VZCZCXRO3343
OO RUEHBZ
DE RUEHC #0478/01 1430052
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230044Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 5939
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7380

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 070478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC LE PREL PTER
SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE:  URGE SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
 
REF: A. USUN 384 
 
     ¶B. USUN 393 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  Department instructs 
Ambassadors (or Chiefs of Mission) to seek urgent meetings 
with host governments at the highest level possible to press 
for support for immediate UN Security Council action to 
establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  The P-3 shared 
the draft resolution text with all Security Council members 
last week.  Except for Belgium and Slovakia, other Council 
members raised a number of questions/concerns (Refs A and B). 
 Posts should draw from the material in paras 4-13 below to 
address these concerns and confirm support.  Demarche may be 
delivered by phone and must be delivered within 24 hours of 
receipt in order to permit UNSC action by May 25.  Demarche 
may be delivered in conjunction with French and British 
counterparts, if appropriate.  End Summary and Action Request. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  OBJECTIVES:  Department requests Embassies pursue 
the following objectives: 
 
-- For Embassies Paris, London, Brussels, and Bratislava: 
Inform host government that we are making this demarche, 
express appreciation for its support of the resolution, and 
ask host government to engage with other UNSC members to urge 
UNSC support of the resolution. 
 
-- For all other posts:  Urge host government to instruct its 
mission to the UN to support the P-3 draft resolution on the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon when it is formally tabled in 
the Security Council, which could happen as early as May 23, 
and to support a UNSC vote on the resolution this week. 
 
--   Note that, as UN Legal Advisor Michel reported to the 
Security Council, all parties in Lebanon support in 
principle the establishment of the Tribunal.  Express our 
full appreciation of the importance of respecting the 
internal processes of member states, but stress that this is 
a case where the subversion of that process - through 
terrorism and other threats of violence - is itself the heart 
of the problem. 
 
--  Underscore the importance of the Tribunal for the future 
stability of Lebanon.  Stress Prime Minister Siniora,s 
conclusion last week that "Lebanon cannot sustain the failure 
to establish a tribunal."  Note that the only way to stop 
future political assassinations is for those responsible to 
be held accountable.  Emphasize that the international 
community must help ensure that there is no impunity for 
political assassinations. 
 
--  Emphasize that the Tribunal must be established soon for 
operational reasons and in the interest of justice and 
stability.  It would take at least a year for the Tribunal to 
become operational. 
 
¶3.  REPORTING DEADLINE:  Embassy should report results of 
demarche to IO/UNP: Anneliese Reinemeyer before May 24. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, led to widespread 
protests and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 
April 2005.  At the GOL's request, the UN established the UN 
Independent International Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) 
and has worked with the Lebanese Justice Minister and other 
Lebanese officials to negotiate the Tribunal statute. 
Approval of the Tribunal has become a key element in the 
current political tension in Beirut, which pits PM Siniora 
and his March 14 allies (the Saad Hariri faction) against the 
pro-Syrian Hizballah-Aounist Alliance. (Note:  March 14 
commands a majority in the Parliament where the 
Hizballah-Aounist alliance represents a minority.  End note.) 
 The UN and the Lebanese Cabinet have approved the Tribunal 
Agreement and Statute; however, Hizballah and Syrian 
sympathizers have prevented the Parliament from convening to 
ratify the Agreement in an attempt to leverage this issue to 
gain a blocking minority in the Lebanese Cabinet. 
 
¶5.  (U)  The Lebanese Parliament, which was scheduled to 
reconvene its regular session on March 20, has still not 
 
STATE 00070478  002 OF 004 
 
 
met.  A majority of the Lebanese Parliamentarians have 
documented more than once their intent to ratify the 
Tribunal, if only the Speaker of Parliament would allow them 
to convene.  These members of the parliamentary majority, who 
took office after free and fair elections monitored by 
international observers, have actively sought Security 
Council assistance to establish the Tribunal.  The P-3 have 
drafted a resolution that keeps the substance of the 
Statute/Agreement as negotiated by the Government of Lebanon 
and the UN in place.  The P-3 plan to table this resolution 
as early as May 23 for a vote later this week. 
 
