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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 002290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/22/07-2 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(6) Reappointment of Takeshima as head of FTC gives rise to 
objections in ruling camp 
 
(7) Examining the Abe administration: Collective self-defense (Part 
2): Will Japan be allowed to intercept ballistic missiles headed for 
the United States? 
 
(8) Commentary: Reality-based discussions needed for SDF activities 
 
(9) Interview on collective self-defense (Part 1): Shoichi Nakagawa 
suggests debating collective self-defense from various angles 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(6) Reappointment of Takeshima as head of FTC gives rise to 
objections in ruling camp 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Slightly abridged) 
May 19, 2007 
 
Yoshiaki Nakagawa 
 
Objections are erupting in the ruling parties against officials 
reported by media as already chosen by the government for such posts 
as chair of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and the president of the 
Narita International Airport Corporation (NAA). The personnel 
selection for those posts requires Diet approval. Because of the 
objections, the ruling parties put off holding a meeting of a 
project team intended to reach an agreement (on the selections). 
 
The official in the spotlight now is FTC Chairman Kazuhiko Takeshima 
(64). He assumed his post in July 2002 during the Koizumi 
administration. At one point recently, it was assumed he would 
retire from the post in September, after serving a five-year tenure, 
but the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) began making 
arrangements to reappoint him to the same post, presumably because 
the Antimonopoly Law will be amended next year to hike fines on 
bid-rigging. 
 
Takeshima, after serving as director-general of the National Tax 
Administration Agency, joined the Kantei in 1998. Serving as deputy 
assistant chief cabinet secretary, Takeshima was deeply involved in 
bring about the passage of the so-called privacy act. Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe was then Takeshima's supervisor as deputy chief cabinet 
secretary. After assuming the post of chair of the FTC, Takeshima 
 
SIPDIS 
has energetically disclosed not only bid-rigging cases involving 
companies but also bureaucracy-initiated ones. 
 
For this performance, Takeshima reportedly has received high marks 
from Abe, but some observers think that the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) found itself in a difficult position to recommend someone to 
the Kantei as a successor to Takeshima. The post of the FTC chairman 
has been almost always occupied by former MOF officials, although 
Takeshima's predecessor was Yasuchika Negoro, who came from the 
Ministry of Justice. MOF apparently wanted to keep the post 
indefinitely. 
 
However, the Kantei and MOF have been at odds over the issue of 
employee placements by government ministries and agencies. Given 
this, even though the ministry recommended (former Vice Minister) 
Hosokawa and (current Vice Minister) Fujii, who is soon to retire 
 
TOKYO 00002290  002 OF 007 
 
 
from the post, the Kantei would not accept either. So, 
"the second best way is to get Takeshima reappointed," a senior MOF 
official analyzed. 
 
Around then, the Asahi Shimbun reported in its morning edition of 
May 17 that Takeshima's reappointment had been confirmed. That day, 
the ruling camp's project team on Diet approval of the personnel 
selection was planning to meet in the Diet, but they did not meet, 
though the reason why the meeting was canceled was unknown. 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Hidenao 
Nakagawa, referring to the reappointment of Takeshima as chair of 
the FTC, told reporters on May 17: "I think it is a good thing for 
him to firmly address bid-rigging cases to eliminate them." He 
expressed an intention to welcome the reappointment, but another 
senior member of the ruling parties revealed: "Takeshima is very 
good at cracking down on bid-rigging cases, but if he should go too 
far, everybody would back away and he would not be able to do 
anything." 
 
(7) Examining the Abe administration: Collective self-defense (Part 
2): Will Japan be allowed to intercept ballistic missiles headed for 
the United States? 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Abridged slightly) 
May 20, 2007 
 
"On April 25, North Korea unveiled a new mid-range ballistic missile 
under development during its military parade in Pyongyang." 
 
Based on this information from the United States in late April, the 
Defense Ministry has step up its efforts to collect intelligence. 
 
The new North Korean missile, already referred to as Musudan among 
US authorities, is believed to have a range of 5,000 kilometers. 
This means Guam, where there are US bases, is within its range. The 
Musudan is also believed to be more accurate than the Taepodong-2 
(6,000 kilometers). The North Korean missile threat is becoming a 
real possibility for the people of the United States. 
 
