VZCZCXRO9808
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2026/01 1701813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191813Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1776
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEES (PRDCS) -  ITAO PROGRAM UPDATE 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U)  Since mid-2005, Provincial Reconstruction and 
Development Committees (PRDCs) have worked alongside 
provincial governments across Iraq.  Developed to build 
capacity of newly elected provincial governments, PRDCs 
continue to provide assistance throughout the provinces. 
They are a premier program to improve Iraqi provincial 
governance.  Pursuing that goal has necessarily meant a 
relatively slow disbursal of funds compared to programs with 
no formal Iraqi consultation.  However, part of the program's 
success can be seen in that the provinces have now submitted 
more approved projects than current funding can support.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
PRDCs 
----- 
 
¶2. (U)  Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees 
(PRDCs) are comprised of provincial council members, governor 
appointees, local directors general of national ministries, 
local business interests and community members at-large. 
Initially funded by IRRF, but now also funded by ESF, our 
goal remains the same; to strengthen the ability of 
provincial governments to set priorities, deliver basic 
services to their communities, and improve economic 
development at the provincial and local levels. 
 
PRDC Process 
------------ 
 
¶3. (U)  Each PRDC creates a prioritized list of 
reconstruction projects that addresses provincial needs.  The 
projects lists are then discussed in a public forum, during 
which time the PRDC further vets, prioritizes and finalizes 
the projects with its constituents. 
 
¶4. (U)  Following PRDC review, the projects lists are 
submitted to the Provincial Council (PC) for review and 
approval. 
 
¶5. (U)  Projects approved by the Provincial Council are then 
forwarded to the Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT's) 
Provincial Program Manager (PPM).  Provided the PPM concurs 
based on USG policies and legal limitations, the list 
proceeds to the Embassy's Iraq Transition and Assistance 
Office (ITAO) for review and approval. 
 
¶6. (U)  The ITAO Budget Office - in conjunction with ITAO 
Essential Services, the Office of Provincial Affairs, and 
other Mission subject matter experts - reviews the projects 
to ensure they meet ESF and other applicable guidelines.  The 
National Embassy Team (NET), made up of the same 
stakeholders, provides final approval.  This can take between 
7 to 10 days. 
 
¶7. (U)  Upon approval the lengthiest part of the process lies 
ahead.  Projects must then be scoped, estimated, bid and 
finally awarded, which can take upwards of 5 months to 
complete.  To date, seventy-nine projects have been awarded; 
work has commenced on 18 of those projects.  Some project 
starts have been hindered, most notably due to security. 
 
Initial Challenges 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (U)  PRDCs were given significant autonomy to create and 
govern themselves; a necessary tool to respond to unique, 
localized issues and needs. 
 
¶9. (U)  This emphasis on local autonomy; however, resulted in 
time being spent by provincial officials to stand up PRDCs, 
leading to subsequent delays in actually implementing PRDC 
activities.  Moreover, the ad hoc terms and conditions of 
PRDC membership has at times fostered a lack of 
accountability and transparency, with some PRDC members 
focusing their efforts solely on party, tribal and/or 
religious affiliations. 
 
¶10. (U)  Several other factors presented obstacles to the 
PRDC initiative with the first IRRF funded program in FY06, 
including mid-stream changes in the NET submission process 
and IRRF sector-specific funding constraints, both of which 
made the process less responsive to the PRDCs.  In addition, 
a first-come first-served approach to funding project cost 
growth without regard to provincial allocations meant that 
provinces that submitted projects late did not receive 
contracts to their full allocation.  Numerous process changes 
in the ESF PRDC process have improved responsiveness to and 
engagement with the PRDCs. 
 
BAGHDAD 00002026  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
PRDC Successes 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (U)  After a bumpy start, the PRDC initiative has gained 
momentum and continues to show progress.  For example, over 
the last six months PRDCs have reviewed and approved 258 
projects.  One of these projects is the Musayib Maternity 
Hospital. 
 
¶12. (U)  The Musayib Maternity Hospital, located in Babil 
province's embattled and predominantly Sunni northern region, 
is representational of the successes found in the PRDC 
initiative.  Babil - a Shi'a governed province with no Sunni 
representation on the Provincial Council (PC) - received 
$8.9M in FY06 ESF.  Yet at the request of the Babil PRDC, the 
PC agreed to approve the Musayib Maternity Hospital at a cost 
of $6.3M; or 70% of Babil's FY06 ESF budget.  Moreover, in 
order to ensure that Musayib Maternity Hospital by quickly 
and properly implemented, the PC tasked a team of Iraqi 
engineers and supervisors to work with the USG.  This level 
of Iraqi ownership in a USG-funded and managed project - a 
level of cooperation and commitment that clearly crossed the 
Sunni/Shi'a sectarian divide - came about as a direct result 
of the PRDC initiative. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (U)  Not intended as principally a reconstruction effort, 
but as a means to stimulate engagement and capacity building 
at the provincial government level, PRDCs have provided a 
mechanism for local and provincial participation and 
management of assistance funds.  These young governments have 
gained valuable skills in democratic decision-making through 
the PRDC process, a process that evokes conversation, debate 
and compromise.  As an increasing number of the approved 
projects are completed, constituents are expected to have an 
enhanced quality of life to include; more effective local 
governments, improved delivery of electricity, water and 
sewage collection services. 
 
¶14. (U)  The PRDC effort also highlights the tension between 
spending money quickly and spending it well.  If we had 
elbowed provincial authorities aside and had dispensed with 
the local consultation process, we could have spent more of 
the funding dedicated to PRDC projects more quickly.  There 
are some circumstances in which a PRT should move forward 
quickly, which is why FY07 "Quick Response Fund" will use a 
more expedited process. However, taking the time to allow 
local processes and Iraqi "buy in" to develop means that the 
PRDC system may be able to continue in the future as a purely 
Iraqi-funded and operated process.  As of June 2007, the 
PRDCs have now submitted projects (which have withstood our 
review process) in numbers and amounts that exceed our 
available funding.  It has been worth the wait. 
CROCKER