VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0916 1250005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041751Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 060916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY 
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY 
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID 
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND  THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: CANADA 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 000845 
 
¶1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political 
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal 
(coordinated by the NSC with strong U.S. interagency support) 
to expand and extend the G8 Global Partnership Against 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) 
for another 10 years (2022)/$20 billion (U.S. 
$10 billion; other GP donors $10 billion) to 
address new and emerging global WMD threats. 
This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27 
Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the 
April 23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting 
(GPWG) (reftel).  All GP members recognize the 
evolving global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
threat, but most have been resistant to our 
proposal ) largely due to worries about cost 
and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts 
in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
Canada and the UK are the most supportive. Russia 
poses the strongest opposition and has expressed 
that the original Kananaskis priorities must be 
completed before moving forward.  Germany has 
expressed similar concerns.  Therefore the U.S. 
is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8 
partners on this proposal, emphasizing that 
this commitment will help address critical 
global proliferation challenges, including 
the requirements of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative), 
and other G8 priorities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 
2002 to address the spread of WMD, and now 
includes the G8 plus 13 additional donor 
nations and the EU.  2007 marks the halfway 
point for the Global Partnership,s initial 
10-year, $20 billion commitment.  GP donor 
pledges to date come in at over $17 billion 
(including $10 billion from the U.S.), plus 
an additional $6 billion from Russia. The 
current GP scope addresses WMD threats only 
within Russia and other former Soviet states 
(the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations 
as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and 
Ukraine are officially recognized as recipient 
states by the entire Partnership).  The 
Kananaskis document anticipated an expansion 
by mandating that GP programs begin 
&initially in Russia8 but not be limited 
to Russia. In the context of the G8, the 
GP is handled by the GPWG, which reports 
to the Nonproliferation Directors Group 
(NPDG).  The GP is a unique model of multilateral 
cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats and 
has made great progress in its first five years to 
reduce the proliferation threat, including 
chemical weapons destruction; redirection of 
former WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; 
improving security for fissile nuclear materials, 
chemical weapons stocks and biological agents; 
and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear 
submarines. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend 
the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD 
threats includes four components: 1) Immediate 
expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia 
and the former Soviet Union (to include the 
broadest possible participation of new recipient 
states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of 
broadest possible functional scope to include 
all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 
and missile threats; 3) Extension of time 
commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022); 
and 4) Increased financial commitment of an 
additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with the 
same parameters as original commitment (U.S. 
$10 billion; $10 billion from other donors). 
The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement 
at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the 
G8 committed to coordinate activities to 
reduce the global WMD threat through the GP. 
Note that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably 
Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis 
Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was 
formed, already include a broad interpretation 
of threats (chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly 
argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important 
priorities of chemical weapons destruction and 
nuclear submarine dismantlement. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) After working this proposal at the 
level of the GPWG and Political Directors, 
the U.S. has gained strong support from Canada 
and the UK and more modest support from Japan 
and France for the first two objectives (geographic 
and programmatic expansion), with limited to no 
support for the 10-year extension and additional 
financial commitments at this time.  Russia objects 
to the entire proposal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
CANADIAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Canada has been a strong supporter 
of the U.S. proposal with particularly avid 
interest in the need to geographically and 
programmatically expand the GP to combat new 
and emerging global WMD threats.  However, 
Canada has stopped short of being able to 
specifically endorse new financial commitments 
and the 10-year expansion at this time.  The 
Canadian Political Director (Colleen Swords) 
sent a letter expressing strong support for 
the first two pieces of our proposal, with a 
preference to continue to work on the financial 
commitment and timeline for extension over the 
course of the next few years.  Nonetheless, in 
the April 23 GPWG meeting, Canada was outspoken 
in its support for our proposals, focusing on 
the need to expand the Partnership worldwide 
and carefully not showing their inability to 
make the political commitment on new funds. 
Continued outreach on the proposal might help 
bring Canada around in their support for the 
entire proposal, and can only serve to strengthen 
their resolve to push hard with other G8 nations 
for geographic and programmatic expansion. 
 
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to 
reach out, at the highest appropriate level, to 
Canada to thank them for their outstanding 
support for geographic and programmatic expansion 
of the GP and press for support for the entire 
proposal as part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, 
statement.  The Draft G8 Leaders' language 
proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the 
Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in 
the points below) will follow as an attachment 
by email to Post. 
 
Recommended talking points are included in Para 8. 
 
¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE: 
 
--We have greatly appreciated Canada,s strong support 
for our proposal to expand the Global Partnership to 
combat new and emerging global WMD threats.  Your 
support in the GPWG and through your Political 
Director and Sherpa has been critical. 
 
--We now have Japan and France expressing interest 
in the geographic expansion, but Germany is still 
cool to the proposal.  We seek your continued strong 
support at the highest possible levels to garner 
stronger support from Germany, to maintain the 
support we have from Japan and France, and to 
press the Italians to come around. 
 
--We are also reaching out to Russia in hopes that 
they can come to the table with us as a partner in 
a geographic expansion and time extension of the GP 
) especially given Russia,s solid support for joint 
initiatives to combat WMD worldwide, such as the 
Global Initiative and United Nations Security 
Resolution 1540. 
 
--However, without new funding commitments to the GP 
to go along with the geographic expansion, Russia,s 
support will be more difficult, and global 
programming will take more time. 
 
--We recognize that the funding commitment is the most 
difficult part of the proposal, but we hope that you 
will be able to join us in supporting the full proposal, 
including the financial commitment and 10-year extension. 
 
--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate 
activities to reduce the global WMD threat through 
the GP.  It is time now to take the next step to 
continue and expand the GP. 
 
--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10 
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that Canada and 
other GP donors can also be able to match this. 
 
--We greatly appreciate Canada,s continued strong 
support for geographic and programmatic expansion, 
and we hope that you will continue to consider the 
financial commitment and time extension. 
 
--Can we count on you to strongly endorse this as 
an integral part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, 
statement? 
 
--If possible, Canadian outreach to Germany and 
other G8 nations to support inclusion of this 
language in Nonproliferation Leaders statement 
and GP Midpoint Review document would be 
especially helpful. 
 
END POINTS 
 
¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this 
action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), 
NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen 
Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, 
Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans), E (John Duncan and 
Benedict Wolf), P (Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and 
Jim Timbie), S/P (Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, 
Lisa Benthien), DoD/NNSA (Joyce Connery and Gerald Stacey) 
and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, 
Andy Weber). 
RICE