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DE RUEHC #0637 1242255
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P 041750Z MAY 07
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UNCLAS STATE 060637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS - NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY 
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY 
OSD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID 
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL  TO EXPAND AND 
 
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: GERMANY 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 000845 
 
¶1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political 
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal 
(coordinated through NSC with strong 
interagency support) to expand and extend the G8 
Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction (GP) for another 10 years 
(2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other 
GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging 
global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. 
This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27 
Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April 
23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG) 
(reftel).  All GP members recognize the evolving 
global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to 
our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost 
and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in 
Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU).  Canada 
and the UK are the most supportive.  Russia poses the 
strongest opposition and has expressed that the 
original Kananaskis priorities must be completed 
before moving forward.  Germany has expressed 
similar concerns.  Therefore the U.S. is increasing 
senior diplomatic outreach to G8 partners on this 
proposal, emphasizing that this commitment will help 
address critical global proliferation challenges, 
including the requirements of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative), 
and other G8 priorities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002 
to address the spread of WMD, and now includes 
the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the 
EU.  2007 marks the halfway point for the Global 
Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion 
commitment.  GP donor pledges to date come 
in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion 
from the U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion 
from Russia, which was not included in the initial 
$20 billion commitment. The current GP scope 
addresses WMD threats only within Russia and 
other former Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes 
all former Soviet nations as GP recipients, but 
so far only Russia and Ukraine are officially 
recognized as recipient states by the entire 
Partnership).  The Kananaskis document anticipated 
an expansion by mandating that GP programs begin 
&initially in Russia8 but not be limited to 
Russia. In the context of the G8, the GP is 
handled by the GPWG, which reports to the 
Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG). 
The GP is a unique model of multilateral 
cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats 
and has made great progress in its first five 
years to reduce the proliferation threat, 
including chemical weapons destruction; redirection 
of former WMD scientists, technicians and 
engineers; improving security for fissile 
nuclear materials, chemical weapons stocks 
and biological agents; and dismantlement 
of decommissioned nuclear submarines. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend 
the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD 
threats includes four components: 1) Immediate 
expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia 
and the former Soviet Union (to include the 
broadest possible participation of new recipient 
states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of 
broadest possible functional scope to include 
all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 
and missile threats; 3) Extension of time 
commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022); 
and 4) Increased financial commitment of an 
additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with the 
same parameters as original commitment (U.S. 
$10 billion; $10 billion from other donors). 
The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at 
the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8 
committed to coordinate activities to reduce 
the global WMD threat through the GP.  Note 
that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably 
Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis 
Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was 
formed, already include a broad interpretation 
of threats (chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly 
argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important 
priorities of chemical weapons destruction and 
nuclear submarine dismantlement. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) After working this proposal at the 
level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the 
U.S. has gained some support from most G8 members 
for the first two objectives (geographic and 
programmatic expansion), with limited to no 
support for the 10-year extension and additional 
financial contribution at this time.  Russia 
objects to the entire proposal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
GERMANY POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND 
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Germany has virtually ignored the 
proposal in every nonproliferation or 
GP-related statement they have drafted 
for the G8 Leaders to date, despite several 
months of discussion on this topic in the 
GPWG.  During the April 23 GPWG, German 
MFA expressed appreciation for our 
proposal, but did not agree to include our 
language in their draft GP five-year midpoint 
review document, which is a Summit deliverable. 
Germany specifically stated that the proposal 
can/should only be considered at the highest 
levels and did not support the U.S. assertion 
that the GP has the responsibility to recommend 
its views on the future of the GP to G8 Leaders 
(emphasizing their view that the GP cannot 
&decide8 such things).  In particular, the 
Germans seem most concerned with the additional 
financial support requested and the inclusion 
of the broadest possible number of potential GP 
recipients upon geographic expansion, rather 
than the current formal approach to GP accession, 
which (largely by Russian design) has hampered 
the GP,s ability to expand even within the FSU. 
 
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to 
reach out, at the highest appropriate level, 
to Germany to garner support for this proposal. 
The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the 
U.S. for inclusion in the Nonproliferation 
statement (as mentioned in the points below) 
will follow as an attachment by email to Post. 
 
Recommended talking points are included in Para 8. 
 
¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND 
APPROPRIATE: 
 
--We remain committed to meeting or exceeding the 
Global Partnership goals laid out at Kananaskis, 
completing the priority tasks in Russia and the 
former Soviet states. 
 
--In addition to our current commitments, the 
global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving, 
and our collective peace and security depends on 
our response and leadership.  Therefore, we must 
act immediately and provide that leadership to 
address the threats that all our nations face. 
 
--Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s 
future within the Global Partnership Working Group 
and general support for the ideas we are proposing, 
our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not 
reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s 
midpoint five-year review document (or the NPDG,s 
broader nonproliferation statement). 
 
--We understand that the financial commitment we 
are asking for - another $10 billion from other 
GP donors - is substantial.  We recognize that it 
will not be easy and will take time for many GP 
members to develop mechanisms to fund projects 
to combat the global threat. 
 
--This is precisely why we must act now to begin 
the expansion and extension process.  The 
global threat we face is too important to 
delay, and we have a chance to 
show important leadership. 
 
--All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation, 
including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on 
halting the spread of WMD, related materials and 
delivery systems after the Kananaskis documents' 
terms expire in 2012. 
 
--The original Kananaskis document stated a vision 
for the future, and we are asking Leaders 
to reaffirm a commitment for a vision of the future 
beyond 2012. 
 
--Global security demands that we help to 
eliminate chemical weapons worldwide, reduce 
dangerous nuclear, radiological, chemical, 
and biological materials, and secure those 
which remain.  In doing so, we will greatly 
reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation 
and terrorism.  Even as we do so, we will 
also facilitate access worldwide to the economic 
and social benefits of the peaceful use of 
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological 
materials. 
 
----We have also committed to help the nations of the 
world implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation 
prevention around the world.  Expansion and 
extension of the GP would provide us with a 
way to help fill these gaps. 
 
--The GP has been successful and effective despite 
numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which 
have been overcome.  The Partnership works without 
any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and 
is a positive model of cooperation for combating 
global proliferation threats.  This makes the GP 
an effective mechanism for providing assistance to 
reduce global proliferation threats, including by 
meeting our 1540 obligations in addition to other 
critical G8 commitments, such as the Global Initiative. 
 
--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate 
activities to reduce the global WMD threat through 
the GP.  It is time now to take the next step to 
continue and expand the GP. 
 
--We have drafted Leaders, language for your 
consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation 
statement and we hope you will support us. 
 
--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional 
$10 billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP 
donors will also be able agree to contribute in total 
an additional $10 billion. 
 
IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE 
CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT 
STATES: 
 
--We feel that the current mechanism for admitting 
new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not 
serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat. 
Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only 
allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to 
formally benefit from the GP. 
 
--When countries ask us for assistance in combating 
terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an 
important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting 
for a formal process before we act. 
 
--Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest 
possible participation of states when the geographic 
scope of the GP is expanded. 
 
END POINTS 
 
¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this 
action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), 
NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen 
Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, 
Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans), E (John Duncan and 
Benedict Wolf), P (Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and 
Jim Timbie), S/P (Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, 
Lisa Benthien), DoE/NNSA (Joyce Connery and Gerald Stacey), 
and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber). 
RICE