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Viewing cable 07PANAMA782, PANAMA: CONCERNED ABOUT VENEZUELA DEVELOPMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PANAMA782 2007-05-14 20:19 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0782/01 1342019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 142019Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0367
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2577
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1125
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3542
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0271
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/AND (MARK WELLS) AND WHA/CEN (ELIA TELLO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM MASS ECON PTER SOCI ELAB IR PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA:  CONCERNED ABOUT VENEZUELA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 61378 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS BRIAN NARANJO.  REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) With uncharacteristic candor, Panamanian MFA DG for 
International Affairs Javier Bonagas expressed Panama's 
concerns with Venezuela's increasing activity with Iran, its 
unconstructive behavior in the hemisphere, and troublesome 
meddling in Panama.  Bonagas shared these views with POLCOUNS 
during post's May 14 presentation of reftel demarche. 
Panamanian President Bonagas would likely visit Caracas on 
May 23, Bonagas said, to discourage Chavez's attendance at 
the June 2-5 Organization of American States General Assembly 
(OASGA) that Panama would host.  Concerned about Venezuelan 
meddling in Panamanian radical leftist politics, Bonagas 
noted that Panama was withholding agrement for Venezuela's 
proposed new ambassador.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Panama Concerned About Growing Iran-Venezuela Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Panamanian MFA DG for International Affairs Javier 
Bonagas thanked POLCOUNS on May 14 for the exhaustive 
demarche (reftel) regarding the growing Iran-Venezuela 
relationship and asked that the U.S. continue to share 
information regarding Venezuela's international activities as 
well as domestic developments.  Noting that Panama continued 
to seek to maintain a channel of communication with 
Venezuela, Bonagas noted that the topics of discussion in 
this channel were "dead matters" and increasingly this 
channel was "more and more closed."  Bonagas acknowledged 
that increasingly dialogue with Venezuela was a "conversation 
of the deaf" and that Venezuela was increasingly "autistic." 
Bonagas took careful notes throughout the demarche 
presentation.  Regarding economic ties between Iran and 
Venezuela, Bonagas commented that, as Panama itself has 
experienced, Venezuela promised much and delivered little. 
He expressed particular concern about Venezuela's transfer of 
F-5 engines to Iran without proper authorization and the 
prospect that Venezuela, in part due to its weak control over 
identity documents, could serve as a platform for extremist 
terrorists to operate in the Western Hemisphere.  Finally, 
with respect to the recently established air links between 
Caracas and Teheran, Bonagas asked if the U.S. had specific 
information that Iran was either importing weapons and 
sensitive equipment to Iran via Venezuela or that Iran was 
introducing such materials to Venezuela. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Handling the "Chavez" Problem at OASGA 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Noting that Panama would soon host the OASGA and 
chaired the OAS counter-terrrorism body (CICTE), Bonagas said 
that Panama was experiencing first hand the unconstructive 
impact that Chavez had in the hemisphere.  Bonagas said 
Panama had been shocked when Venezuela recently rejected the 
CICTE declaration, adopted in Panama, regarding 
infrastructure security.  While reservations on particular 
aspects was one thing, complete rejection of the text in the 
OAS, an organization that highly valued consensus, was 
unheard of.  Also, Bonagas complained that Venezuela was 
behaving in a "highly polemical manner" with respect to the 
OASGA, the theme of which would be energy for development. 
Venezuela opposed discussion of alternative fuels such as 
ethanol, would only discuss the role of hydrocarbons, and 
viewed discuss of alternative fuels as a threat to Venezuela. 
 
4.  (C) In an effort to head off a visit by Chavez to the 
OASGA, Panamanian President Torrijos would visit Caracas on 
May 23, making a stop-over en route to Rio de Janiero.  Also, 
Panama was putting out the word that Colombian President 
Uribe was the sole head of state to attend an OASGA-related 
event, the Private Sector Forum.  Bonagas explained that this 
forum was not a formal OAS event, Uribe would only attend the 
forum since Colombia would host the next Private Sector Forum 
on the margins of the 2008 OASGA it would host, and Uribe was 
following the precedent of Torrijos who had attended the last 
Private Sector Forum held on the margin's of the 2006 OASGA. 
In addition to dissuading Chavez from attending, Panama was 
also trying to discourage Mexican President Calderon from 
attending as well in an effort to keep this year's OASGA a 
ministerial-level event. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Withholding Agrement for Venezuelan Ambassador-designee 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
5.  (C)  Bonagas explained that Panama had been withholding 
granting agrement for Venezuela's proposed new ambassador, 
Jorge Luis Duran Centeno, out of concern that Venezuela 
intended to deepen its relationship with Panamanian radical 
leftist organizations, such as the National Front for the 
Defense of Social Security (FRENADESSO).  (Note:  Duran is 
currently Panama's Consul General in Sao Paolo, Brazil.) 
Increasingly, Venezuela was becoming upset with Panama's 
delay in responding to its request for agrement.  Working 
with FRENADESSO, Bonagas commented, Venezuela had sponsored a 
Bolivarian Congress over the weekend of May 12-13 in Cocle 
province. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) While increasingly uncomfortable with developments in 
chavista Venezuela, Panama is unlikely to do anything that 
would openly put Panama at odds with Venezuela.  Driven by 
its desire to seek good relations with all nations that seek 
good relations with it, Panama will continue to hold itself 
out as a "valid interlocutor" for Chavez though it 
increasingly understands the difficulty in maintaining a 
meaningful dialogue with a mercurial Chavez who listens less 
and less to his neighbors.  Panama does, however, understand 
that Chavez is a liability that needs to be carefully managed 
lest he over turn the apple cart on things that matter most 
to Panama, such as hosting a successful OASGA. 
EATON