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Viewing cable 07TUNIS619, FMF IS KEY TO TUNISIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM SUCCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TUNIS619 2007-05-18 12:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0619 1381254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181254Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3178
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS TUNIS 000619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE AND ACTING DIRECTOR 
OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FORE FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/FO (WELCH AND GRAY), NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND 
HOPKINS), NEA/RA AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS PTER MARR PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: FMF IS KEY TO TUNISIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM SUCCESS 
 
1. (SBU) I noted with disappointment that the State 
Department,s Fiscal Year 2008 budget proposal to Congress 
included only $2.064 million in Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) for Tunisia.  This figure is significantly lower than 
the Embassy Tunis Country Team request of $30 million in FMF 
for FY-08 or the $8.075 million in FMF that Tunisia will 
receive in FY-07.  Such a decrease will have a major impact 
on Tunisia, a historical partner in the Global War on Terror, 
as it faces a growing domestic and regional terrorist threat. 
 In January 2007, the GOT announced it had disrupted a 
Salafist plot to attack US and UK diplomatic interests in 
Tunisia.  Regionally, Tunisia and the Maghreb are 
experiencing an increase in extremist activity, particularly 
the new threat of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  More 
broadly, anecdotal evidence suggests that Tunisians are 
disproportionately represented among foreign fighters 
entering Iraq and a significant percentage of suicide bombers 
in Iraq are said to be Tunisian. 
 
2. (SBU) The Tunisian military is responsible for monitoring 
and supervising Tunisia,s borders and shares a strong 
apolitical military culture with the United States.  The 
military is Tunisia's most professional and progressive 
institution, in a country that has disappointed in other 
areas.  A large percentage of military officers have received 
US training, and the majority of Tunisia,s Army and Air 
Force equipment is American.  However, this equipment is 
rapidly deteriorating and cannot be maintained without 
significant foreign assistance.  The proposed reduction in 
FY-08 FMF represents a potentially crippling blow to Tunisian 
military capability.  The Minister of National Defense has 
repeatedly and specifically asked for US FMF assistance to 
strengthen the military,s ability to control its borders, in 
cooperation with neighbors Algeria and Libya.  This is the 
type of regional integration that the USG is encouraging 
through initiatives such as the Trans-Sahara Counter 
Terrorism Partnership.  Severe cuts in US security assistance 
send the wrong message to a critical North African ally in 
the war on terror and hobble Tunisia,s ability to 
effectively combat terrorism. 
 
3. (SBU) The $2.064 million in FMF proposed for FY-08 is not 
sufficient to encourage Tunisian partnership in the Global 
War on Terror, further our bilateral military relations, or 
ensure Tunisia can combat terrorism.  I very much hope that 
the FY-09 Foreign Assistance process, which is now underway 
in the Department, will result in significantly higher FMF 
for Tunisia.  If this is not the case, Tunisia will be forced 
to look elsewhere (e.g., France, China) for military 
assistance.  While Embassy Tunis will seek out every 
opportunity for alternative US funding for the Tunisian 
military, I urge the Department to reverse this crippling 
decrease in FMF and fund significantly more assistance to 
Tunisia in FY-09. 
GODEC