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RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
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DE RUCNDT #0393/01 1390157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190157Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1913
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON TRIBUNAL: P-3 PERMREPS ENGAGE COUNCIL 
MEMBERS ON DRAFT UNSCR 
 
REF: A. USUN 384 
     ¶B. USUN 389 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  P-3 PermReps joined forces May 18 to 
canvass their Council counterparts to explain the draft 
Chapter VII resolution on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(ref A) and seek their support.  Most delegations said they 
had yet to receive instructions on the draft text and 
conceded that their position would likely be determined at a 
political level in capitals.  While expressing concerns about 
the consequences for political stability in Lebanon of 
Council action, Indonesia and South Africa suggested that 
they would wait for further consultations with the GOL before 
adopting a position on the resolution.  Panama and Peru 
underlined strong legal concerns about the precedent of the 
Council deciding to bring into force an agreement that a 
country has failed to ratify.  Qatar pushed for a delay in 
Council action on the tribunal to give the Lebanese 
parliamentary process one last chance.  Ghana seemed inclined 
to support the text.  The British met bilaterally with Ghana 
and reported a positive reaction.  The Congolese Charge told 
the French he was concern about the political impact in 
Lebanon.  At this stage the P-3 count only six firm votes: 
the P-3, Belgium, Slovakia, and Ghana.  End Summary. 
 
P-3 PermReps Engage Counterparts 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) P-3 PermReps engaged with their Council counterparts 
May 18 to explain the draft Chapter VII resolution on the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (ref A) and press for support. 
The P-3 diplomats drew a distinction between the "light" 
approach in the P-3 text, which calls on the Council to 
"decide" that the tribunal agreement and statute previously 
agreed to by the government of Lebanon and the UN shall enter 
into force, and the "heavy" alternative of asking the Council 
to decide to establish an international tribunal as a 
subsidiary body of the UNSC.  In response to arguments about 
the alleged negative effect of a Chapter VII resolution on 
stability in Lebanon, P-3 PermReps argued instead that 
Lebanon's stability would be undermined if the Council fails 
to act.  They explained that the UNIIIC criminal 
investigation of the Hariri and other political 
assassinations would benefit from the establishment of the 
tribunal, and defended the timing of Council action by noting 
that both PM Siniora and SYG Ban have declared the Lebanese 
parliamentary process deadlocked.  The Lebanese Government 
and people have requested the Council's assistance, the P-3 
concluded, and the Council cannot let them down. 
 
Indonesia: Waiting for Siniora 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Pending instructions from her capital, Indonesian 
DPR and Charge Asmady suggested to Ambassador Khalilzad and 
French DPR Lacroix that her government would want to wait 
until GOL PM Siniora visits Jakarta -- scheduled for May 24 
-- before adopting a position on the draft resolution. 
Noting that the Lebanese parliament "must have good reasons 
not to ratify the agreement," she asked whether Council 
action to establish the tribunal would help stabilize 
Lebanon.  Asmady contended that it might be better to wait 
for Lebanese consensus rather than act now.  Indonesia does 
not want to take sides in an internal Lebanese dispute and 
must balance the risk of stability and threats to UNIFIL -- 
to which Indonesia contributes forces -- with the need to 
establish the tribunal. 
 
South Africa: Siniora-Mbeki Contact Key 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) South African PR Kumalo told Ambassadors Khalilzad 
and UK DPR Pierce that PM Siniora had talked to SAG President 
Mbeki about Council action on the tribunal.  Kumalo said he 
expected that the close relationship between the two leaders 
would play an important role in deciding Pretoria's stance on 
the resolution.  In the meantime, Kumalo argued that the 
Council should be in "no rush" to move forward on the 
resolution.  South Africa supports the need to establish the 
tribunal and agrees that it would help the UNIIIC 
investigation, but has the Council exhausted all other 
options besides Chapter VII?  The UNSC must also be wary not 
to cause more trouble in Lebanon through its actions. 
Specifically, the Council should be careful not to pre-empt 
the role of the Lebanese parliament.  The problem, Kumalo 
opined, is that Lebanon asks the Council to do "everything" 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000393  002 OF 003 
 
 
for it.  If the Council must act, though, he expressed 
preference for the "light" approach on a resolution rather 
than the "heavy" option.  Kumalo also noted the letter from 
President Lahoud, which he construed to mean that Lahoud does 
not oppose establishment of the tribunal but objects to 
Siniora's request for Council action. 
 
