VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1018/01 1510934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310934Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9291
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): ACHIEVING U.S. 
GOALS (AND AVOIDING IRAN) 
 
This is CWC-45-07. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  It has become increasingly apparent that 
most formal consultations at the OPCW are of marginal value 
in meeting U.S. goals and objectives, and there are much more 
productive ways of achieving progress.  On certain subjects 
(budget, Article VII), they are obviously unavoidable. 
However, consultations are usually of more value to Iran in 
attempting to stymie work at the OPCW.  There is a need to 
deal with the overarching issue of countering Iranian efforts 
to block progress, particularly at Executive Council 
sessions.  However, it appears the best way to achieve 
progress on what Washington wants is not to hold fruitless 
consultations, but to find alternative ways to get work done, 
such as through work with the Technical Secretariat, or 
prompting efforts by other States Parties.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Late Declarations: Two events this year have affected 
the perceptions of the delegation (and most other dels) on 
how to proceed with work at the OPCW.  The first was Iran's 
performance at the March EC which led to a conclusion of the 
session at 23:00 on Friday evening, with all the blame 
squarely on Iran's shoulders.  The second incident was the 
latest consultations on late declarations, where Iran 
(admittedly supported by South Africa) set work back to 
square one by asking for papers and clarifications from the 
TS.  Unfortunately, it is necessary to have some type of EC 
 
SIPDIS 
blessing on this particular issue, so it will be important to 
find some way of regaining ground in the consultation. 
However, there is a considerable risk that Iran will block 
any work in formal consultations. 
 
¶3.  (U) Article VII: Work on this topic provides a good 
example of how to get what Washington wants by focusing on 
the work of the TS, not consultations.  After continuously 
repeating the mantra that the TS needs to do substantially 
more technical assistance visits to promote full national 
implementation, the Del believes that message has sunk in. 
It is apparent that under the direction of Legal Advisor 
Onate, there has been a considerable increase in the quantity 
and quality of TS performance.  They are scheduling more 
targeted visits, and have reduced substantially the number of 
workshops and conferences.  The TS provided a lengthy report 
on its activities at the May 22 consultation (which will be 
sent back to Washington once it has been distributed by the 
TS). 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶4.  (U) Indeed, the concern in the Delegation was that 
holding the consultation would give Iran the opportunity to 
raise questions about TS activities and throw a spanner in 
the works.  Fortunately, that did not happen.  But it is a 
clear indication that consultations now generate more concern 
about how they might blow up, rather than how they can 
generate progress.  There has been significant progress 
achieved on Article VII.  To the extent that can be 
attributed to the TS, it is due to the pressure exerted by 
the U.S. and other delegations in individual discussions with 
the DG, Onate and TS staff.  It clearly is not the result of 
the consultation mechanism. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Delegation recognizes there will need to be 
consultations at various points to address key issues (report 
language, particularly on continued TS efforts).  However, 
there is every expectation that Iran will be difficult and 
uncooperative, and that the final agreement will come down to 
discussions with Iran at the EC or CSP.  If that prediction 
is correct, then there is no benefit in having numerous 
consultations before the EC/CSP, and only the detriment that 
Iran could use the discussion to disrupt TS work. 
 
¶6.  (U) Challenge Inspections: Once again, substantial 
progress has been made in improving the ability of the TS to 
conduct a challenge inspection, and this has nothing to do 
with the frequency of consultations.  The TS held a 
successful table-top exercise a few weeks ago, and Germany 
hosted a CI exercise last year, the results of which it 
shared with delegations in an informal briefing later in the 
year.  The Netherlands will host an exercise in September, 
 
and is extending an invitation to all EC members to observe. 
The current discussion is on how to utilize the event so that 
the EC can exercise its role in the CI process. 
 
