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Viewing cable 07TUNIS605, BLUE LANTERN CHECK: TUNISIAN MOD LICENSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TUNIS605 2007-05-16 10:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0605 1361000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161000Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3162
UNCLAS TUNIS 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) AND PM/RSAT (ARNETT) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC MARR TS
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN CHECK: TUNISIAN MOD LICENSES 
05-998131 AND 05-991008 
 
REF: STATE 52041 
 
1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 4. 
 
2. As instructed in reftel, on May 15 PolMilOff conducted a 
post-shipment end-use check on applications 05-998131 and 
05-991008 for the export of F-5 aircraft spares to the 
Tunisian Ministry of National Defense (MND).  PolMilOff met 
with the following officials at the Ministry of National 
Defense in Tunis to conduct the post-shipment verification: 
 
-- COL Hussein Al-Abeid, Logistics Division, Tunisian Air 
Force 
-- MAJ Monji Najjar, Contracts and Transit Division, Tunisian 
Air Force 
-- COL Mohamed Issaoui, Security, Tunisian Air Force 
-- MAJ Rym Belhiba, Department of International Cooperation 
and Relations, MND 
 
Al-Abeid and Najjar confirmed that the Tunisian Air Force had 
ordered F-5 parts from Commerce Overseas Corporation.  Najjar 
had copies of all relevant parts' contracts and confirmed 
that all parts are for the exclusive use of the Tunisian Air 
Force.  Regarding case 05-998131, Najjar said that the MND 
had signed three contracts (2004 - $155,800, 2005 - $192,500, 
and 2006 - $210,000) with Commerce Overseas and was currently 
reviewing if a fourth and final contract for F-5 spare parts 
would be signed in 2007.  Regarding case 05-991008, Najjar 
said the MND had initially planned to purchase two 
gyroscopes.  However, the price had risen to $148,000, so the 
MND had purchased one gyroscope and sent two MND gyroscopes 
for repair by Commerce Overseas. 
 
3. Najjar and Al-Abeid confirmed that all parts received to 
date were in use, in storage or used and disposed.  The 
Tunisian Air Force's twelve F-5 aircraft are all located at 
the Sidi Ahmed Air Base in Bizerte (northern Tunisia). 
Access to the airbase is strictly controlled, and on base 
personnel are restricted to those areas they are authorized 
to work.  F-5 parts are stored in restricted access 
warehouses, however, the MND is not aware of the specific 
storage provisos associated with the export licenses.  The 
MND's copy of the contracts has no reference to storage 
provisos or license requirements, other than to say that the 
contract is in compliance with appropriate US export 
licensing. 
 
4. ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that PM/RSAT provide copies 
of any Defense Trade Control procedures, policies and 
regulations that explain the need for US export licensing in 
commercial military sales contracts to the Tunisian Ministry 
of National Defense.  Al-Abeid said that the MND was not 
familiar with U.S. defense trade controls procedures related 
to commercial sales contracts.  Al-Abeid requested Post 
provide further details about the Defense Trade Controls 
Compliance procedures so that the MND can ensure all 
necessary regulations and procedures are outlined in their 
future commercial contracts. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Post finds the transactions to be 
legitimate and the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense to 
be a reliable party to receive USML items and/or technology. 
GODEC