VZCZCXRO1971
OO RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0399/01 1412322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 212322Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1929
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0145
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1311
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0272
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1484
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0732
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1119
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1722
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1020
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8286

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 65750 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 66637 
     ¶C. USUN NEW YORK 00374 
 
¶1. (SBU) PolMinsCouns and Poloff delivered ref A and B points 
to United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Assistant-Secretary General Hedi Annabi,  DPKO Africa 
Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Military Planning 
Service Chief Ian Sinclair and DPKO Office of Mission Support 
Senior Logistics Officer Peter McGhie on May 16. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the joint UN-African Union (AU) report on the 
hybrid operation for Darfur, Annabi had yet to connect with 
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit to 
confirm the need for UN-AU agreement on the text by May 18. 
Annabi was firm that no concessions would be made on 
substance of the report, especially command and control, but 
that "cosmetic" changes would be possible.  Annabi 
acknowledged that the UN would ultimately receive no credit 
for the hybrid, as it would be touted as an AMIS success, 
despite the fact that it would be UN-controlled and 
Commanded.  Annabi noted that Djinnit was aware of this 
reality, whereas AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare 
was not.  Annabi requested USG assistance in convincing the 
AU on this point, and Missionoffs relayed that demarches 
would be conducted with the AU and some of its member 
countries. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Once UN-AU agreement was secured, Annabi said the 
hybrid report would be transmitted to the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) and to the AU Peace and Security Council, after which 
"consultative briefings" would be conducted with Khartoum to 
inform the Government of National Unity (GNU).  Annabi 
stressed that these would be consultations, not negotiations. 
 Annabi noted that this approach differed from that offered 
by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in a May 11 meeting with the 
P3 (ref C), who had reported that the report would go 
simultaneously to the UNSC, the AU PSC and the GNU.  Annabi 
feared that if the GNU saw the report first, "we will 
negotiate forever" on its provisions, whereas securing UNSC 
and AU PSC agreement ahead of time would increase the 
report's appeal to Khartoum. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the substance of the hybrid report, Annabi and 
Titov were emphatic that operational control would 
"absolutely" come from the UN.  Annabi and Titov said that 
the Addis Ababa coordination cell could not by definition 
serve as an alternate command post and would consist of 
mostly UN personnel, despite its being under AU auspices. On 
incorporating language for a strong mandate to protect 
civilians and humanitarian operations, as well as to disarm 
the janjaweed, Titov said that the resultant UNSC resolution 
should amplify these elements, which would be featured in the 
report though without a specific Chapter VII reference. 
Titov added that a UNSC stop in Khartoum during its June 
mission to Africa could go a long way in getting the GNU on 
board with any hybrid resolution under consideration at that 
point. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Annabi reported that the UN was making decisions on 
Heavy Support Package (HSP) troop contributions and solicited 
USG assistance in shoring up additional African troop 
contributions for the Heavy Support Package, since the only 
viable offers to date were from Egypt and Nigeria.  He noted 
there were no African engineering units or attack helicopters 
pledged (Sinclair interjected that Jordan had recently put a 
hold on its pledges of attack  helicopters).  Annabi pointed 
out that the UN could not force deployment of certain troop 
contributors on a host country if that country did not accept 
them, and he enlisted USG assistance in convincing Khartoum 
of the need to take non-African offers (such as Pakistan, 
Jordan, Thailand, Bangladesh and China - all Sudan's 
"friends," according to Annabi).  Annabi believed that the UN 
now had in hand sufficient TCC pledges for HSP requirements, 
although they were mostly non-African. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On China's pledge of an engineering unit, Titov 
reported that the Chinese Ministry of Defense rejected the 
proposal to move an existing Chinese unit from the UN Mission 
in the Sudan (UNMIS) in order to expedite HSP deployment. 
Titov was not optimistic that the new Chinese unit would 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000399  002 OF 002 
 
 
deploy by August, as the Chinese suggested, given their 
history of delayed deployment.  On overall deployment of the 
three stages of AMIS assistance, Annabi was cautious in 
responding to USUN's push for tandem flow deployment.  Annabi 
acknowledged that the plan was "all one process," but warned 
that the HSP was the backbone of what the hybrid operation 
would ultimately be and without a majority of HSP elements as 
"stepping stones" in place, hybrid success could be 
jeopardized from the outset. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Annabi reported that $60 million had been authorized 
by the ACABQ for HSP funding.  McGhie confirmed that a UN 
officer of Somali descent was working well with the walis of 
the three Darfur states (citing his language skills and 
cultural knowledge as major factors), obviating the need for 
USG pressure on the GNU on issues of water surveys, 
permission for water use and designation of land for the HSP. 
 McGhie said identifying water sources was not the problem in 
Nyala that it was in El Fasher and described plans for the 
"super-camp" to be constructed in South Darfur.  McGhie 
reported that UN contracting with PA&E for construction was 
"moving nicely."  McGhie was pleased to hear that the USG 
would finalize the contract for expansion of all seven camps 
for the AMIS plus-up within a week and that the priority 
camps could be ready by July/August. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COL Sinclair noted that expansion of these seven 
camps was the "cornerstone" of AMIS sector restructuring, 
since the Force Commander refused to move from eight to three 
sectors until the two additional battalions from Nigeria and 
Rwanda were in place to provide force protection.  Deployment 
of these battalions in turn was predicated on camp expansion, 
as well as to the provision of transport.  Sinclair said that 
the Cairo linked its pledge of 36 APCs to the infantry troops 
it offered for the hybrid and that the GOE was not willing to 
lease these APCs to other battalions besides its own, 
effectively taking the Egyptian offer off the table.  Titov 
gave no specific indication of how much of the Egyptian 
pledges DPKO would be able to accept, saying only it would 
not be the whole package.  Sinclair appealed to the USG for 
assistance in this regard, saying that ideally the Nigerian 
and Rwandan battalions should come equipped with their own 
APCs and corresponding equipment or should appeal to donors 
to supply them. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Finally, on the issue of appointments, Annabi said 
the UN was trying to persuade Konare to de-link the 
announcement of Force Commander (FC) with the announcement of 
Deputy FC, on which the Rwandan candidate was not yet 
confirmed.  Annabi reported that FC GEN Agwai would be in New 
York and in Washington for consultations on May 17-18 and 
would hopefully arrive in Sudan before the UNSC Mission 
arrived in mid-June.  Annabi assured that Agwai would have a 
coterie of "trusted" UN advisors.  Titov reported that there 
was no UN movement yet on appointment of a Special 
Representative for UNMIS, adding that "you (the USG) probably 
know more about it than we do." 
 
¶10. (SBU) USUN inquired about the status of the UN mission to 
Chad, and Annabi reported that a delegation consisting of 
police and military planners, humanitarian representatives, 
logistics and political officer would depart for N'djamena 
May 22 and remain for at least 30 days.  Titov noted, 
however, that the team would have no power of negotiation but 
would only explain the concept and modalities of UN 
peacekeeping for eastern Chad. 
KHALILZAD