"Japan is in a situation where we cannot shoot down a ballistic 
missile that may be headed for the United States." 
 
The government's blue-ribbon panel to discuss the legal system for 
national security held its inaugural meeting on May 18 in which 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe urged the members to examine the current 
situation in which the country is not allowed to use the missile 
defense system for intercepting a ballistic missile possibly headed 
for the United States. 
 
At present, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) takes this view: 
"Japan is not allowed to intercept missiles headed for other 
countries because doing so corresponds to an act of collective 
self-defense." 
 
But Abe, since his tenure as deputy chief cabinet secretary, has 
repeatedly indicated: "It's nonsense to shoot down only those 
missiles targeting Japan and overlook those headed for the United 
States. The American public would find such a view absolutely 
absurd." 
 
Abe's concern became reality when US Ambassador to Japan Thomas 
Schieffer held a press conference last October in which he said: 
 
TOKYO 00002290  003 OF 007 
 
 
"What would happen if a missile were launched by an adversary and a 
Japanese naval vessel had the ability to knock that missile down? 
Would it have to wait until it could be finally determined that the 
missile was headed for Japan? Given the few minutes that are 
involved in missile defense decisions, it is better for us to answer 
that question now." 
 
Japan was not armed with the missile defense (MD) system last 
October. Schieffer added: "The answer will be absolutely critical to 
the function and future of our alliance." Basically it is about the 
Japan-US alliance rather than about technology. Politically 
speaking, saying "no" is not an option. 
 
In justifying an act of shooting down missiles targeting Japan, the 
government cites police powers for eliminating dangerous objects 
intruding into Japan's airspace. Responding to a ballistic missile 
constitutes an invocation of the defense right under international 
law. But in the case of Japan, SDF activities are based on police 
powers until a defense mobilization order is issued. 
 
The government has a plan to justify shooting down US-bound missiles 
with police powers. The reason is because chances are high that 
missiles headed for Guam and Hawaii would fly over eastern Shikoku 
and Aomori, respectively. But a senior Defense Ministry official 
thinks such is improper, noting: "Technically speaking, it's rather 
difficult to use such logic because the altitudes of ballistic 
missiles targeting such places are quite different from those headed 
for Japan." 
 
Intercepting ballistic missiles would become possible in 10 years' 
time. The governments of Japan and the United States have been 
jointly developing a highly powerful and accurate next-generation 
interceptor missile with the aim of producing it in 2015. Once 
deployed, Aegis vessels in the Sea of Japan would be able to shoot 
down US-bound missiles. 
 
Intelligence between the two counties must also be integrated in 
order to allow US early warning satellites and SDF and USFJ radars 
to detect fired ballistic missiles by using the MD system. 
 
An agreement was reached in the Japan-US Security Consultative 
Committee meeting (2 plus 2) held in Washington on May 1 to 
establish an MD joint operational screen. 
 
The Air Self-Defense Force's Base Air Defense Ground Environment 
(BADGE) system has been steadily providing intelligence to the US 
military since late April. 
 
Some opposition party lawmakers think providing intelligence to the 
US corresponds to collective defense. The government's position is 
that providing intelligence not specifically instructing the US 
military to fight back does not pose any problems legally. 
 
A senior SDF official took this view: "There won't be enough time to 
determine whether a fired missile is headed for Japan or the United 
States unless the entire system, including the radars, miraculously 
functions 100%." 
 
The government's view that the SDF is not allowed to intercept 
US-bound missiles might hinder the defense of Japan. 
 
(8) Commentary: Reality-based discussions needed for SDF activities 
 
 
TOKYO 00002290  004 OF 007 
 
 
YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full) 
May 18, 2007 
 
Hidemichi Katsumata, senior writer 
 
The government has now set up an advisory panel, which will review 
the government's conventional way of reading and interpreting the 
Constitution over the right of collective self-defense, focusing on 
specific cases. I hope the panel will hold broad discussions 
envisioning various activities to be conducted by the Self-Defense 
Forces. 
 