¶7.  (U) All of this is achieving the U.S. goal in this area: 
improving TS capabilities to conduct a CI.  There is no 
facilitator for the CI issue, and no one could care less. 
Should a facilitator be found, it would simply lead to a 
repeat of the fruitless consultations in which Iran and 
like-minded delegations seek to resolve "unresolved issues" 
and question the TS mandate to maintain any capability to 
conduct a CI, while the U.S. and like-minded delegations 
object and ask the TS to focus on capabilities.  Delegations 
and TS staff alike agree that more harm than good tended to 
result from this particular facilitation.  While the 
performance of the last facilitator always made this an 
entertaining consultation, it certainly did not produce a 
productive result, and there is no reason that his successor 
will be able to produce one either.  Instead, the immediate 
task is to ensure that the Netherlands exercise in September 
is utilized to maximum benefit.  That will mean overcoming 
objections from Iran, Russia and other delegations.  That 
certainly will not be achieved in a consultation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) OCPF Site Selection:  This may well be the prime 
example of the need to find methods other than consultations 
to resolve an issue.  After three years of fruitless 
consultations in which it was increasingly apparent that 
diplomats are hopeless at mathematics, the U.S. asked the 
Director General to have the TS take unilateral action to 
improve an important part of the OCPF site selection 
mechanism.  Admittedly, this does not totally resolve the 
issue or meet all of Washington's objectives.  However, it is 
1) a significant improvement in the current mechanism, 2) 
supported by almost all delegations, and 3) actually 
achievable. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The TS publication of its paper on site selection 
highlights the readiness of the DG and the TS in general to 
work with the U.S. to find solutions and move things forward. 
 Admittedly, there were process problems and the TS forgot 
its pledge to consult with the delegation and Washington 
before publishing the paper.  And certainly the TS will not 
always be in sync with U.S. views on how to move forward. 
That, however, does not diminish the fact that the TS 
 
generally is supportive of efforts to move ahead on practical 
ways to make progress. 
 
¶10.  (U) Article X:  To reiterate, the delegation is not 
arguing that all consultations are fruitless.  As in most 
other cases, the question is the objective to be achieved and 
the role consultations can play in reaching that objective. 
The new facilitator (Jitka Brodska, Czech Republic) informed 
del rep that the reason she took on the facilitation was due 
to the frustration with TS performance.  In discussing her 
plans for her upcoming consultation, Brodska flatly said that 
her goal is to use the consultation mechanism to spark 
greater activity by the TS.  Whether that will require 
continued consultations remains to be seen, and ultimately, 
will depend on how the TS responds.  (Note: Brodska said she 
wanted to have discussions with the delegation on how best to 
avoid Iranian complications at her facilitation.) 
 
¶11. (U) Risk Assessment: As another example of useful 
discussions, the TS is finalizing its paper on risk 
assessment for consideration by the DG, and CSP Chair 
Ambassador Dastis (Spain) is ready to hold the third 
discussion on the topic once the paper is distributed.  The 
risk assessment issue provides a good example of when an item 
on the OPCW calendar is truly useful: several key delegations 
(China, Mexico, etc.) had expressed great concern on this 
matter last year, and it is essential that there be a 
thorough discussion of this topic before engaging on the 2008 
budget consultations.  However, the effectiveness of the 
efforts by the DG and Dastis has nothing to do with frequency 
of meetings.  Instead, the key is to give the TS sufficient 
time to come up with solid answers and analysis for 
delegations. 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment: The point which is being emphasized is 
that the OPCW calendar of events is not/not the best gauge of 
whether U.S. goals and objectives are being met at the OPCW. 
The test should simply be whether the desired outcomes are 
being achieved.  In many cases, that can be accomplished by 
working with the TS and spurring them to action.  In other 
cases, it can be by working with other delegations to 
encourage them to take the initiative.  Consultations are 
sometimes unavoidable and may or may not be helpful for the 
U.S.  However, in view of the obstructionist Iranian behavior 
at the OPCW, the calculus on consultations is simple: do they 
provide more opportunities to assist the U.S., or provide 
more opportunities for Iran? 
 
¶13.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL