urban 
environment of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern 
Lebanon.  The camp is usually home to 35,000 Palestinian 
refugees, but it is presently the stronghold of several 
hundred, well-trained extremists.  The current battle erupted 
without notice on May 20, when Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants 
struck LAF units stationed near the camp in the aftermath of 
a raid by Internal Security Forces (ISF) on a FAI hideout in 
the nearby city of Tripoli.  Part of the determination and 
sacrifice of the LAF currently engaged can be traced to the 
murder of unsuspecting LAF guards during the first few hours 
of the conflict. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  As the fight enters its fifth week (the first 
three weeks were essentially a holding action designed to 
allow innocent refugees a chance to escape the camp -- 
approximately 2,000 refugees remain somewhere in the 
complex), LAF units have suffered high losses:  more than 65 
soldiers killed in action, mostly from its hard-to-replace 
elite units.  FAI losses have also been high and the influx 
of U.S.-supplied weaponry has been of considerable help. 
Many observers have been surprised by the tenacity of the LAF 
in attacking and eventually taking FAI strong points.  While 
 
BEIRUT 00000898  002 OF 004 
 
 
armed forces victory over the FAI now seems certain, the 
aftermath of the struggle remains in doubt, in part because 
FAI is a murky group.  A year ago, FAI didn't even exist as 
an entity and it is still not known exactly who controls and 
supplies it.  An educated guess would be Syria. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The outcome of this fight, and any others against 
Palestinian or Al Qaida groups in the immediate future, will 
do much to determine the long-term credibility and 
operational effectiveness of the LAF.  Pro-democratic forces 
both in and outside the government believe the outcome will 
be pivotal for Lebanon and they are pulling out all the stops 
to obtain assistance for their troops.  Some of these 
well-intentioned calls for assistance are misplaced, because 
they unduly emphasize "precision" weapons without fully 
understanding engagement constraints, to say nothing about 
the lack of pertinent training.  But regardless of the 
inapplicability of some calls for assistance, it can be 
stated with assurance that the LAF desperately needs resupply 
of dwindling munitions and upgrades to their intelligence and 
urban war-fighting capacities. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Outside the LAF, the ISF (national police force), 
Customs police, and Surete Generale (internal police 
activities, such as anti-TIP, anti-piracy, anti-organized 
crime) also badly need assistance in the form of training and 
equipment to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. 
The Department of State in cooperation with other U.S. 
agencies, including the FBI, is fully engaged in a 
substantial USD 60 million plus effort to provide this 
assistance, but the program is expected to take several years 
and requires sustained commitment, as well as additional 
funding. 
 
A POROUS BORDER....AND SHEBAA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Only one year after Hizballah fired more than 
4,000 rockets into northern Israel, prompting an Isaeli 
attack on Lebanon and a month-long war, Lebanon is awash once 
more in weapons.  Despite efforts to improve border security 
by positioning approximately 8,000 additional LAF troops on 
the border, all evidence indicates that weapons smuggling has 
continued unabated to both Hizballah and several Palestinian 
rejectionist groups resident in the country. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The most serious attempt to address this critical 
issue, whose enforcement is emphasized in UNSCR 1701, the 
resolution which ended last summer's conflict, is the 
German-led Northern Border Pilot Project.  The chief problem 
with this well-conceived and well-financed project is that it 
will take until the end of 2007 to fully test the integrated, 
intelligence-based concept.  The second drawback is that it 
will only apply to the less problematic northern border with 
Syria, while it appears the primary flow of weaponry and 
militants cross into Lebanon along its long eastern border 
with Syria.  That said, there are already plans to "turn the 
corner" and extend the project's integrated approach to the 
more difficult eastern border in December 2007.  The 
German-led effort is presently the best option, and although 
we would like to see a more rapid timeline, it holds the 
greatest promise to finally seal Lebanon's border to the 
destabilizing trafficking of illegal arms and militants. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  One final border issue you may encounter is the 
largely-manufactured problem of Shebaa Farms -- a 45 square 
kilometer piece of contested land controlled by Israel, that 
the UN has formally recognized as Syrian, but which Siniora's 
government steadfastly maintains is Lebanese.  Although it is 
an insignificant slice of border territory with no 
inhabitants, PM Siniora seems to believe that if it could be 
transferred from Israeli control to UN oversight, it would 
give his government the instrument it needs to force the 
disarming of Hizballah's powerful militia.  This somewhat 
naive position has unfortunately become embedded in almost 
every policy discussion the Prime Minister now has with U.S. 
officials, and even though your interests lie elsewhere, do 
not be surprised if Siniora also raises it with you. 
 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM -- TRYING TO STAND UP 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Thirty years of Syrian control and systemic 
corruption has eviscerated Lebanon's traditionally strong 
 
