VZCZCXRO4881
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHIK RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #0374/01 1342239
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 142239Z MAY 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1870
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1297
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1075
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1031
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0152
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0835
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0352
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0716
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0220
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0282
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0734
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0869

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: IN MEETING WITH P3 SYG BAN STILL CAUTIOUS ON 
DARFUR ACTION 
 
REF: USUN NEW YORK 00368 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000374  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a May 11 meeting with Permanent Three 
Security Council Members, United Nations Secretary-General 
(SYG) Ban Ki-moon seemed defensive about his emphasis on the 
political process as the appropriate way to proceed on 
Darfur.  While SYG Ban agreed joint and/or individual 
pressure on Khartoum might be necessary to spark Darfur 
progress, he would not commit to dates for coordinated 
demarches with the P5 (reftel) to apply such pressure.  He 
did, however, stress the need for P3 assistance to secure 
Sudanese cooperation on land acquisition and water drilling 
rights for camp construction in Darfur under the Heavy 
Support Package (HSP), as well as to drum up African HSP 
troop commitments.  Ban reiterated his stance that imposition 
of sanctions would not be as strategically effective with the 
Sudanese Government as the mere threat of them.  Ban said 
candidates, including European candidates, were being 
interviewed for Special Representative for the UN Mission in 
the Sudan (UNMIS).  Ban sought P5 assistance with normalizing 
relations between Chad and Sudan and with convincing Chadian 
President Deby on the need for a UN peacekeeping presence in 
eastern Chad.  French Permanent Representative (PR) de La 
Sabliere pushed for SYG intervention with Russian FM Lavrov 
and/or President Putin to convince Moscow to endorse the 
Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo.  The SYG raised Lebanon, to be 
reported septel.  Finally, the SYG requested P3 support for 
the process of restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO).  END SUMMARY. 
 
BAN UPDATES ON MODEST DARFUR PROGRESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad, UK PR Jones Parry and French 
PR de La Sabliere all expressed appreciation for the SYG's 
efforts on Darfur but expressed their shared concern that 
progress on the political, security and humanitarian fronts 
needed to be accelerated, offering their assistance to 
increase momentum.  Updating the P3 on the political process, 
Ban reported that Special Envoy Eliasson would be in New York 
May 17-18 to discuss his "roadmap" on Darfur political 
reconciliation, which, according to Eliasson's staff, 
outlined preparations for negotiations between the Sudanese 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and rebels; Eliasson is 
expected to brief the SC on this timeline in early June. 
According to DPKO Assistant-SYG Annabi, Eliasson sought to 
consolidate regional diplomatic initiatives, including those 
of Egypt, Eritrea, Libya and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement, whose plans to host a conference in Juba of 
non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement were supported 
by the GNU.  Ban wanted to emphasize the political process to 
avoid creating a "negative" situation on the ground in 
Darfur, which could lead to further instability.  He 
reiterated his stance that imposition of sanctions would not 
be as strategically effective with the GNU as the mere threat 
of them.  Ban made a point of defending his request for 
political space on Darfur, refuting the "negative perception" 
that in doing so, he showed himself sympathetic to the GNU. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On the hybrid, Ban said the AU had reverted to the 
UN on May 9 with "numerous comments" to the UN draft hybrid 
plan, amendments nevertheless deemed "workable" by DPKO 
Under-SYG Guehenno and currently under consideration by DPKO 
technical experts.  Ban expected the hybrid details to be 
finalized with AU by May 18, after which they would be 
presented to the UNSC and discussed under the Tripartite 
Mechanism with the GNU.  Ban assured that hybrid command and 
control would be based on standard UN principles and 
practices.  The Joint Special Representative (JSR) and Deputy 
JSR appointments were intended to be a package; although 
Khartoum had endorsed Mr. Rodolphe Adada as JSR, it had yet 
to say yes to MAJ GEN Henry Anyidoho as Deputy, but the SYG 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000374  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
did not expect opposition.  Annabi explained that since the 
appointment of hybrid Force Commander (FC) and Deputy FC were 
to be made by the AU, only the AU could announce them, an 
announcement delayed by AU Commission Chairperson Konare's 
indecision on the Rwandan Deputy FC candidate but expected in 
the coming days.  The hybrid FC, GEN Agwai, would be in New 
York May 16 after a May 14 stop in Addis Ababa before 
assuming his duties in Darfur on June 1. 
 