¶6.  (U)  In expert level meetings in New York, UNSC 
delegations have raised a number of concerns (refs a and b). 
Posts may respond to these specific issues drawing on the 
points in paras 7-14 below.  Posts may leave these points 
with the host government as a non-paper. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  WILL COUNCIL ACTION UNDERMINE LEBANESE 
SOVEREIGNTY?  The United States continues to fully support 
the immediate establishment of the Special Tribunal to try 
those responsible for perpetrating the terrorist attack that 
killed Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.  We believe the 
establishment of the Tribunal is necessary to see that 
justice is done.  The Tribunal will serve as a deterrent to 
those who in the future might be tempted to engage in similar 
violent crimes intended to undermine Lebanon's democracy, 
sovereignty and independence.  While we would prefer Lebanese 
parliamentary approval, this is no longer a realistic option. 
 
 
Although established by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII, the Tribunal will retain all the key Lebanese 
Components.  Lebanon will continue to have a role in choosing 
judges and the Lebanese deputy prosecutor and in consulting 
with the UN on a Headquarters Agreement.  Additionally, the 
Tribunal will work in accordance with Lebanese law.  A 
Chapter VII Tribunal will strengthen sovereignty by working 
integrally with Lebanon to see that justice is done. 
 
This is a case where international pressure can help free a 
country from internal and external threats to its 
sovereignty.  Lebanon,s sovereignty is imperiled when 
political leaders, journalists, and citizens are targeted for 
assassination because of their political views. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  WHY NOW? 
 
-- First, the Lebanese people,s right to justice should be 
neither denied nor delayed.  The Tribunal will demonstrate 
that there is no impunity for politically-motivated violence 
and thereby deter further violence.  In the current highly 
volatile political situation in Lebanon, all political 
leaders, journalists, and citizens must feel free to express 
their views without threats or fear of assassination.  The 
need for this freedom of expression is even more urgent as 
Lebanon approaches its fall Presidential elections.  Without 
the Tribunal and the assurance of justice, all political 
leaders may fear they are vulnerable. 
 
-- Second, the Tribunal must be established soon for 
operational reasons, since it will take at least a year for 
the Tribunal to become operational. 
 
-- Third, the unresolved question of the Tribunal has 
prevented Parliament from addressing the other important 
political issues facing Lebanon, including economic reform, a 
new electoral law, and the disarmament of militias. 
Parliament will not convene until the issue of the Tribunal 
is resolved by the Security Council. 
 
-- Fourth, Prime Minister Siniora has requested urgent UNSC 
action on this issue to bolster his democratically-elected 
government against attempts by parties in Lebanon and the 
region to undermine its authority. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  ARE THERE OTHER OPTIONS?  While Parliamentary 
ratification would have been far preferable, the ratification 
process is definitively blocked.  The opposition refused to 
discuss specific concerns about the Statute with UN Legal 
Advisor Nicolas Michel and continues to use the Tribunal as 
leverage in its negotiations with the government to gain a 
blocking minority in the Cabinet.  The Lebanese domestic 
courts are unable to take on sensitive political prosecutions 
because of the high-risk security situation.  The only 
realistic option for justice is for the Security Council to 
act on the request of the democratically-elected Government 
of Lebanon and take a &binding8 decision to bring the 
Tribunal Agreement into force. 
 
STATE 00070478  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
-- (IF ASKED ONLY) WHAT ABOUT THE ICC?  The International 
Criminal Court is not an appropriate venue for the 
prosecution of those responsible for the Hariri 
assassination, a terrorist action that violated Lebanese law. 
 The ICC prosecutes war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide, which are offenses within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.   A referral to the ICC would also be inconsistent with 
respect for Lebanese sovereignty; Lebanon itself should have 
the lead in the prosecution of those responsible for 
terrorist acts on its soil. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  WILL COUNCIL ACTION LEAD TO INSTABILITY? 
 
-- Lebanon already suffers from a high level of instability 
resulting from the threat of violence from Lebanon,s armed 
militias and their foreign sponsors, who use this threat to 
control Lebanon,s internal political dialogue.  We have no 
information that the clashes between the Lebanese Armed 
Forces and Fatah al-Islam are connected to the issue of 
Security Council Action to establish the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. The establishment of the Tribunal, with its promise 
of ending impunity, will increase stability by deterring 
politically-motivated violence and permitting Lebanese 
leaders to address the serious, underlying political issues 
facing Lebanon. 
 
-- As Prime Minister Siniora said last week:  "Lebanon cannot 
sustain the failure to establish a tribunal. It touches the 
heart and essence of fundamental justice in the country and 
will lead to the continued obsession with assassinations; it 
will be a sword hanging over the necks of the Lebanese."  (Ya 
Libnan, 05/17/2007) 
 
-- Now that the Tribunal has been referred to the UNSC, all 
parties in Lebanon and the region consider it a fait accompli 
and are not likely to respond violently. 
 
