VZCZCXRO1974
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0400/01 1412323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 212323Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1931
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1313
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1087
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0840
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0734
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0289
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0137
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY ELIASSON TELLS COUNCIL 
TO SET HIGH MARKERS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000400  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In back-to-back meetings with Ambassador 
Khalilzad and with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Permanent Five Members on May 17, UN Special Envoy (SE) for 
Sudan Jan Eliasson recommended the Council set high markers 
for all parties to the Darfur peace process to help move 
along the three-track approach he outlined in his "roadmap": 
convergence of initiatives to consolidate the positions of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory movements, 
pre-negotiations and, finally, invitation to formal talks. 
Eliasson suggested the Council speak with one voice in urging 
movements to prepare for negotiations, reminding Sudan's 
neighbors to abide by their April 29 Tripoli commitments, and 
calling on the Government of National Unity (GNU) stop aerial 
bombardments and listen to "reasonable requests" from DPA 
non-signatories.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In May 17 meetings with Ambassador Khalilzad and 
then with the UNSC P5 Members, SE Eliasson emphasized that 
for Darfur peacekeeping to succeed, there must be a peace to 
keep.  He described his and African Union SE Salim's efforts 
to convince parties to the Darfur conflict that there was no 
military solution but acknowledged that a faction of the GNU 
still held out hope for such an outcome.  Eliasson reported 
he had urged the GNU to refrain from aerial bombardments, 
which it had done between February 11 and April 19, a lull 
that needed to be sustained for the political process to 
begin.  Eliasson believed that GNU fears about the threat 
Darfur instability posed to Sudanese cohesion and to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement were enough to keep Khartoum 
from pursuing military victory in Darfur.  Eliasson believed 
President Bashir favored the political process but, like the 
international community, was not open to re-negotiating the 
DPA, just to amending it as needed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Eliasson, the non-signatory movements 
were too politically and ideologically splintered ever to 
unite (he counted at least 12-14 factions at this point). 
The international community's best hope was to consolidate 
their positions.  He said the movements did however share 
three basic demands they considered unaddressed by the DPA: 
power-sharing, including a unified Darfur region and a 
Darfurian vice-presidential slot; wealth-sharing, including 
more money to the Darfur compensation fund; and security 
issues, namely janjaweed-free returns for displaced 
populations.  Eliasson noted the logistical challenges he 
faced in physically accessing the rebel movements and agreed 
that the rainy season in the region would further complicate 
the situation and delay the political process. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Eliasson envisioned a three-stage political process, 
as outlined in the "roadmap" he and Salim drafted for the 
Secretary-General.  Stage One was the convergence of 
 
SIPDIS 
initiatives to consolidate the rebel movements, to occur in 
the coming weeks.  The Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) had credibility with the rebel group the Sudan 
Liberation Army and with "mediator" Eritrea, and GNU First 
Vice President Salva Kiir made clear the SPLM's intention to 
play a role in consolidating movements.  Eliasson reported 
the UN's intention to assist the SPLM in convening a meeting 
of non-signatories in Juba.  Eliasson noted the efforts of 
Egypt, Libya, Chad and Eritrea, as well as by the Community 
of Sant'Egidio, to gather non-signatories but warned there 
was too much competition between initiatives.  He called upon 
the P5 to use its influence to ensure Phase One success, 
including by reminding regional players of their commitments 
made on April 29 in Tripoli to allow the UN and AU to 
coordinate all initiatives. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Eliasson's Phase Two was the pre-negotiation phase, 
involving shuttle diplomacy and significant resources (NOTE: 
Eliasson met with the SYG after the P5 meeting to request 
this type of support. END NOTE), to take place in June. 
Eliasson requested P5 assistance in urging the 
non-signatories to accelerate their preparation for eventual 
negotiations with the GNU.  He recommended allowing three to 
four weeks for this process in order to prevent movements' 
resorting to "maximalist" positions or possibly to 
confrontation. 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000400  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The third and final phase was that of invitation to 
and conduct of negotiation, envisioned for July.  Eliasson 
requested P5 assistance to his and Salim's efforts to make 
this stage the priority by setting high benchmarks for the 
movements and the GNU to make good-faith efforts at 
negotiation.  In response to a suggestion by Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the parties be brought together to hash out 
their differences, Eliasson recommended first strengthening 
the negotiating teams from both sides and allowing Eliasson 
and Salim to "massage" them.  Eliasson said he did not mind 
the "sanctions drum beating in the background" to keep the 
political process moving forward, but he cautioned that a 
"serious chance" existed with the parties to move forward. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In addition to delays posed by the advent of the 
rainy season, Eliasson pointed out three other possible 
obstacles to the peace process.  First was the potential 
explosion of new tribal fighting, whose impact he described 
as eclipsing that of rebel and GNU violence.  Second was the 
"radicalization" and militarization of refugee and IDP camps, 
and finally was desertifiction, which Eliasson saw as 
resulting in the loss of eight to ten kilometers of land in 
the region per year. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Members welcomed Eliasson's roadmap and expressed 
readiness to assist his efforts.  Chinese Deputy PermRep Liu 
hoped for political progress during the summer, going so far 
as to specify his wish that the situation be resolved by the 
start of the General Assembly in September. 
KHALILZAD