R 080956Z JUN 07 ZDS
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADANA 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH KURDISH SOUTHEAST: ELECORAL ARITHMETIC 
 
REF: ADANA 78 
 
CORRECTED COPY AS FOLLOWS: 
Signature Block: GREEN 
Subject Line: Turkey's Kurdish Southeast: Electoral Arithmetic 
 
Summary 
----------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) released 
its list of 65 "independent" candidates who will compete for 
parliament in Turkey's July 22 general election, hoping to elect 
MPs after 13 years during which no Kurdish nationalists were 
represented.  The DTP-endorsed list includes candidates who were 
imprisoned for alleged links with the PKK as well as people 
prominent in NGOs who have not been previously active in the 
DTP.  These candidates are expected to do well in 12 heavily 
Kurdish provinces in the east and southeast, and could win a 
total of 30-40 seats in the 550-member parliament.  The 
candidates' platform will include calls for amnesty for PKK 
fighters, as well as highlighting some issues intended to reach 
beyond their Kurdish base.  Once in parliament, the DTP has 
signaled that its members will avoid confrontational gestures 
that led to their eviction in the past.  Given the procedural 
hurdles facing all independent candidates, success by the DTP 
will require careful vote management.  End summary. 
 
Past Performance: Lots of Votes, No Seats 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) In the 2002 election, the pro-Kurdish DEHAP (the 
predecessor of today's DTP) finished in first place in 12 
provinces in the east and southeast: 
 
Province        DEHAP vote      Population      Total Provincial Seats 
                (2002)          (2000 census) 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------------------- 
 
Diyarbakir      56 %            1,362,708               10 
Van             41%             877,524         7 
Mardin          40 %            705,098         6 
Bitlis          29%             651,169         3 
Agri            35%             470,796         5 
Mus             38%             453,654         4 
Sirnak          46%             353,197         3 
Siirt           32%             263,676         2 
Batman          47%             248,000         4 
Hakkari 45 %            236,581         3 
Igdir           32%             168,634         2 
Tunceli         33%             93,548                  2 
 
TOTAL                           5,884,585               51 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) In this election, the DTP plans to run candidates as 
independents, i.e. not on any party list.  While this is an 
admission that the party lacks the votes to reach the 10% mark, 
it is a way to guarantee at least some its members will gain 
seats.  Of the 65 candidates thus far endorsed by the DTP, 30 
are running from these 12 provinces and the rest are 
concentrated in neighboring regions with large Kurdish 
populations or in cities farther west that have experienced 
heavy in-migration from the southeast.  The final number of 
DTP-endorsed candidates may change as some candidates may be 
disqualified from standing and the party could offer its 
endorsement to other independents. 
 
The Candidates: Lawyers and People Who Need Them 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Most of the DTP's 65 independent candidates are 
long-time pro-Kurdish activists who have been affiliated with 
the party and its predecessors.  Like the DTP itself, the 
candidates represent a range of views: for example, both the 
party's co-leaders Ahmet Turk, who is considered relatively 
moderate, is running in Mardin and harder-line Aysel Tugluk is 
one of five candidates in Diyarbakir.  The other Diyarbakir 
candidates include two prominent human rights attorneys, 
Selahattin Demirtas and Akin Birdal, who are not party officers, 
but have long been associated with the DTP. 
 
¶5. (SBU) One "celebrity" candidate is Hakkari's Seferi Yilmaz, 
the owner of the bookstore in Semdinli township that was bombed 
in 2005 by two noncommissioned military officers, whose legal 
case is continuing.  His candidacy is sure to galvanize 
supporters for whom "Semdinli" is shorthand for the Turkish 
establishment's continued animosity towards the Kurdish cause. 
Yilmaz himself is no angel, having served 15 years in prison for 
PKK membership.  Three other candidates are in jail for 
statements made earlier this year during Women's Day and the 
Nevruz festival. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In Ankara and Istanbul, the DTP is considering 
endorsements of candidates whose civic activism has not been 
previously connected with the DTP, such as Metin Bakkalci, a 
leader in the Turkish Doctors' Union.  One contact noted, 
however, that while the candidates are more moderate than past 
DTP slates, connections with the PKK are still a big factor in 
determining inclusion on the list.  This contact also noted that 
there is a one-dimensional focus on candidates with records of 
human rights activism to the exclusion of people skilled at 
dealing with other high-priority issues such as extreme poverty 
and the effects of massive forced migration in the last 15 years. 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to the media, the DTP platform includes old 
standards such as calls for an amnesty for PKK fighters and 
expanded Kurdish language rights.  They are also planning to 
include advocacy of some non-Kurdish issues such as abolition of 
compulsory military service and increasing female participation 
in politics.  DTP leaders have also signaled that, if elected, 
their candidates will avoid provocative gestures, such as 
speaking in Kurdish in parliament, that sparked controversy (and 
evictions of MPs) in the 1990s. 
 
Success Depends on Careful Management 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The DTP candidates' success will depend in part on the 
political and security environment in the coming weeks, but also 
on how well the DTP can manage its votes.  For example, in a 
province such as Diyarbakir, where five independent DTPers are 
running for the province's ten total seats, the party will need 
to ask its supporters to spread their votes in a manner that 
ensures success for as many of its candidates.  If the votes are 
spread too thinly among several candidates, then the party risks 
having some or all of them coming up short.  In Bitlis province, 
the DTP appears to be playing safe, running a single candidate 
in a three-seat district, making vote management a relatively 
straightforward challenge. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The recent constitutional amendment requiring all 
independent candidates across the country to be listed on the 
ballots in every province presents further challenges to the 
DTP.  Ballots are expected to be cumbersome with the names of 
independent candidates difficult to locate, which will likely 
increase spoiled ballots, particularly by voters in the 
southeast, where illiteracy is still rife.  In Diyarbakir, for 
instance, DTP's five candidates will be mixed in with at least 
34 others. 
¶10. (SBU) DTP gains in the southeast will necessarily come at 
the expense of the AK Party, which currently holds 33 of the 51 
seats in the provinces cited in para 2.  In Diyarbakir, for 
example, the AKP bagged 8 of the 10 seats in 2002 while only 
winning 15% of the vote (because of DEHAP's exclusion from 
parliament and consequent discounting of DEHAP ballots).  If the 
DTP is able to organize if voters successfully, AKP could lose 
three or four of those seats.  A successful showing by the DTP 
could halve the number of seats in the area held by the CHP, 
which has done little to engender support since 2002.  While the 
hard-line nationalist MHP may pass the threshold nationally, it 
is unlikely to gain a single seat in this region. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The massive escalation of PKK violence in the last 
month can only amplify the pervasive nervousness within the 
Turkish political establishment about providing a parliamentary 
platform for the DTP due to its association with the PKK.  As a 
result, in the weeks remaining before the vote, the GOT may take 
other actions against the DTP candidates such as arresting some 
of them or restricting their ability to campaign.  Current 
estimates put the expected number of DTP seats at 20-30 - 
perhaps not sufficient to meaningfully affect the balance in 
parliament, but enough to form a parliamentary group and - 
Kurdish activists hope - enough to advance the currently 
stagnant debate on the Kurdish issue at the national level. 
GREENE