Panama: Serious Legal Concerns 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Panamanian PR Arias told Ambassadors Khalilzad and 
de la Sabliere that he has serious concerns about the legal 
and political implications of the draft resolution.  While 
the draft text "might be a light option for Lebanon, it is a 
heavy option for the rest of the world" because of the 
"serious repercussions" of the precedent it would set of the 
Council imposing an agreement on a country that had failed to 
ratify it.  Taking his argument to the "absurd," he wondered 
if this action meant the Council could impose the 
still-unratified Kyoto Treaty on the United States.  Instead, 
he suggested that the Council could either establish a 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon as a subsidiary organ of the UN, 
taking into account Lebanese law, or send the case to the 
ICC.   (Note: Arias conceded the case for ICC jurisdiction is 
weak, but argued that the Hariri murder plus other attacks 
could constitute a crime against humanity.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) After much back and forth on his two alternatives, 
Arias eventually proposed two other ideas.  First, the UNSC 
could consider a mission to Lebanon to better understand the 
situation.  (Note: Arias participated on the Council's recent 
trip to Kosovo but has yet to commit to a position on that 
draft resolution.  End Note.)  Second, similar to a proposal 
he has offered to the text of the Kosovo resolution, Arias 
suggested that the Council adopt a resolution that decides to 
establish a tribunal four weeks from the date of the 
resolution's adoption if the Lebanese have failed to ratify 
the tribunal agreement by that point.  Arias eventually 
agreed to consult UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel on the 
legal implications of the draft resolution, and to consider 
the precedent of the UNSC Chapter VII resolution mandating 
the transfer of Charles Taylor to the Hague. 
 
Peru: Solidarity With Panama 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Noting that he had spoken with Lima about the draft 
resolution on May 18 but did not yet have formal 
instructions, Peruvian PR Voto-Bernales told Ambassador 
Khalilzad that he had serious legal concerns about the 
Council taking action to bring the agreement into effect.  He 
emphasized that Peru strongly supports the UNIIIC 
investigation and wants the perpetrators of the Hariri 
assassination brought to justice.  While Peru also wants to 
"untie the knot" of the Lebanese parliament's failure to 
convene, the Council could consider other options besides 
"breaking new ground" with this unprecedented legal approach. 
 Although he was careful not to endorse the idea of Council 
action on the tribunal, Voto-Bernales offered establishment 
of an international tribunal as a subsidiary organ of the 
UNSC or referral to the ICC as two possible alternatives to 
the approach taken in the draft P-3 text.  In response to 
Ambassador Khalilzad's point that the P-3 did not want to 
re-open the agreement and statute in order to establish an 
international tribunal as a subsidiary body of the UNSC (i.e. 
the "heavy" option), Voto-Bernales argued that the agreement 
and statute have "no legal standing" because they have not 
yet been ratified.  While at this point he could not promise 
his support for the resolution, Voto-Bernales conceded Peru's 
decision would likely be taken at a political level. 
 
Qatar: Pushing for a Delay 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) During a quick pull-aside with Ambassador Khalilzad, 
Qatari PR al-Nasser initially suggested that PM Siniora on 
May 17 had agreed in a phone conversation with Qatari Prime 
Minister Hamid bin Jasim to a one or two week delay in 
Council action to encourage a Lebanese solution.  If bin 
Jasim fails to secure a Lebanese solution in that time, 
Nasser reported, Qatar would then support the draft 
resolution.  Embassy Beirut and the Lebanese Mission in New 
York later clarified that PM Siniora had not agreed to any 
such delay, but had instead welcomed bin Jasim to do whatever 
he could to encourage Lebanese parliamentary ratification 
while the Council continued to move forward on the draft P-3 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000393  003 OF 003 
 
 
resolution.  In a subsequent phone conversation with 
al-Nasser, Ambassador Khalilzad clarified that Qatar would 
have only two to three days to secure a Lebanese solution 
before the Council would have to act. 
 
Ghana Seems Solid 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The British expert on Lebanon reported that UK DPR 
Pierce's meeting with Ghanaian Charge Christian went well. 
Although Christian did not yet have instructions from Accra, 
he reportedly did not expect to have any problems with the 
draft resolution.  He expressed appreciation for the P-3's 
"light" approach to the resolution and noted that the draft 
did not attempt to compel cooperation from third states or 
overcome immunities. 
 
Congo Nervous, But French Have Influence 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to French Mission experts, French PR de 
la Sabliere's meeting with Congolese PR Ikouebe was "not 
encouraging."  Although Ikouebe conceded that his 
instructions are ten days old -- from around the time that 
Michel briefed the Council -- he told de la Sabliere that 
Congo has strong political concerns about Council action to 
establish the tribunal and believes the UNSC should not take 
sides in Lebanon.  Ikouebe also conceded, though, that the 
UNSC had now "entered a new phase" after receiving PM 
Siniora's letter and SYG Ban's briefing.  Ikouebe also 
recalled President Lahoud's view and noted the importance of 
the views of the Lebanese community in Congo-Brazzaville 
(NFI). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Although most delegations have yet to receive 
instructions on the draft resolution, we count only six solid 
votes in favor -- U.S., France, UK, Belgium, Slovakia, and 
Ghana.  In order to ensure a positive dynamic in the Council 
when the P-3 formally table the resolution, USUN recommends 
that the Department demarche UNSC capitals again at a high 
level before a second round of consultations in New York 
on/around May 23.  We understand France will do the same. 
KHALILZAD