BEIRUT 00000898  003 OF 004 
 
 
judicial culture.  The fact that a Lebanese court is not able 
to indict or try the perpetrators of the numerous acts of 
political violence committed since October 2004 is sad 
testament to the present weaknesses of the country's judicial 
system.  Judges have been murdered, witnesses intimidated, 
forensic evidence has disappeared, but perhaps most dangerous 
is the widespread public belief that a fair, speedy trial is 
nearly impossible to attain. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  There are numerous courageous and progressive 
jurists, lawyers and court administrators, but they must cope 
with a system that was deliberately distorted and manipulated 
to favor and protect Lebanon's Syrian overlords.  Making 
matters more difficult is the fact that Lebanon's legal code 
has not been updated for decades and any attempt to do so in 
parliament is obstructed by an anti-reform minority that 
seeks to maintain the status quo. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  U.S. programs, under the auspices of USAID and 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative, are beginning to make 
a dent in the many areas that require reform.  And this 
effort has been augmented by similar assistance programs 
sponsored by our European allies and some agencies of the 
United Nations.  But overall, the work still to be tackled is 
significant and will require several years of sustained 
effort. 
 
POLITICAL SITUATION -- NEVER BE SURPRISED 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  As implied above, PM Siniora is the glue that 
holds it all together.  Through an unanticipated war, 
difficult cease-fire negotiations, coup attempts by a 
well-financed and unscrupulous opposition led by Hizballah, 
multiple assassinations and assassination attempts of 
pro-reform leaders, and political in-fighting among his own 
coalition, PM Siniora has demonstrated remarkable endurance 
and commitment to democratic rule.  He frequently states that 
his most cherished dream is to peacefully leave office to 
another democratically elected government. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  That said, it is also clear that Siniora and his 
close circle of loyal advisors need help to continue and 
persevere in their difficult fight.  A key challenge will be 
the upcoming presidential election, scheduled to take place 
in a special electoral session of parliament in the September 
23 - November 26 timeframe.  The current president, Emile 
Lahoud, makes no secret of his allegiance to Syria and he has 
effectively stalled many of the pro-reform programs Siniora 
has tried to implement.  In the face of its defeat to block 
the UN Special Tribunal, Syria appears to be pulling out all 
the stops to re-elect another pro-Syrian president, both to 
blunt the effectiveness of the tribunal and to keep alive 
Syria's deeply held desire to re-establish its hegemony over 
Lebanon. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Because of the very high stakes involved, all the 
political maneuvering is now centered on this upcoming 
election.  The terrorist organization Hizballah wants a 
president amenable to its self-perceived role as the 
"resistance" so that it can keep its powerful armed militia. 
Opposition member and Christian leader Michel Aoun is the 
tormented Hamlet of Lebanon, deeply desiring the throne, but 
forever changing his positions and then attempting to explain 
them using tortured logic.  The influential Maronite 
Patriarch Sfeir continually tries to preserve the "Christian" 
institution of the presidency, but remains anxious of open 
commitment due to events in the past.  At the same time, Saad 
Hariri, leader of the parliamentary majority as well as the 
Sunni community, wants to protect the fledgling tribunal and 
his majority, but at the same time is cognizant of the 
charges that the Sunnis already control too much of the 
government.  And then there are the six, or seven, or even 
eight political leaders of the Maronite community who all 
want to be president, but in fighting each other, make the 
opposition's job that much easier.  And finally, there is the 
Druse warlord Walid Jumblatt, who has been both ally and 
enemy to almost every other participant in Lebanon.  At 
present, he is the strongest and most impassioned voice for 
sovereignty, but everyone is mindful that his ultimate 
allegiance is toward his small community. 
 
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
----------------- 
 
BEIRUT 00000898  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  In just the past week, discussions between the 
myriad political players have increased in both frequency and 
seriousness.  But we have witnessed increased dialogue 
before, only to see it unceremoniously dissolve into 
recriminations and renewed impasse.  The difference now is 
that the coming 150 days are indeed critical:  if Lebanon 
emerges with a president committed to the country's 
sovereignty and stability, democracy stands a good chance of 
success.  If on the other hand, another pro-Syrian president 
is installed in Baabda palace, continued stalemate may 
actually be a preferred outcome. 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  Director Mueller, you arrive with Lebanon at yet 
another crossroads.  You will undoubtedly be asked to 
re-confirm America's commitment to Lebanon and her struggling 
democracy.  You will also undoubtedly hear many rumors and 
well-meaning but half-baked ideas.  Lebanon has become a 
critical case for democracy and reform in the Arab world.  It 
is essentially the only Arab country with a pluralistic 
tradition and some (though distant) experience with 
democracy.  We are convinced our assistance can make a real 
difference.  We urge you to listen to your Lebanese 
interlocutors, give them your valued counsel, and let us know 
how we can better help your Bureau advance U.S. interests in 
this most important country.  Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman 
sends. 
FELTMAN