HOW THE P3 COULD HELP 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ban appealed for P3 assistance to secure Sudanese 
cooperation on land acquisition and water drilling rights for 
camp construction in Darfur under the HSP, as well as to drum 
up African HSP troop commitments.  He noted that there were 
currently only two viable African TCCs (Egypt and Nigeria), 
not enough to stave off GNU attempts to get the UN to put off 
final TCC decisions until more African commitments were made. 
 Ban noted that P3 pressure might be needed while the GNU 
deliberated on the UN-AU hybrid plan but vowed to expedite 
the GNU acceptance process as much as possible through 
"face-to-face" contact so as to avoid a repeat of the two 
months Khartoum took to endorse the HSP.  Acknowledging the 
SYG's request that any P5 outreach on Darfur take into 
account parallel UN efforts, P3 Ambassadors agreed that 
individual or joint demarches calling for action on key 
benchmarks along a timeline would be coordinated with the 
SYG. 
 
STILL NO NAMES FOR SRSG 
----------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) UK PR Jones Parry pressed Ban on the need to name a 
replacement for UNMIS SRSG.  Ban reported that there were 
"European" candidates on the shortlist being considered and 
that interviews were being conducted.  He mentioned the 
possibility that "an experienced European negotiator" would 
be appointed to a non-permanent position as political advisor 
to Adada as a follow-on to Eliasson's role. 
 
P3 IMPATIENCE ON CHAD 
--------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) All P3 Ambassadors stressed the need for a UN 
mission to deploy to N'Djamena to follow up with President 
Deby on plans for securing the refugee camps in eastern Chad. 
 Ban and Annabi confirmed that this mission would be 
dispatched in the near future, and Ban sought P5 assistance 
with convincing a reticent Deby on the modalities of UN 
peacekeeping in eastern Chad and with normalizing relations 
between Chad and Sudan in the face of Libyan indignation.  UK 
PR Jones Parry pushed the SYG to commit to a date for the 
mission to Chad to depart, but the SYG resisted. 
 
FRENCH SOUGHT SYG INTERVENTION WITH RUSSIA ON KOSOVO 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶7. (SBU) French PR de La Sabliere told the SYG there was a 
"clear majority" among UNSC Members in support of the 
Ahtisaari plan, with the only wild card being Russia.  De La 
Sabliere emphasized the need to engage with the Russians, 
both in New York and in capitals, to convince them there was 
no alternative to the Ahtisaari plan, with the upcoming G-8 
and EU-Russia Summits as good opportunities to send this 
message.  The SYG took note of de La Sabliere's suggestion 
that he speak with Russian President Putin and/or FM Lavrov 
on this point. 
 
SYG SOUGHT P3 INDULGENCE ON DPKO RESTRUCTURING 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶8. (SBU) The SYG urged P3 consideration of his plan to 
restructure DPKO, given that "time was of the essence" to 
present the plan to the Fifth Committee and the ACABQ by May 
¶26.  He stressed that this restructuring was necessary to 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000374  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
preserve DPKO integrity and was "resource-free" but would 
require a $65 million increase over a two-month period in FY 
2007-2008 to keep up with the surge in peacekeeping demands. 
Ambassador Khalilzad and UK PR Jones Parry requested clarity 
on the number and duration of new appointments, and UK PR 
Jones Parry cautioned that unless DPKO and the SYG undertook 
intensive lobbying efforts in support of the plan, it would 
not get through Fifth Committee. 
KHALILZAD