The Council for Rebuilding the Legal Foundation of National 
Security, which consists of former Foreign Ministry and Defense 
Ministry officials and experts, cites four cases to be studied. 
There are problems to be cleared up in each case. 
 
Case Study 1: Is Japan allowed to intercept a ballistic missile 
aimed at the United States? 
 
The government has been taking the position that Japan's missile 
defense (MD) system will not be used to defend a third country, 
according to its statement released by Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Fukuda. The government has said Japan would not be allowed to 
intercept a ballistic missile even for the purpose of protecting the 
United States as an ally. However, the government is also aware that 
the alliance will collapse if Japan overlooks a missile headed 
toward the United States, as noted by a senior official of the 
Defense Ministry. 
 
MD is a system that Japan and the United States are developing 
together to cope with newly emerging threats, such as North Korea's 
nuclear arsenal and missile deployment. The key is in the hands of 
the United States. If not for its intelligence and technologies, 
Japan cannot shield its people. For instance, the security 
environment surrounding Japan is undergoing a sea change. MD 
necessitates collective self-defense, and Japan must be allowed to 
intercept US-bound missiles passing near Japan. 
 
Another problem is that the act of intercepting missiles is grounded 
police authority stipulated in the Police Officers Duty Performance 
Law. Under international law, a country's police authority is within 
the scope of its territorial soil, waters, and airspace only. 
International waters and outer space are outside the scope of police 
authority. It is difficult for the notion of police authority to 
account for an Aegis ship's interception of a missile flying in 
outer space at a high altitude. 
 
Why? The threat of a ballistic missile falls under the category of 
imminent violations. International law allows invoking the right of 
self-defense in such situations. However, the SDF is to act under 
the Police Officers Duty Performance Law until an order for defense 
operations is given in the event of emergencies. Accordingly, the 
panel would have to review the Self-Defense Forces Law. 
 
Case Study 2: In the event a US naval vessel comes under attack on 
the high seas when an SDF vessel is acting in concert with that US 
ship, is the SDF vessel allowed to fight back? 
 
This theme is not only in the case of US naval vessels, as seen from 
the fact that the Maritime Self-Defense Force currently deploys a 
squadron in the Indian Ocean to act in concert with multinational 
forces engaged in an antiterror campaign. 
 
TOKYO 00002290  005 OF 007 
 
 
 
Even more realistically, if and when there are illegalities like 
terrorism on the Straits of Malacca and other sealanes that are 
vital to Japan, coastal countries would form a coalition of the 
willing with Japan, the United States, Australia, and other 
countries. We want the panel to discuss what kind of legal 
interpretation and scheme will be needed in that case for the SDF to 
act in concert with the naval forces of foreign countries acting in 
the same sea area for the same purpose. 
 
One high-ranking official of the government has indicated this view: 
"If that is when an SDF vessel is running alongside a foreign 
country's naval vessel, we can't tell at once which is targeted. In 
that case, it's possible to fight back (under SDF Law Article 95) to 
protect weaponry (in legitimate self-defense)." However, it is rare 
for warships to run alongside in their operations since their 
weapons and radar detection range farther today. We want the panel 
to hold discussions to meet the realities of places where the SDF is 
actually working. 
 
Case Study 3: If a foreign country's troops come under attack when 
they are working with SDF members in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, are these SDF members allowed to rush to the scene of 
the attack and fight back? 
 
When Ground Self-Defense Force members were deployed in Iraq, they 
worked in an area covered by British and Australian forces. If GSDF 
troops were attacked, British and Australian troops would go to the 
rescue of those GSDF members as their duty. However, the GSDF is not 
allowed to rescue British and Australian troops if they were 
attacked. That is because SDF personnel engaged in international 
activities are allowed under the current law to rescue only "those 
who are under their control." 
 
Rescue activities could develop into the constitutionally prohibited 
use of armed force (i.e., combat). This is why the SDF is not 
allowed to do so. However, all countries participating in 
international cooperation recognize that their activities are United 
Nations members' responsibilities stipulated in the Charter of the 
United Nations. Even in the case where their troops have no choice 
but to use weapons, they recognize that their use of weapons in that 
case is not an act of exercising the right of self-defense as their 
sovereign right but is a sanction measure based on a UN resolution. 
The panel would have to separate this case from the right of 
collective self-defense in their discussions. 
 
