VZCZCXRO4042
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1960/01 1741414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231414Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6727
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC AU SU SO
SUBJECT: UNSC-AFRICAN UNION DISCUSSIONS IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  African Union Commission Chairperson 
Konare urgently requested visiting UN Security Council 
representatives to provide funding for African peacekeeping 
forces in Darfur and Somalia.  Konare, AU Commissioners, and 
African Ambassadors highlighted capacity and financial 
limitations, but asserted that African states were committed 
to meeting and resolving African crises.  Deployment of 
African troops to Darfur and now to Mogadishu underscore the 
AU,s ability to act quickly to stabilize a crisis situation, 
but the AU lacks resources to sustain such deployments and 
looks to the UN to take over operations and ensure funding. 
Konare pointed to Burundi operations as an example of 
successful UN-AU cooperation.  AU forces helped stabilize 
Burundi, brokering an end to a decade-long civil war through 
a ceasefire and peace accord.  The UN followed up with a UN 
peacekeeping mission, thus demonstrating that the UN and AU 
working cooperatively can meet Africa's difficult challenges. 
 Sudan and Somalia dominated discussions.  Discussions also 
included the DRC, Cote d,Ivoire, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
border.  The large number of participants did not allow for 
substantive detail discussion of the topics, but did help 
highlight commitment by the UN and AU to pursue closer 
cooperation and coordination.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------- 
AU PLEA FOR FOLLOW-UP 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a morning session on June 16 with visiting UN 
Security Council representatives, African Union Commission 
Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare and AU Commissioners 
highlighted areas for closer AU-UN cooperation and 
coordination in meeting crises in Africa, particularly UN 
support for funding of contingency operations.  The African 
Union was making progress in organizing members to rapidly 
respond to crises, AU officials said, citing the initial 
deployment of 2,000 Rwandan troops to meet urgent 
humanitarian needs in Darfur.  Operations now lasted over ten 
months, however, and AU member states found it difficult to 
financially sustain such operations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) More important, Konare pointed out that close 
cooperation between the UN and AU was important to ensure 
forward political movement to enable the AU Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) to be replaced by the United Nations.  The degradation 
in Chad-Sudan relations, the inability to implement the Abuja 
Accord, and continued instability, made Darfur operations 
difficult. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Konare called for greater dialogue with Sudanese 
President Bashir to find workable solutions.  Konare 
recommended that clear messages of assurance be conveyed to 
Bashir and the Sudanese that there was no hidden agenda 
against Sudan.  In response to UN representatives' queries on 
accountability and transparency, Konare asserted that the AU 
and UN hybrid force could work out a clear command and 
control structure, and that transparent financial management 
could be arranged.  AU Commissioner for Peace and Security 
Ambassador Said Djinnit said that time was of the essence: 
action on a hybrid force had to take place now, not in 2008. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad outlined the fundamental issues 
confronting the UN and AU in enhancing closer cooperation. 
There needed to be a clearly defined timeline and taskings of 
next steps by the UN and AU.  Furthermore, clarity was needed 
in the command and control structure by the UN, and in 
transparency and financial management of funding operations. 
These details, critical to AU-UN coordination in Sudan, had 
to be laid out quickly. 
 
------------------------------ 
SOMALIA: THE NEXT UN OPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Konare articulated the African Union's position that 
the United Nations now had to take over Somalia operations. 
The AU had deployed some 1,400 Ugandan troops and now awaited 
the deployment of Burundian troops to bolster the AU Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM).  The deployment was far short of the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001960  002 OF 002 
 
 
8,000 minimum needed to support peacekeeping operations, but 
the message to Somalia was that the AU was committed to its 
stabilization.  Konare described the importance of Somalia 
operations in the context of fragile political dialogue in 
the Middle East affecting East Africa, noting that extremist 
elements still operated in Somalia.  Ethiopian forces had 
helped neutralize some negative influence and had given 
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) an 
opportunity to establish itself in Mogadishu.  It was 
necessary for Ethiopian troops to depart, but not before more 
AU troops were in place to support a smooth transition from 
Ethiopian forces to AU peacekeepers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The TFG was weak but the upcoming Somali National 
Reconciliation Congress could help strengthen stability in 
Somalia.  Konare said the international community had to stop 
extremism in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, and neutralize 
the influence of Jihadist groups.  This was why the AU, and 
hopefully the UN, could help protect the TFG in the short 
term, and allow for Somalia to stabilize and hold elections 
for its future leaders. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
WHY SHOULD THE UN TAKE OVER SOMALIA OPERATIONS? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the afternoon session, UN representatives pressed 
Commissioner Djinnit on why the AU should expect the UN to 
take over Somalia operations.  Djinnit noted that AMISOM's 
current mandate would end in July; while the AU would have to 
extend AMISOM, it expected the UN to take over operations. 
He echoed Konare's remarks that UN-AU cooperation in Somalia 
was key to stability, pointing out Burundi operations as the 
model for such mutually shared interests.  In Burundi, the 
African Union had deployed Ethiopian and South African forces 
to stabilize the country.  A ceasefire was negotiated, and 
Tanzania had led peace talks resulting in a peace accord. 
With a transition government in place in Bujumbura, 
conditions were met for the UN to take over AU operations. 
The result had been successful elections, stability, and 
peace in Burundi. It was hoped that the UN could move into 
Somalia to help follow-up on AU operations. 
 
¶9. (SBU) UN representatives asked about the prospect for 
stability in Somalia and the challenges facing the National 
Reconciliation Congress.  Ambassador Khalilzad suggested that 
if the now-delayed reconciliation congress could not convene, 
perhaps the AU could help hold several, smaller 
reconciliation meetings that could eventually lead to a 
larger comprehensive meeting. 
 
------------ 
OTHER ISSUES 
------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) UN representatives and African Ambassadors provided 
brief informational reports on Cote d,Ivoire, the DRC, 
northern Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia border, and political transition in the 
Comoros.  The reports were brief and void of any 
controversial remarks.  The Belgium UN PermRep's presentation 
on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border issue was so brief that no 
issue of contention between the parties was raised. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT.  The day-long meeting at AU headquarters 
could not delve into substantive detail but did highlight the 
support for closer AU-UN cooperation and coordination in 
meeting crises in Africa.  UN Security Council 
representatives first met formally with AU Peace and Security 
Council (AU PSC) counterparts at AU Commission Headquarters 
in Addis Ababa in 2006.  Significant challenges remain before 
the UN considers operations in Sudan and particularly 
Somalia.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad cleared this message. 
YAMAMOTO