-- As long as there is impunity for politically-motivated 
violence, the Lebanese Cabinet, the Lebanese Parliament, 
journalists, the Lebanese people and UNIFIL are all at risk. 
Lebanon can only have a secure future when the killers know 
they will be held accountable for their actions. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  WHY SHOULD THE COUNCIL PICK SIDES IN AN INTERNAL 
DISPUTE?  WHY SHOULD THE COUNCIL LISTEN TO PRIME MINISTER 
SINIORA RATHER THAN PRESIDENT LAHOUD - BOTH HAVE SENT 
LETTERS?  The establishment of the Tribunal is not a partisan 
political issue, it is an issue of justice.  The Council is 
not picking sides ) all political sides in Lebanon have 
professed their support for the Tribunal in principle. 
Unfortunately, the opposition in Lebanon is attempting to 
leverage the universal support for the Tribunal for their 
political gain in an unrelated political issue.  By linking 
the Tribunal to its demand for a blocking minority in the 
Cabinet, the opposition has politicized the Lebanese people's 
desire for justice.  Council action to establish the Tribunal 
will depoliticize the Tribunal and the search for justice. 
 
President Lahoud's letter does not argue against the 
Tribunal; rather he argues against Prime Minister Siniora's 
request for Council action to establish the Tribunal. 
President Lahoud has indicated on many occasions that he 
supports the Tribunal; in fact, the full Lebanese Cabinet, 
with President Lahoud presiding, authorized Lebanese judges 
to negotiate the Tribunal Agreement and Statute with the 
Secretariat.  Despite this history of support, President 
 
SIPDIS 
Lahoud refused to sign the Tribunal Agreement following 
approval by the Cabinet. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR 'BRINGING AN 
AGREEMENT INTO FORCE'?  CAN THE UNSC NOW RATIFY AGREEMENTS 
FOR COUNTRIES THAT HAVE FAILED TO DO SO THEMSELVES?  (Note: 
Posts are encouraged to deflect this question and 
rely on the political arguments found elsewhere in this 
cable.  However, if necessary, posts can draw from the 
following points.  End note.) 
 
--  We understand your concerns about having the UN Security 
Council decide that a state shall be a party to 
an international agreement to which it has formally decided 
not to become a party.  But there is an important 
distinction between the Security Council taking action that 
would impose obligations on a state, on the one hand, 
and the UNSC taking action that would require a state to 
become a party to a particular treaty, on the other hand. 
 
-- There are in fact numerous examples of the former in 
Council practice.  For instance: 
 
STATE 00070478  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
-- In UNSC resolution 1593, the Security Council decided that 
the Government of Sudan "shall fully cooperate with and 
provide any necessary assistance" to the ICC, even though 
Sudan was not a party to the Rome Statute creating the ICC. 
Thus, the Council imposed these substantive obligations that 
a party would have under the Rome Statute, even though Sudan 
was not a party and had not consented to the Rome Statute. 
 
-- In UNSC resolution 1737, the Council called upon Iran to 
ratify the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, but did not 
require Iran to become a party to that agreement.  At the 
same time, the Council required Iran to provide the same kind 
of access and cooperation with the IAEA that it would have 
had to provide if it were a party to the agreement. 
 
-- In this case, the proposed resolution would decide that 
the "provisions" of the Agreement would enter into force, 
with the effect that Lebanon would be required to comply with 
them.  Lebanon would be required to take the actions 
described by the provisions of the resolution, but the 
resolution would not say that Lebanon had agreed or consented 
to the Tribunal Agreement. 
 
-- This is especially appropriate in a case like this, where 
Lebanon has been involved and supported the process 
from the outset, where (as verified by UN Legal Advisor 
Michel) all parties in Lebanon support in principle the 
establishment of the Tribunal, and where the inability of the 
Lebanese Parliament to act results from threats of 
further violence and terrorism.  We understand fully the 
importance of respecting the internal processes of member 
states, but this is a case where the subversion of that 
process - through terrorism and other threats of violence 
- is itself the heart of the problem. 
 
13:  (U)  DOES CHAPTER VII HAVE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS?  This 
resolution would do no more than make the provisions 
of the Agreement legally binding, just as if the Lebanese 
Parliament had approved it.  There were no implications that 
foreign militaries would intervene to enforce the agreement 
if the Lebanese Parliament had approved it, and there would 
be none under this resolution. 
 
¶14.  (U)  POINT OF CONTACT:  Please contact IO/UNP: 
Anneliese Reinemeyer at (202) 647-0046 or via e-mail for 
further background information or with questions. 
RICE