Case Study 4: How far is Japan allowed to back up US and 
multinational forces? 
 
Then, what if an emergency situation breaks out in the periphery of 
Japan? In that event, Japan is to support US forces "in the rear" 
where no combat operations are conducted, as stipulated in the Law 
Concerning Measures to Ensure Japan's Peace and Security in the 
Event of Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan or the so-called 
"regional contingency security law" for short. However, Japan is not 
allowed to provide weaponry and ammunition. 
 
The government says providing weaponry and ammunition to US and 
multinational forces is tantamount to an act of exercising the right 
of collective self-defense since such could be linked to their use 
of armed force. This logic, however, can pass muster only in Japan. 
In the eyes of an adversarial country, Japan's act of providing 
logistical support-such as bases, provisions, and fuel-would appear 
 
TOKYO 00002290  006 OF 007 
 
 
to be Japan's participation in collective self-defense even though 
such rear-echelon support is not conducted in a combat area. 
 
(9) Interview on collective self-defense (Part 1): Shoichi Nakagawa 
suggests debating collective self-defense from various angles 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
May 21, 2007 
 
The government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have 
set in full motion a debate on the question of whether to allow 
Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, now a 
constitutional taboo. Based on the discussions of a blue-ribbon 
panel of hand-picked experts on whether to allow the use of that 
right, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aims to set the stage for 
constitutional revision. But opinions are divided over 
reinterpretation of that right. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun will 
interview the policy chief of each party, starting with Shoichi 
Nakagawa, who chairs the LDP's Policy Research Council. 
 
-- What do you think is the meaning of launching the discussion of 
the right to collective self-defense now? 
 
Nakagawa: "The prime minister's pet argument is to allow the 
exercise of the right to collective defense. With the collapse of 
the cold-war system, challenges facing Japan on the security front 
are changing, such the threats from terrorism, North Korea's nuclear 
weapons and its missiles. In terms of defending the security of the 
country and the people, I think it is only natural to put that right 
on the agenda for discussion. By this fall, when the panel comes up 
with a conclusion, our party, too, wants to reach our own 
conclusion." 
 
-- The panel's debate seems to center on four specific cases, such 
as whether the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) ships can guard US vessels 
if they come under attack on the high seas. 
 
Nakagawa: "Our party's special committee will discuss cases other 
than the four the government's panel plans to examine. Without any 
prejudice, we will examine what we should do and shouldn't do under 
the current Constitution in consideration of the present state of 
security. The time and the situation are changing. How to define 
terrorism? Is the right of belligerency not allowable if the enemy 
is asymmetric (or the enemy is not a state)? I think it is difficult 
to deal with these cases in line with the previous interpretation." 
 
-- There is a view that the Constitution should be amended to allow 
the exercise of the right to collective self-defense instead of just 
constitutional reinterpretation. 
 
Nakagawa: "The government should not easily reinterpret the 
Constitution in terms of the impact on diplomatic ties with other 
countries, as well as other countries' security. When it comes to 
what Japan should do for its self-defense and international 
contributions, in some cases, constitutional amendment is required. 
According to provisions in the National Referendum Law, 
constitutional revision will come in three years at the earliest. 
Until then, it is necessary to distinguish between what we can do 
within the current framework of the Constitution and what we can't 
do unless constitutional revision is made." 
 
-- Do you mean that Article 9 must be revised in the future so that 
Japan can use the right to collective defense? 
 
TOKYO 00002290  007 OF 007 
 
 
 
Nakagawa: "Aside from debate on whether Japan can recognize the 
right to collective defense, when I read Article 9 without any 
prejudice, I feel somewhat strange about it. The provision specifies 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. It leaves me under impression that even a 
self-defense war is not recognized." 
 
-- The junior coalition partner New Komeito is cautious about the 
exercise of collective defense. 
 
Nakagawa: "I don't think coalition partners always have to share the 
same views. We accommodate each party's differences regarding other 
subjects, as well. Our LDP has just begun discussion. No limitations 
are placed on debate. Various approaches are welcome." 
 
SCHIEFFER